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Summary
In this PhD we analyse some topics about food-retail pricing behaviour from the
point of view of the empirical industrial organisation. Large UK supermarkets chains
are actively involved in quality discrimination; they offer three quality variants for
most of the products they sell. These quality variants are from higher to lower qual-
ity: branded products, high quality own brand products and low quality own brands.
Hence, the first two empirical chapters of this PhD are aimed at studying the impli-
cations of the supermarkets chains multiquality nature over supermarkets patterns of
price competition. The first of these chapters compares the pattern of price dispersion
and price competition for each quality variant. In the second of them we build an
econometric model that allows to take into account the effects of competition over the
price setting for each quality variant of: different quality variants sold at the same
supermarkets, and variants of the same and different quality sold at different super-
markets. The results of these two chapters suggest that competition is less intense for
the quality variant with greater possibilities of supermarket product differentiation,
the high quality own brand products. The joint consideration of this softer price com-
petition and the higher market share of this quality variant in UK food retailing (if
compared with continental food retailing) offers a new explanation for the high profits
enjoyed by the UK supermarkets in comparison with their continental counterparts.
Claims for antitrust actions against low-price guarantees have been quite common in
the USA for some time now. In the UK, the report "Competition in Retailing" written
by London Economics for the Office of Fair Trade recognises the anticompetitive effects
of low-price guarantees. However, the analysis of Tesco 's Unbeatable Value low-price
guarantee did not detect any anticompetitive effect. Tesco 's Unbeatable value triggered
a process of reduction of the prices of the products included in the guarantee. Further
analysis of the data and the consideration of the supermarket as a multiproduct firm
lead us to analyse the possible relationship between this low-price guarantee and a loss-
leaders strategy. Our analysis seriously advises to reconsider the effects of low-price
guarantees when the firms offering them are multiproduct firms.
• Large UK supermarket chains face not only the competiticin of other supermarkets
but also the competition of discounters. Whereas large UK supermarkets chains of-
fer a homogeneous level of service quality, the level of service quality offered by the
discounters is manifestly lower. We propose a model controlling both for locational
asymmetries and service quality differentials to analyse the ability of service quality as
a market segmentation tool. Also with the aim of analysing this segmentation ability,
we study the differential effects of Tesco 's Low Price Guarantee over a supermarket
and a discounter store affected by it. The results of these two analysis confirm the abil-
ity of service quality differentials to segment the market and advice the consideration
of supermarkets and discounters as forming part of two different relevant markets.
All the empirical analysis is carried out using a panel of prices that were collected
in three supermarkets and a discounter in the south area of Coventry.
Aknowlegments
First of all I have to thank my father and my mother, as since I was a child they
have supported me in any new project I started and this is probably one of the most
important ones. Always with my mother in mind, I would like to make a special
mention for my father; I am sure that he would have followed closely my work for this
dissertation but life did not allow him to see even its start. Also my brothers and sisters
deserve my thank, they know that without them it would not have been possible to
stay in Warwick for so long.
My two supervisors Michael Waterson and Morten Hviid have helped and supported
me all along these years. They were there whenever I needed them and I would like to
give them my most sincere recognition.
The FundaciOn Ram& Areces in Spain through their programme for "Further Stud-
ies Abroad" provided the economic support while staying at Warwick. They made my
PhD possible and I would like to encourage them to continue with this priceless task.
From reading time after time the first version of my papers to standing my bad
moods when things were not going so right, Alessandra Ferrari has been constant help
and support for me during this PhD years. I am grateful for her help.
Finally, I would like to thank all my Warwick friends, Jose Antonio Martinez Serrano
and people from FundaciOn Empresa Pdblica in Spain for their continuous support
along these years.
Declaration of the Author
No material contained in this thesis has been previously published. I declare that
this thesis has not been submitted for a degree in another university.
Contents
1 Introduction	 4
2 Food Retailing in the UK	 10
2.1 Market structure characteristics and evolution 
	
 10
2.1.1 The structure 	
 10
2.1.2 The reasons 	  1.3
2.1.3 The trends 	  16
2.1.4 Legal and institutional interventions 	  17
2.1.5 Effects on the consumers 	
 18
2.2 Branded Products vs. Own-Brand Products 	
 19
2.2.1 Vertical characterization of the quality variants in the UK large
supermarkets chains 	
 20
2.2.2 Some effects of the own-brand product phenomenon 	
 22
2.2.3 The manufacturers 	
 23
2.3 Manufacturer-large supermarket chains bargaining: retailers buying power 24
2.3.1 Evidence of retailing buying power 	 •	 25
2.4 Other food retailers 	
 27
3 Survey	 30
3.1 Introduction 	
 30
3.2 Price competition and product differentiation: single product firms
	 31
3.2.1 Two-dimensional models of product differentiation
	
 36
3.3 Multiproduct competition in a model of vertical product differentiation
with endogenous quality range decision 	
 41
3.4 Multiproduct competition in two-dimensional models of product differ-
entiation 	
 42
3.4.1 A model with homogeneous brand preferences 	
 44
3.4.2 A model of separate quality submarkets 	
 47
3.4.3 A model with heterogeneous brand-preferences and quality de-
termined horizontal differentiation 	
 50
3.5 Discrete choice models of product differentiation 	
 54
3.5.1 A benchmark for the estimation of discrete choice models of prod-
uct differentiation 	
 54
3.6 Concluding Remarks: Learning from the empirical results 
	
 64
3.7 Appendix 	
 69
1
CONTENTS	 2
4 Price Competition and Price Dispersion 	 72
4.1 Introduction 	  72
4.2 Brief characterization of quality variants and outlets 	  75
4.2.1 Characterization of the quality variants in a UK supermarket. 	 75
4.2.2 Characterization of the outlet structure in the analysis 	  80
4.3 The data 	  81
4.4 An analysis of supermarket price dispersion 	  82
4.4.1 Between-supermarket price dispersion across quality variants . 	 84
4.4.2 Analysis between-supermarket price dispersion 	  87
4.4.3 Disaggregated analysis of price dispersion 	  89
4.5 Analysis of the patterns of competition among supermarkets 	  92
4.5.1 Between-supermarket price competition across quality variants	 93
4.5.2 Analysis of between supermarkets price competition 	  98
4.5.3 Disaggregated analysis of price competition 	  101
4.6 Concluding Remarks 	  103
4.7 Appendices 	  105
5 Does Quality Matter?	 119
5.1 Introduction 	  119
5.2 Theoretical Framework 	  123
5.2.1 Within supermarket competition 	  124
5.2.2 A model of within and between supermarket competition 	 126
5.3 The data 	  130
5.4 Methodology 
	
 130
5.4.1 Estimation Model 	  130
5.4.2 Identification and estimation method 	  ' 131
5.5 Analysis of the results 	  134
5.5.1 Between supermarket competition: price effects between super-
market differentiated variants of the same quality 	  134
5.5.2 Between supermarket competition: price effects between super-
market differentiated variants of different quality. 	  141
5.5.3 Within supermarket price competition 	  147
5.6 Concluding Remarks 	  149
5.7 Appendices 	  152
6 Unbeatable Value	 158
6.1 Introduction 	  158
6.2 Literature review 	  161
6.3 Unbeatable Value, an empirical case 	  166
6.3.1 Description of the Low Price Guarantee 	  166
6.3.2 Description of the data set 	  168
6.3.3 From theory to practice 	  169
6.4 Low price guarantees and prices 	  173
6.4.1 Low price guarantees and price coordination 	  174
6.4.2 Low-price guarantees and price trends 	  180
CONTENTS 3
6.5 Is Unbeatable Value a loss-leader strategy?	 	 189
6.5.1	 From theory to practice 	 	 190
6.5.2	 Unbeatable Value: the start of a price war ? 194
6.6 Concluding Remarks 	 199
6.7 Appendices	 	 201
7 Supermarkets and Discounters 216
7.1 Introduction 	 216
7.2 The model 	 218
7.3 From the theory to the practice 	 224
7.3.1	 Characterising supermarkets and discounters 
	 224
7.3.2	 The data
	 226
7.4 Empirical Part I: Are supermarkets competing with discounters ? 226
7.5 Empirical Part II: Analysis of Tesco's LPG 	 231
7.5.1	 A brief theoretical introduction to LPGs 	 	 232
7.5.2	 Low-price guarantees and price coordination 	 234
7.5.3	 Low price guarantees and price trends	 	 239
7.5.4	 Su=ing up 	 245
7.6 Concluding remarks 	 246
7.7 Appendices	 	 248
8 Concluding Remarks 271
Chapter 1
Introduction
Food retailing is the most important component of UK retail sales, covering in 1997
46.9% of the total market. In the nineties, the large supermarket chains have become
the main player of food retailing as indicated by the fact that in 1997 four supermarket
chains (from larger to smaller Tesco, Sainsbury, Asda and Safeway) controlled 67.5%
of the market.
All these large supermarket chains are actively involved in quality segmentation
and offer a range of three quality variants for most of the products they sell. The top
quality variant is the branded product sold under the manufacturer brand name (e.g.
Heinz Baked Beans). Both the intermediate and the low quality variants are own brand
products, where by own brand products we will understand those products sold under
the supermarket brand name. The intermediate quality variant is the high-quality own
brand product (e.g. Tesco Baked Beans), which is the result of the evolution of the
first own brand products introduced in the UK supermarkets. At the moment the
products of this variant can be considered as very similar in quality to the Branded
Products. The high quality own brand products compete with the branded products
for those consumers in the upper medium segment of the consumer distribution that
are willing to exchange the brand name for a price discount buying a product of very
similar quality. The lowest quality variant is the low quality own brand product.
4
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UK supermarket chains introduced the low quality own brand products (e.g. Tesco
Value Baked Beans) since the middle of the nineties as a reaction to the arrival in
the UK of the continental discounters. These latter retailers offer a limited range of
low quality products sold at very reduced price. Therefore, they supposed a new form
of competition for the supermarket, specially for the lowest segment of the consumer
distribution. Supermarket chains faced this competition launching the low quality own
brand products: very basic products whose relevant dimension is the price.
The importance of the own brand products in food retailing sales is increasing year
after year and in 1996 they represented no less than 36% of the total food retailing
sales. For the four large supermarket chains own brand penetration is even higher and
sales of these products account at least for the 47% of their total sales. This increasing
importance of the own brand products impose the need of considering the supermarket
as a multiquality firm and studying the implications of this multiquality nature over
supermarkets patterns of price setting for each one of the quality variants. This is one
of the main aims and novelties of this PhD dissertation, which starts in Chapter 2 with
a brief description of the UK food-retailing system.
Throughout this PhD dissertation we will assume that the utility that a consumer
obtains from buying a product depends not only on the quality variant Purchased but
also on the supermarket in which the product is purchased. These differences in utility
are explained by the characteristics of the products that are intrinsic to the supermarket
in which they are sold. Therefore, in the UK supermarkets products are differentiated
in two dimensions: on the one hand, the quality variant to which they belong gives
them the vertical attribute; on the othei . hand (as we will explain in the next chapters)
the supermarket characteristics of the products confer them their horizontal attribute.
As a consequence, a product of a given quality variant sold at a given supermarket
does not compete only with other products of the same quality variant sold at other
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supermarkets but also with products belonging to different quality variants sold at the
same and other supermarkets.
With the aim of introducing the modelling of multiproduct competition in mar-
kets in which variants are differentiated both vertically and horizontally, we present in
Chapter 3 a survey of the more recent literature about the topic. In this survey, we
provide a framework to compare the different models analysing multiproduct compe-
tition when variants are differentiated both horizontally and vertically. Additionally,
we explore the relationships between these models and the discrete choice models of
product differentiation widely used in the last years to empirically model markets in
which the relevant alternatives of consumption are differentiated in more than one di-
mension. Although the work in this PhD dissertation is mainly empirical, this survey
provides the fundamental keys to interpret the results later obtained.
Chapters 4 and 5 are devoted to the analysis of supermarket price setting for the
different quality variants they sell. In Chapter 4, we analyse price competition and
price dispersion for each one of the quality variants just taking into account the price
effects between supermarket-differentiated variants of the same quality. The results of
the empirical analysis in this chapter suggest that whereas differences in the degree of
between-supermarket price dispersion across quality variants are cost driven, between-
supermarket price competition is less intense for the quality variant with greater pos-
sibilities of supermarket product differentiation, the high quality own brand products.
In Chapter 5, we build an econometric model to take into account both the effects
of competition between variants of the same quality and variants of different quality
over supermarket price setting. The empirical results obtained in this paper confirm
those obtained in Chapter 4: between supermarket competition is less intense for the
quality variant with greater possibilities of supermarket product differentiation, the
high quality own brand products.
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The confirmation of these results suggests a new explanation of the higher profits
enjoyed by the UK supermarkets in comparison with their continental counterparts.
The traditional factors used to explain this phenomenon are more advanced supply
management systems and the existence of high property costs acting as barriers to
entry. However, we think that the joint consideration of the lower intensity of price
competition for the high quality own brand products and the fact that the UK market
share of this variant is the highest one in the EU provides an additional explanation
to this phenomenon.
All the empirical analysis in this PhD dissertation was performed using a panel of
micro level price data. These prices were directly taken in three adjacent supermarkets
located in the south of Coventry, which correspond to three of the four chains with
largest market share in the UK: Tesco, Sainsbury and Safeway. It would have been
interesting to include in the analysis an Asda store but the closest Asda is located in
the north of Coventry, an area quite different from a socioeconomic point of view.
During the period in which the price data was collected, Tesco started offering the
Unbeatable Value low price guarantee (LPG). Having price data both for the periods
before and after the start of the low price guarantee, as well as for products included
and not included in the LPG, gave us the invaluable opportunity to test empirically
the predictions of the theoretical models about LPGs. This analysis is the object of
Chapter 6.
Whereas the theoretical literature about low-price guarantees is extensive, to the
best of our knowledge only Hess and Gerstner [1991] analyse empirically the effects of
a particular LPG in food retailing. They analysed a price-matching guarantee and,
conclude that it served the supermarkets to tacitly collude to rise prices to supra-
competitive levels. Therefore, their analysis supports both the line of analysis started
by Salop (that related LPGs with collusive episodes), as well as Sargent's 1-19931 and
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Edlin's [1997] antitrust claims.
Tesco's Unbeatable Value offers to refund double the difference and so is a price-
beating guarantee. Both Hviid and Shaffer [1994] and Corts [1995] call the attention
on the differential effects of price-beating guarantees: when they are introduced in the
space of possible strategies the incentive to compete is restored and price matching
guarantees loose their ability to raise prices to supracompetitive levels. -Whereas most
of the literature about LPGs assumes that activating the LPGs is costless, Hviid and
Shaffer [1998,1999] theoretically analyse the effects of LPGs when activating the LPG
has a cost (hassle costs): LPGs will be activated only when the reward from activating
them is larger than the cost of doing it. Therefore, if this condition is not accomplished
LPGs should not have any effect over prices. Our analysis suggest that in general in
food-retailing the costs of activating overweight the rewards and so guarantees will be
activated only occasionally. However, Tesco's Unbeatable Value did have an effect over
supermarket prices and this was a reduction of the prices of the products included in
the LPG with respect to the prices of the products not included. Further analysis and
the consideration of the supermarket as multiproduct firm led us to relate this LPG
with a loss-leaders strategy. Moreover, the decreasing price trend observed recommends
tO carefully analysing each LPG before claiming antitrust action.
Supermarkets face not only the competition of other supermarkets offering the same
level of service quality, but also the competition of other food retailers offering a lower
level of service quality, the discounters. We devote Chapter 7 of this PhD dissertation
to analyse the influence of service quality over the patterns of price competition between
Tesco, Sainsbury and Kwik Save in an area of the south of Coventry. The first two are
supermarkets offering a homogeneous level of "high" service quality. In contrast, Kwik
Save (the largest UK discounter) offers a "low" level of service quality (by comparison
with the supermarkets). In the first part of Chapter 7, we present a theoretical model
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controlling both for the effects of locational asymmetries and differences in service
quality over supermarket price setting. In the second part, we analyse if the effects of
Tesco LPG depend upon retailer service quality levels. The results of both analyses
reveal service quality differentials as a determinant element segmenting the market and
suggest that supermarkets and discounters are possibly part of two different relevant
markets.
Finally, I would like to note that each one of the chapters was initially thought as
a self contained paper. This implies that some tables and definitions are included in
more than one chapter'. The objective of maintaining this structure has been to ease
the independent reading of each one of the chapters.
1 When these repetitions happen they are indicated.
Chapter 2
Food Retailing in the UK
Abstract
The objective of this chapter is to carry out a brief description of the UK food
retailing system. We start describing the recent transformations that have lead to
the dominance of a group of four large supermarket chains (Tesco, Sainsbury, Asda
and Safeway). Second we carry out a vertical characterization of the quality variants
(branded products vs. own brands) sold by large supermarket chains. Third, we present
a brief discussion about retailers' buying power. Finally, we characterise other players
in UK food retailing: soft discounters, hard discounters and buying groups.
2.1 Market structure characteristics and evolution
2.1.1 The structure
Food retailing is the most important single component of UK retail sales, covering in
1997 46.9% of the total market. The 90s have witnessed a terrific change in its structure
and organization that has been even labelled as a revolution; this has shifted the
market from being a rather unsophisticated, non-concentrated one, into being highly
technological, sophisticated and concentrated. As we will see, the dominant player
has become the large supermarket/hypermarket chains, selling a variety of food and
non-food products, and offering a variety of additional services to the customers.
The whole market can be divided between three main kinds of players:
1. large multiples stores (supermarkets, superstores and hypermarkets);
10
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2. smaller multiple stores (symbol/buying groups and convenience stores) and
discounters;
3. independent retailers and specialist outlets;
Table 2.1: Turnover by food retailers by type of outlets, 1992-1997 (Pounds millions)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 change (%)
1992-97
Supermarkets 25,252 24,050 22,655 20,660 21,482 22,728 -10
Hypermarkets 22,401 24,491 25,823 26,920 27,991 28,943 29
Cooperatives 5,404 4,933 4,727 3,834 3,672 3,598 -33.40
Discounters 6,368 5,645 4,160 4,662 4,953 4,749 -25
Indep. retailers 3,878 3,497 3,394 3,138 3,183 2,941 -24
C-stores 4,551 4,625 5,352 5,947 6,139 6,740 48
Symbol/Buying Groups 2,181 2,608 1,850 1,951 2,381 2,068 -5.20
Off licences 1,776 1,990 2,077 2,049 2,723 2,639 48.60
Specialists 4,004 3,641 3,455 3,051 2,826 2,651 -33.80
Total 75,815 75,480 73,503 72,212 75,350 77,057
Source: Euromonitor/ONS/trade estimates, 1998. Cooperatives include also some non-food
specialists. The category "specialists" includes: dairymen, butchers, poulterers,
fishmongers, greengrocers, fruiterers, bread and flour confectioners.
As we can see from tables 2.1 and 2.2, the large multiples chains of supermarkets
and hypermarkets (which in the UK belong to the same owners) dominate the market
with a 67.1% of total food turnover, a 12.7% increase over the period, whereas all
other players, in particular the small independent retailers, have suffered a continuous
decrease in their market share.
Table 2.2: Market shares evolution 1992-1997
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Large multiples 62.9 64.3 66 65.9 65.6 67.1
Smaller multiples 16 16.1 16.2 16.2 16.2 16.1
Discounters 8.4 ' 7.5 5.7 6.5 6.6 6.2
Indep. retailers 10.4 9.4 9.3 8.6 8 7.3
Off licenses 2.3 2.6 2.8 2.8 3.6 3.4
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Euromonitor/ONS/trade estimates, 1998.
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A more detailed situation is offered by Table 2.3. This shows that the multiples
dominance is actually the dominance of a group of four supermarket chains which
together cover 67.5% of the whole market: Tesco (23.6%), Sainsbury (19.6%), Asda
(13.5%) and Safeway (10.8%).
Table 2.3: Grocery market shares (sales in value) 1993-1997
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 % Change 1993-1997
Tesco 18.7 19.3 21.8 22.5 23.6 26.20
J Sainsbury 21.6 22 21.1 20.7 19.6 -9.26
Asda 10.5 10.9 11.7 12.8 13.5 28.57
Safeway 9.1 9.2 9.6 10.3 10.8 18.68
TOP 4 59.9 61.4 64.2 66.3 67.5 12.69
Kwik Save 7.2 6.9 6.6 6.5 5.8 -19.44
Somerfield 4.6 4.8 4.5 4.5 4.5 -2.17
Wm Morrison 3.3 3.6 4 4.2 4 21.21
Iceland 3.3 3.4 3.2 2.9 3 -9.09
Waitrose 1.5 1.4 1.6 1.6 1.6 6.67
Netto 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 125.00
TOP10 80.2 82.1 84.8 86.8 87.3 8.85
Aldi 0.2 0.3 0.8 0.9 0.8 .	 300.00
Lidl - - 0.3 0.5 0.6 100.001
Other mult. 5.4 4.9 2.9 2 2.7 -50.00.
Co-ops 7.3 6.6 6.3 5.5 5 -31.51
Symbols 1.6 1.3 1.1 1 0.8 -50.00
Other indep. 5.3 4.8 3.8 3.3 2.8 -47.17
Tot al 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Taylor Nelson Sofres/ Mintel , 1998; % change . (1995-97).
Price wars between the major players, as a means to gaining market share, char-
acterised the first half of the 90s, and helped keeping the level of prices on food well
below the average RPI. This was also a response to the appearance in the UK of the
European hard discounters and their low-price policy, that triggered also the spread of
low-quality own brands' by the major supermarkets.
The price wars stop around 1995, and are replaced by a different policy, aimed at
keeping customers and building their loyalty, consistently also with a perceived change
'We characterise low and high-quality own brand products in section 2.
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in consumers tastes, that, once out of the recession, stop giving the highest priority to
low prices: notwithstanding the forecasts, the discounters do not get much of a market
share (see table 2.2).
2.1.2 The reasons
The main reasons that lead to the dominance of large retailers can be summarised in
the following.
1. Cost advantages: sunk costs and economies of scale and scope
Food retailing becomes a large scale activity much more sophisticated and techno-
logically advanced than before. The cost advantages include:
1. floor space economies of scope and product proliferation: larger stores can
pile and sell many more products, consistently with the preference of con-
sumers for one-stop shopping and bulk buying.
2. Between 1992 and 1997, the average sales area in supermarkets and hyper-
markets increased by 5.8% and 21% respectively (see Table 2.4).
Table 2.4: Average Sales Area (square meters)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Supermarkets
Hypermarkets
1653
3815
1638
3974
1580
3821
1606
3955
1665
4268
1749
4616
Source: Retail Monitor International, June 1998
3. cost advantages from the existence of buying power (see section 3 in this
chapter);
4. economies of scale in logistics and distribution: distribution activities change
a lot for the big retailers, and are one of the main causes of their higher levels
of efficiency. Wholesaling and distribution are internalised, and the retailer
controls them directly. The suppliers now transport all their merchandises
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to the central wholesaler who then allocates them to its outlets. The new
transport trucks, with fridge and freezer capacity, make it possible to trans-
port in a single journey a lot of different items to each outlet, reducing the
number of journeys and therefore reducing costs. The adoption of EPoS
(electronic points of sale), EFTPoS (electronic funds transfer systems) and
electronic scanners greatly improves the efficiency of distribution and stock-
ing activities, as needs can be communicated almost in real time to the
wholesaler and then to the supplier.
As an example of the rate of penetration of new technologies in food retailing,
we can see in Table 2.5, that the number of food-outlets with electronic scanners
increased fivefold between 1990 and 1997.
Table 2.5: Number of food-outlets with electronic scanners in period 1990-1997
Scanning Stores % growth year-on-year
1990 1506
1991 1811 20.3
1992 2681 48.0
1193 3700 38.0
1994 4954 33.9
1995 5729 15.6
1996 6683 16.7
1997 7462 11.7
Source: Retailer Monitor International, August 1998
2. Legal advantages
At the beginning of the nineties it was relatively easy to obtain planning permission
to build out-of-town large stores, which are cheaper than the high street ones and
enjoy a large space for car parking. The recent changes in the law that makes it
virtually impossible to obtain the permission are obviously an strategic advantage for
the incumbents. There is also evidence that some of the major chains in the past
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bought these large, cheaper sites in excess with respect to their needs, and might now
enjoy a first mover advantage by not renting them, or renting them at very high prices.
The Sunday Trading Act of 1994 abolishes most of the restrictions on Sunday
opening; late-night opening (with a few stores trying even a 24-hours shift) and Sunday
opening become the rule for the large multiples which enjoy a larger, more elastic staff;
this makes competition for other, smaller kinds of retailers even more difficult. The
abolishment of the restrictions on alcohol sales on Sunday to supermarkets gives them
a further advantage over specialist outlets (off-licences).
3. Strategic advantages.
Strategic advantages are all the advantages related to consumer loyalty, reputation
and advertising that all in effect restrict the residual demand for a potential entrant.
The four major multiples are now investing a lot in consumers loyalty, through the
use of loyalty cards (see table 2.6) and the spread of their own brand products. Loyalty
cards can give an advantage not only if they build loyalty to the store, but also because
they are providing the retailer with a huge detailed information on consumers tastes
and changing preferences.
Table 2.6: Loyalty card owners, 1997
Total Consumers (in millions) %consumers
Tesco 9 78
Sainsbury 7 72
Safeway 5 80
Asdal 0.5 34
Somerfield 3 43
Source: Retail monitor international, 1998; 1 on trial in 18 stores
4. Social changes
From the beginning of the eighties there is an increasing trend among the UK
consumers towards one-stop shopping and bulk shopping. This in turn is due to a
variety of social changes, among which the increase in the number of women working,
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in the levels of car ownership and of women driving, in the ownership of fridges and
freezers. As a response to these new needs and as competition for customer loyalty
grew, supermarket chains start offering services like car parking and petrol stations, as
well as complimentary bus services; on their own or via franchising agreements with
other independent chains they offer photo printing services, pharmacies, dry-cleaning
and newsagents.
Since the middle of the nineties, changes in customers' tastes and needs, as well as
the attempt at differentiation because of possible market saturation has led to heavy
investment in consumer loyalty through growth of own-brands products and launch of
loyalty card schemes.
The end of the nineties has witnessed the introduction of several additional services
by the major retailer chains. They have moved into banking and insurance, and have
started introducing home shopping.
In addition, they increase the amount of non-food items (27% of their total turnover
in 1997) including books, music and clothes.
2.1.3 The trends
All the above factors explain the trend towards greater concentration during the decade.
They worked and still work as barriers to entry, so that the only source of competition
for the dominant retailers could come from mergers between smaller, already existing
retailers. This, together with the increasing saturation of the market, justifies the gen-
eral belief that it will concentrate further rather than expand, with the large multiple
stores increasing their shares at a rate between 5% and 7% annually 2 , covering up to
80% of the market by the end of the century. This will happen via mergers between the
existing players (for example the announced merger between Kwik Save and Somer-
2 Key Note 1997.
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field), whereas mergers between the major chains have to be ruled out, as they are
looked at unfavourably by both the Government and the MMC. This, together with
the increasing difficulty in obtaining planning permissions to build new sites especially
out-of-town, translates into the trend of the major chains to focus back on their high
street locations (like the Tesco Metro stores for Tesco) and to expand their capacity
via buy outs.
2.1.4 Legal and institutional interventions
A few legal interventions have heavily contributed to modifying the structure of the
food retailing market during the decade, though we might say that the main role has
been played by a general policy of non intervention, especially under the conservative
government.
The OFT has started an investigation in the summer 1998 as the big four chains,
who have almost quadrupled their profit margins over the last 10 years, are suspected
to be charging too high prices to the customers. An international comparison (Finan-
cial Times, 8-98) has shown that prices charged by British leading supermarkets are
between 35%-40% higher than the prices in Europe and USA. Even though the strength
of the pound has made price of (food) imports much cheaper, and prices of food at
the farm gate and at the factories have decreased, in 1998, respectively by a 7.2% and
1.1%, prices at supermarkets have increased by 0.6%. Their dominant position on the
market has made them very strong against the suppliers, and there starts to be some
evidence that they might be abusing their buying power at the expenses of the man-
ufacturers but not at the advantage of the consumers. An earlier OFT investigation
in 1997, following a complaint of the National Association of Master Bakers (NAMB),
had concluded in favour of the supermarkets, ruling out predatory pricing on their side.
The problem is, apparently, far from being resolved.
CHAPTER 2. FOOD RETAILING IN THE UK 	 18
2.1.5 Effects on the consumers
If consumers have benefited from this change in structure, the benefits are of two main
kinds.
1. These changes reflected their changing needs: they can now do most of
their weekly shopping in the same place, which they can easily reach by
car; they enjoy a wider variety of products, a quicker and more efficient
service (shorter queues, credit cards, efficient stocking and distribution of
the products to all the stores), longer opening hours and, increasingly, home
service
2. The technological advances, together with the competition for market shares
between supermarkets and with the discounters, have helped to keep prices
low, both via price wars and the introduction of own-brand products. This
last point though is now controversial, as was mentioned before and will be
discussed more in detail later.
However, it is necessary to remember some drawbacks:
1. The expansion of large food retailers has brought both a reduction in the
number of brands available and a reduction in possible consumer choice
about the place to shop. Along with the introduction of own label products,
the supermarkets have delisted second brands, limiting consumer alternative
to the leader brand in the market and the own brand product.
2. The expansion of large food retailers has lead to the closure of small retail
business that cannot match supermarket price offers and so to a reduction
of the shopping alternatives available.
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2.2 Branded Products vs. Own-Brand Products
Own brands are very important in the UK retailing. England was the first country to
introduce own label3
 products, in the 70s, and has been the leader in their development
and diffusion for two decades. Although, own-brands products market share for the
whole food retailing was estimated between 37% and 39% for 1996 (depending on the
source, see Table 2.7) its importance varies widely both across products classes and
retailers formats. As it is possible to observe in Table 2.8, own-brand penetration is
notably high for the chilled foods, a category for which supermarkets are leaders in
development and introduction of new varieties. However, in general we can say that
own brand product penetration is high in categories such us bakery, kitchen towels or
aluminium foils in which quality is easy to evaluate, and possibilities of differentiation
and levels of advertising low. In contrast, own brand penetration is particularly low in
categories like toiletries for which quality is difficult to determine ex-ante, taste play
an important role in the buying decision and possibilities of product differentiation
greater'.
Table 2.7: Estimated own brand shares of total retail sales 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Own Brand Share 24.1 25.7 27.8 31.3
	 32	 34.1 36:7
Source: KeyNote, 1996
Own-brand penetration also varies with retailer format. On the one hand, the
highest own brand shares (see Table 2.8) correspond to the major supermarkets chains
(Sainsbury, Tesco and Safeway) with highly developed own-brand products programmes.
On the other hand, the lowest own-brand market share corresponds to Kwik Save that
3 We will use indistinctly the own brands and own-labels names to refer to products sold under the
supermarket brand name.
4 Some examples of low own brand penetration: 9.2% for deodorants, 8.0% for toothpaste or only
1.9% for cold treatments. A curious case is pet food, a survey carried out by MAPS discovered that
consumers were more willing to try a new own brand when they were the consumers of the product
than when the final consumer were their pets.
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Table 2.8: Market Shares of Own Label in UK by Category, 1995
Chilled
Products
Dry	 Household
Grocery	 Goods
Pet Food
& Care
Toiletries Total
Asda 66.2 33.4 34.9 19.3 19.6 47.3
Co-op 60.2 24.0 23.3 5.0 13.9 39.2
Kwik Save 23.6 12.1 17.4 4.7 3.5 17.0
Morrisons 71.4 17.4 17.1 6.7 3.2 49.5
Safeway 73.7 35.7 40.4 14.1 16.2 54.2
Sainsbury 80.1 51.1 48.5 26.7 25.4 65.6
Somerfield 75.1 28.1 34.7 11.2 13.8 50.4
Tesco 76.3 38.5 41.9 18.6 23.7 55.1
Discounters 33.8 15.7 21.9 7.1 8.1 25.7
Source: Nielsen, 1996
operates a reduced line of "No Frills" own brand products and specializes in the sales
of branded products at discounted prices.
2.2.1 Vertical characterization of the quality variants in the
UK large supermarkets chains
In all the major UK supermarkets we can find both branded products (BPs) 5 and
own-brand products (OBPs) determining the quality rank offered by the supermarket.
The BP, sold under the manufacturer brand name, is the quality variant that ini-
tially created the product space. The BPs are sustained by intense manufacturer
advertising and product development, and provided with identical specifications to all
the supermarket chains.
The own brand products, sold under the retailer brand name, cover a wide range of
products and can be divided in two categories: high quality (HQ) and low quality own
brand products (LQ) 5 . HQs were the first to be introduced, more than twenty years
ago, with the aim of competing directly with the branded products. Their quality
level has been improving over the decade and is now considered (by consumers) very
5 Also called National Brands.
6 Using Corstjens and Corstjens [1995] terminology, HQs would be Type-I own brands and LQs
would be Type-II own brands.
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close, if not identical, to the quality level of the branded products, so that they can be
used to compete with the latter for those consumers located in the upper and medium
segment of the consumer distribution that are willing to exchange the brand name for
a price discount. The cost advantage enjoyed by the supermarket as a multiproduct
firm (economies of scale and product development, etc.) allows it to offer a product of
very similar objective quality at a lower price. In addition from the point of view of
the supermarket, the HQs enjoy a series of advantages with respect to the BP:
1. higher profit margins than the BP, usually 20-30% higher.
2. possibility of using them to create a reputation of quality and loyalty to the
supermarket (Mills, 1995, Cortsjens et al, 1997).
3. possibility of using an umbrella brand to advertise all them.
In the supermarkets, these products are located on the shelves very close to the
BPs, and tend to mimic very closely the packaging and presentation of the BPs.
With respect to the LQs, their origin is much more recent, and their introduction
can be related to the arrival in the UK of the Continental discounters, that offer
products of a lower quality at a lower price. The development of this type of retailers
implied a new form of competition for the supermarkets, because the segment of more
price conscious consumers might prefer to buy at the discounter even at the risk of
a lower quality. The aim and characteristics of these products are therefore different:
they are basic products, of lower quality level, with basic packaging (with the aim of
reducing the cost), and a name that suggests their competitive approach (Tesco Value,
Sainsbury Essentials, Safeway Savers). In order to compete for the lowest segment of
the market, they are offered at a very low price.
In Table 2.9, we show the proportion of high and low quality own brand sales in
total own brand product sales for the four largest supermarket chains and Kwik Save.
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Table 2.9: Proportion of high and low quality own labels (over total own brand sales),
1996
HQ LQ
Tesco 91.5 8.5
Sainsbury 97.6 2.4
Safeway 88.6 11.4
Asda 91.0 9.0
Kwik Save 0 100
Source: Marketing Week 28th June 1996
The difference between the shares of HQs and LQs is to some extent conditioned by
two factors: shares are calculated over sales in value and LQs are much cheaper than
HQs; rank availability7 is smaller for the LQs. As we will explain later Kwik Save does
not have a range of high-quality own brand products.
2.2.2 Some effects of the own-brand product phenomenon
Overall, the share of own brand products has been steadily increasing in the nineties, as
we saw in Table 2.7. An important consequence of this increasing importance has been
the disappearance of second brands from the supermarkets, i.e. those secondary'brands
of products who used to be a cheaper alternative to branded goods were squeezed
between the own labels and the brands. For most of their manufacturers the only
chance of survival was then to start producing for the supermarkets own label.
Moreover, in many product spaces now the only branded product sold by the su-
permarket is the brand leader, so that competition within the supermarket between
branded products has lost importance in favour of the competition with the own brand
products.
If the own brand market keeps growing, as it tends to, then this might seriously
reduce consumers choice as well as increase supermarkets profit margins.
As it has been suggested for other countries, also UK supermarket chains set very
7 The number of LQ lines is smaller than the number of HQ lines.
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Table 2.10: Retailer gross margins (in percentage of sales), 1993
Own label	 Brand leader
Baked beans 18 2
Soft drinks 26 26
Household detergents 20 6
Paper products 26 6
Cigarettes 10 8
Source: Independent Grocer/PLMA 1993
high margins on own brands. The most recently available information (for 1993) is
provided in Table 2.10.
2.2.3 The manufacturers
As the importance of own brands increased and their role changed, more and more
brand manufacturers started producing for own labels. Names include Unilever and
Nestle' (two of the main manufacturers in the UK), PepsiCo, Danone, McCain, Camp-
bell, Allied Lyons and others, among which, recently, also Heinz. Not all manufacturers
agree to produce for own labels, as some of them, like Kellog's, Coca Cola or Gillette,
consider it prejudicial to their (quality) reputation. The list of those who agree is
getting longer every year, though.
- The relationship between producers of branded goods and- retailers has become
more complicated now that the former have started producing for the latter's own
label as well as their branded product. There is evidence that in some cases their
production deals can be used as negotiation tools for example for the stocking of other
branded goods by the same manufacturer, so the relationship is mutually beneficial.
However this is not always the case, as' evidenced by the growing number of claims
and complaints by manufacturers, and by the very foundation of a special association
to protect their rights, the British Producers and Brand Owners Group, or BDPOG.
Apart from the copy-right claims, against the copy-cats produced by the supermarkets,
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manufacturers have complained for example about the reduction or the quality of
shelving space offered by the supermarkets. Another point that has to be noticed
about this relationship is that brand producers involvement in the production of own
labels entails the sharing of some cost information with the retailers. The latter can
therefore use this information in the negotiation of the price of branded goods.
The possibility of retailers exerting buying-power in the manufacturer-large super-
market chains relationship has been an issue of great public concern in the last years
and we will give it closer attention in section 2.3.
2.3 Manufacturer-large supermarket chains bargain-
ing: retailers buying power
Consistently with their size and dominant position on the market, the "big four" have
been shown to enjoy by themselves significant buying power with the manufacturers.
This buying power has manifested itself not only positively, as a way of increasing
efficiency by reducing costs, thus passing over to consumers in terms of lower prices
and/or higher quality; it has also assumed extortionary forms, increasing the burden on
the manufacturers at the advantage of the retailers, in terms of higher profits, therefore
reducing social welfare. As it can be expected, whether buying power is *going to be
socially beneficial or detrimental, will depend crucially on whether it serves as a means
of increasing efficiency and thus reduce costs in the interest of the final consumer, or
as a means of increasing the power of the dominant firms and reducing competition in
retailing8
As a reaction to the increasing powei. of the dominant retailers chains, smaller re-
tailers have started joining up in buying groups and symbol groups, as will be discussed
8 For a detailed analysis of the manufacturer-retailer bargaining and its possibles consequences see
Dobson et al. [1998].
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in Section 4 of this chapter.
2.3.1 Evidence of retailing buying power
There is growing evidence that the major supermarket chains abuse their dominant
position and engage in such practices, at their only advantage, i.e. with the aim of
increasing their market power by reducing competition, and increasing profits. As the
major retailers are operating nationally or even internationally, the manufacturer often
does not have much of an alternative than accepting the imposed conditions. More
specifically, claims have been made by some manufacturers of the use of the following
procedures:
1. conditional purchase behaviour, like exclusivity contracts for example to
fight the competition coming from the discounters, or refusal to purchase,
delisting or refusal to stock;
2. use of "minimum supply levels" to rule out supply to other retailers;
3. imposition of extortionaxy prices, in order to reduce costs and/or promote
discounts in store;
4. use of slotting allowances.
At this point is relevant to make reference to the direct information provided by
interviews with a supermarket manager and a representative of an association of food
producers9.
In general, supermarkets do not deny that they engage in such practices, as they
know that their competitors are going to 'use them anyway, and that would leave them
out of the game in terms of competitiveness. Among the practices that entail an abuse
of buying power there are:
9 This interviews were carried out as part of a study about retailing buying power carried out by
Dobson Consulting.
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1. The international imposition of discounts: supermarkets that operate in
more than one country impose to the supplier the most favourable contrac-
tual conditions everywhere; for example, that was the case for Heinz USA,
that was forced to supply to Shaws (a retailer owned by Sainsbury) in the
USA at the same conditions as those offered by Heinz Europe.
2. Imposition of the packaging characteristics of the product, even when these
are against the interest of the supplier (for example, they increase its trans-
portation costs); this power extends to an almost complete determination of
all the characteristics of the product with the manufacturers of own brand
products. Although theoretically they are independent firms, supermarkets
are said to behave as if they were the very owners;
3. Imposition of discounts: request of special discounts to the suppliers to
copy the special offers proposed by another supermarket (even when the
promotion was not related to any supplier discount); price cuts for special
offers (like three for two) whose burden stays with the manufacturer and
remains like that even when the special promotion is over; lower costs that
do not translate anymore into lower prices to the consumers, but in higher
profits for the retailer;
4. Use of "advice" letters as not to sell to particular retailers; this was for
example the case of the discounter Aldi, whose entrance in the market was
hindered in this way.
Triggered by the unjustified price increases in retail shops, and the huge increase in
their profit levels (net profits in the UK supermarkets, averaging 6%, double those of
the supermarkets in the continent 10 ), parallel to the increasing degree of concentration,
10 The Economist, 6-2-99.
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the OFT has announced an investigation on the matter.
2.4 Other food retailers
Beside supermarket chains other players in the UK food retailing are soft discounters,
hard discounters and buying groups.
Soft discounters
UK owned soft discounters, as Kwik Save, are characterised by smaller size than
supermarket/superstores both in sales area and range of products'. Kwik Save 's range
is integrated by branded products sold at discount and a limited range of low-quality
own brand products sold under the "No Frills" name. A clear difference between Kwik
Save and the large supermarkets chain is the level of service quality. The supermarkets
offer a nice shopping atmosphere with wide aisles, tidy shelves and big number of
check-out lines to assure short queuing times and convenience. In contrast, in Kwik
Save aisles are narrower, products are just piled up on the shelves, the number of
check-outs is small and the queues are frequent, etc. Supermarkets accept all major
debit and credit cards whilst Kwik Save only accepts some of them. Supermarkets offer
loyalty cards with accumulable points that later on will be transformed in monetary
discounts and the possibility of using it in the own supermarket petrol station.
Hard or Continental Discounters
Owned by continental companies, hard discounters are located in cheap sites and
give a carefully studied image of low price outlets. Hard discounters such as Aldi or
Netto sell a limited and frequently discontinued line of low-quality own brand products
that rarely includes branded products at very competitive prices. In the price strategy
of hard discounters service quality is not a concern, products are piled up inside its own
11 Whereas the average size of a superstore belonging to a large supermarket chain is over 25000 sq.
feet, the larget Kwik Save outlet ares about 12000 sq. feet.
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transportation boxes, no credit or debit cards are accepted and check out availability
reduced12.
We can observe in Table 2.11 the market shares that correspond both to hard and
soft discounters in total retail food sales between 1992-1997.
Table 2.11: Discounters' Share of Total Food Retail Sales
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Hard Discounters 0.5 0.7 1.3 1.8 1.9 2.1
Soft Discounters 7.9 6.8 44 4.7 4.7 4.1
Source: Retail Monitor International, June 1998
We can observe two opposite trends for soft and hard discounters. Whereas hard
discounter more than multiply by four their market share, soft discounters market
share in 1997 is less than half of what it was in 1992. Soft discounters market share
has been squeezed between the larger more efficient Continental owned stores and the
competition of supermarket chains, which appear to be offering better quality products
at comparable prices and the possibility of the desired one-stop shopping.
Buying Groups
With the increase in market concentration over the decade and the increasingly
dominant position of the four chains of supermarkets, joining a buying or a symbol
group became basically the only chance for survival of smaller retailers. This has
proved true, as increased efficiency of the groups and their members has made them
more successful specially during the recession.
Both buying and symbol groups give their members the advantage of enhancing
economies of scale in purchasing; in the case of symbol groups this corporate identity
goes beyond the purchasing activity, and extends to marketing support for retailing.
Members operate under a symbol group facia, and are subject to disciplines as regards
12 111 Aldi check outs do no have scanners and products do not have price labels. Prices are the same
for many products and check out clercks know these prices by heart.
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unity of style and coherent product offering, though retaining their financial autonomy.
A very recent variant of the symbol group is the development of the new logo facias,
where the traders sign a three-year agreement to purchase a given value of stock in
exchange of marketing services and preferential prices on shopfittings and equipment.
Buying groups differ from symbol groups because their members operate autonomously
and are united only with respect to the purchasing activity. Membership is relatively
fluid and requires to satisfy certain conditions of operational performance which vary
across the groups consistently with their particular aims.
Table 2.12: Buying/Symbol Gropus Share of Total Food Retail Sales
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Buying/Symbol Groups 2.9 	 3.5	 2.5	 2.7	 3.2	 2.7
Source: Retail Monitor International, June 1998
We can see in Table 2.12 that buying /symbol groups represented only 2.7% of the
total retail sales in 1997. Between 1992 and 1997 this market share fell in only 0.2
percentage points. Very likely, this evolution is the result of two opposite effeet: on
the one hand, the continuous influx of independent grocers into these associations and
on the other hand the increasing importance of supermarket chains.
Chapter 3
Multiproduct Firms and Product
Differentiation: a survey
Abstract
We start the survey by reviewing the implications of horizontal and vertical product
differentiation on market structure under the assumption of single-product firms. Then,
we analyse the main results of the multiproduct firm models, both when variants are
assumed to be differentiated in vertical attributes only and when variants are assumed
to be differentiated in two dimensions (vertical and horizontal). Finally, we review the
empirical literature about discrete-choice models of product differentiation.
3.1 Introduction
In recent years the study of models of multiproduct competition with product differ-
entiated variants has become an important field both for the theoretical and empirical
industrial organization. This survey tries to explain firms' product range and pricing
decisions using models in which variants are differentiated in one or more dimensions.
The literature that is of potential relevance to a survey of this field is extensive. Hence,
most of the times we explicitly review those models that we have consider essential for
the general argument pursued: briefly expose the possibilities of modelling multiprod-
uct competition under different product differentiation assumptions.
In order to give an intuition to understand more complex models, we start the survey
by the "finiteness property" of the models of vertical product differentiation. The aim
is to stress the different effects on market structure of the assumptions of horizontal
30
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and vertical product differentiation. In the second part of the introductory section, we
first present a model of single product competition in which goods are differentiated
both horizontally and vertically (two-dimensional product differentiation) and, then
we present a reconsideration of the "finiteness property" with two-dimensional product
differentiation.
We start the analysis of multiproduct competition by a brief review of a model in
which variants are differentiated only by vertical characteristics. Then, we start the
analysis of multiproduct competition when goods are differentiated in two dimensions
(vertical and horizontal dimensions). Most of the attention is focused on these models
with the aim of using them as a reference for the empirical analysis of supermarket
competition carried out in later chapters. As we already explained in Chapter 2, UK
supermarket offer three variants of different quality (vertical attribute), from higher
to lower quality: BPs, HQs and LQs. Besides, we consider that the supermarket
in which the variant is sold confers it a differential horizontal attribute. Therefore,
UK supermarket competition is a clear example of a market in which variants of a
given quality compete both with variants of the same quality and variants of different
qualities sold at other supermarkets.
In recent years, the most interesting empirical approach to oligopolistic models of
product differentiation is the discrete-choice models of product differentiation. Hence,
we devote the last part of this survey to review this models with the aim of using the
empirical results obtained in this models as modelling suggestions.
3.2 Price competition and product differentiation:
single product firms
It is a standard result in models analysing markets with horizontally differentiated
products that in free-entry equilibrium the number of firms increase without bound
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when the size of the fixed setup costs tends to zero or the size of the market becomes
very large. Additionally, the limiting price approaches the marginal cost'.
However, in markets in which products are vertically differentiated (only), as long
as consumers' willingness to pay for quality grows faster than the unit variables costs
of providing this quality, the number of firms in the market is independent of both the
size of the market and fixed costs. In the free-entry equilibrium of these models, the
number of firms in the market will never be greater than a maximum determined by
the income distribution. Thus, price will be above marginal costs and the firm will get
positive profits. In order to illustrate these phenomenon usually referred as "finiteness
property", we will follow Shaked and Sutton [1982, 1983]. First, we present the general
framework of the model and then we analyse the particular case of a single product
duopoly selling vertically differentiated products.
Let us assume that n products of different quality produced by n single-product
firms are available for sale. If we denote quality by q we can sort the products in
_
increasing order of quality: q1 < q2 < ... < qn with prices for each one of the quality
variants pi < p2 < •.. < pn . As the finiteness property is a property of the price
equilibrium we consider qualities as given and focus on the Nash equilibrium in prices2.
All consumers have the same tastes but differ in income. Consumers' incomes (9) are
assumed to be uniformly distributed with density s over [a, b] with a> 0. Consumers
either choose to consume one unit of one of the available qualities or instead consume
none. Utility from consuming the variant of quality k is supposed to be of the specific
form3:
1 For an analysis of the different effects of horizontal and vertical product differentiation on market
structure see Sutton [1986]. For extensive reviews of product differentiation: Eaton and Lipsey [1989],
Tirole [1988, ch2], Ireland [1987], Waterson [1989] and Beath and Katsoulacos [1991].
2 In general Shaked and Sutton consider a two-stage competitive game. In Stage 1, firms choose
quality and in Stage 2 prices (Bertrand competition).
3 Here we use Mussa and Rosen [1978] specification of preferences instead of Shaked and Sutton
[1982] specification. The reason is that the papers considering both horizontal and vertical product dif-
ferentiation reviewed later use this function to specify the vertical product differentiation component.
(3.3)
(3.4)
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U (0,k) = Oqk — pk ,	 k = 1, n	 (3.1)
and the utility from consuming nothing:
U (0,0)	 Oqo	 (3.2)
A consumer with income Ok will be indifferent between buying variants of quality
k and k — 1 if
U (0k ,k)=U (0k ,k — 1)
Ok qk — Pk = k qk-1 — Pk-1
We can rearrange (3.3) as
Oh
 = rk (Pk — Pk-1)
where rh l/qk — qk-1 • Thus, given prices, those consumers with an income greater
than k will to buy the variant k and those consumer with an income lower than k will
buy the variant k — 1. By repeating this operation for every pair of adjacent qualities,
we can partition the distribution the consumers into income bands such that every one
within a specific income band buys a certain quality. The higher the income band the
higher the quality. We can use this income-splitting property to obtain the demands
for each one of the quality variants, starting with the highest, n,
xn = s(b — On)
Xn_i = s(On
 — On-1)	 (3.5)
xi = 8(0 2 — a)
By substituting (3.4) into each one of the demands of (3.5) it is possible to observe that
the demand of each one of the quality variants depends on its own price and quality
Other applications for markets in which products are vertically diferentiated using this specification
can be found for example in Tirole [1988; ch7] and Moorthy [1988].
=
spi.(02 — a), 0 1 < a
sPi(02 —	 > a •(3.8)
	— On —	
— 
rnpn_i
 — rn-lPn-2 0 if On_i > a
apn-i
(3.10)
aRn_i
= On
 — 0n-1 — Pn-irn = 0 if 0n-1 < a
apn-1
(3.11)
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but also on prices and qualities of its lower and upper quality neighbours.
With respect to the costs, it is assumed that fixed costs depend upon quality and
that unit variable costs are independent of quality, i.e. all the burden of quality im-
provements is placed on fixed costs.
Ck = CXk F(qk)	 (3.6)
Furthermore, it is assumed that the range of the income distribution is such that
2a < b < 4a. If, without loss of generality we set c = 0, the revenues of the firms
producing the variant of quality qn and the variant of quality q1 are, respectively
sRn spn(b — On)
	
(3.7)
and
where s can be understood as a measure of the size of the economy. The first order
condition of profit maximization for the firm producing the variant of quality qk (given
qualities) is given by aRk lapk. Therefore, for the firms producing the variants of
quality qn and qn_ 1 these are respectively,
ORn
ap. 
= b — 20n
 —	 = 0 (3.9)
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Using (3.9) and (3.10) Shaked and Sutton [1982] establish that if 4a > b > 2a
only two firms stay in the market'. As Pk > 0 and rk > 0, FOCs (3.9) and (3.10)
require respectively that b > 207, and On
 > 20,i_ i which implies b > 40,2_ 1 . Since by
assumption we consider b < 4a, this implies that 0 72_ 1 < a, i.e. at most two firms have
positive market shares at the Nash equilibrium in prices. Thus, the number of firms in
the market is independent of both the size of the market and the size of the fixed costs
and depends only upon the wideness of the income distribution.
The Nash equilibrium in prices in this model is characterised by working out the
best-reactions functions of the two duopolists. Given the direct relationship income-
price (through the marginal consumer conditions) we can study the reaction functions
in the space (Or, 02 ) [Shaked and Sutton, 1982]. Accordingly, three possible areas where
q2	 q0we can find a Nash equilibrium can arise depending on the values of v =  —.
q2 — ql
	
b — 2a	 2b — aIf v > (b ± a)/ 3a the Nash equilibrium prices are p i =-- 	  1 P2 = 0	 . If3 (v — 1) ri
	ar2
	
a	 b + a(v — 1) (b—a)/3a <v < (b+a)/3a then Nash equilibrium prices are pi = -, P2 =
	r 1	2r2.	 ,.
In both cases the market is covered (i.e. all the consumers buy one or the other good).
Region III (v < (b — a)/3a) is not possible because of our assumption 2a < b < 4a.
Both equilibria involve two established firms producing different qualities (the qual-
ity decision has not been made explicit here) at a price which in general implies supra-
normal profit but which not attracts entry. In a model of pure vertical product differ-
entiation the existence of sunk costs (even very small) implies that no firm will enter
the market producing one of the already available quality variants. If entry happens
Bertrand competition will drive prices equal to unit variable costs and fixed sunk costs
will be not covered.
4 1n general Anderson, de Palma and Thisse [1992, ch. 81 show that the necessary condition for n
products to have positive market shares is b> 2n-1 a.
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3.2.1 Two-dimensional models of product differentiation
Actually, most of the products that we usually purchase and use embody both hori-
zontal and vertical product characteristics. We can combine this two characteristics in
the following utility function:
vi
 = r + 9 — z 16 — —
	
(3.12)
where r is the basic willingness to pay for the product. Each consumer type is defined
by its willingness to pay for quality (8) and its parameter for horizontal specification (8).
A variant can be specified as (qi ,li ). The indirect utility function (3.12) is additively
separable in the horizontal and vertical characteristics. The underlying assumption
behind this additivity is the independency of the two characteristics.
Neven and Thisse [1990] analyse duopoly product selection using (3.12). They
assume quadratic transportation costs, z 18 — lj = z(6 — 02 . Consumers are uniformly
distributed over [0, Om] x [0, Qualities q 1 ,q2 are chosen from [qni, qm] and loca-
tions from [0, L]. Without loss of generality, it is assumed that q 2 > qi and 12 > 11.
Production costs are assumed zero.
Firms decision process is modelled as two stage game: in the first stage firms
choose simultaneously product characteristics; in the second stage firms choose prices.
Depending on the two variants it is possible to distinguish two regimes: the horizontal
dominance regime characterize those situations in which variants are closer vertically
than horizontally (2z L(12 — l i ) > 0 m(q2 — qi )); the vertical dominance regime is char-
acterized for the opposite situations, variants are closer horizontally than vertically.
5 For other works in which single product firms compete in more than one-dimensional space see:
Vandenbosch and Weinberg [1995] for a two-dimensional vertical product differentiation model and
Degryse [1996] for the application of a two-dimensional model of horizontal/vertical product differ-
entiation to study the interaction between remote access (vertical attribute) and location (horizontal
attribute) as determinants of the market equilibrium in the banking sector.
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Let us start by briefly commenting the properties of the price equilibrium, Neven and
Thisse show that, "when finn 1 improves upon its position (higher q 1 < q2 or more
central location i i
 < 12) along the dominated characteristic, its equilibrium price gen-
erally increases despite the fact that variants are getting closer". In contrast to the
one-dimensional models of horizontal or vertical product differentiation prices do not
necessarily fall when variants get closer'. The cause of this result is that variants
are sufficiently separated by the dominant characteristic. However, when variants get
closer in the dominant characteristic, the results of the one dimensional model hold
and prices fall.
With respect to the equilibrium variant specifications, two configuration appear
as equilibria depending on the preference intensity in vertical dimension relative to
the preference intensity in horizontal dimension. If preference intensity in vertical
dimension is large enough (relative to preference intensity in horizontal dimension)
then vertical differentiation is maximum and horizontal differentiation is minimum,
, ln = (qm , L/2) and (Q1, /;) = (q, L/2). If the opposite is true, then the equilib-
rium configuration involves maximum horizontal product differentiation and minimum
vertical product differentiation, (ql, = (q, 0) and (ql, = (q, L). Whereas, in
one-dimensional model of vertical/horizontal product differentiation the equilibrium
implies maximum product differentiation, in this model the maximum product differ-
entiation configuration ( (qr, lfl =(qm , 0); (q, = (q, L)) never arises. This results
uncovers that interplay between horizontal and vertical characteristics (even under the
assumption of additive preferences) has important effects in the firms' product selection
process.
6 See for example the prices resulting from the Nash equilibrium in prices of the vertical product
differentiation model.
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Reconsidering the finiteness property in two-dimensional models of product
differentiation
The finiteness property of the models of vertical product differentiation ceases to exist
when the horizontal dimension is introduced. Assume that consumer preferences are
given by (3.12). Independently of the number of firms in the market an entrant can
make positive profits by introducing a new variant with quality equal to the quality
ranked first for all consumers and horizontal specification different from that of the
already established firms. Since this new variant will be strictly preferred by the nearby
consumers, the entrant will capture a positive market share selling at price over unit
costs of production. The limiting result is that all firms will choose the same quality
specification but different locations.
Notwithstanding, Shaked and Sutton [1981 7 suggest the existence of some kind of
finiteness property in two dimensional models (vertical-horizontal) of product differen-
tiation when fixed costs depend of quality. They show that in a free entry equilibrium,
at least one firm has a market share bounded away from zero, even if the market gets
arbitrarily large.
Firms costs are decomposed in quality-dependent fixed costs, K (q), and quality-
dependent unit costs of production, c(q). Shaked and Sutton make three more assump-
tions about the costs:
(q) < m	 for all q E [0, cc/	 (3.13)
a log K (q) 0<	 <
aq for all q E [0, co[	 (3.14)
71n order to use the same specification of indirect utility function that we will use when analysing
multiproduct competition we follow chapter 8 of Anderson, de Palma and Thisse [1992] to review
Shaked and Sutton [1987].
CHAPTER 3. SURVEY	 39
c(q) < r for all	 q E [0, oo[	 (3.15)
where marginal costs and fixed costs are assumed to be continuously differentiable with
respect to q, and 8 is a constant. The first two conditions ensure that the burden of
quality improvement is placed on fixed cost rather than in marginal costs, but fixed
cost do not grow too fast with quality. The third condition ensures that unit costs of
production are lower than income for all the qualities.
The objective is to show that in free entry equilibrium at least a firm will have
a strictly positive market share (,u > 0). The proof is carried out by contradiction.
Assume a free entry equilibrium at which all firms have positive market shares smaller
than an arbitrary e > 0 that is independent of size of the market, s. Since price cannot
be higher than income, the maximum possible revenue is given by ser, therefore fixed
cost must be less than ser. What we need to show is that there are strictly positive
values for A, m, IL such that if a firm enters the market producing a variant of quality
(q+ + A) (where q+ is the highest quality available in the market) at an arbitrary
location 1 in [0, L] and incurring in a fixed cost K(q+ + A ), it can get a market share
its selling at a price c(q+
 + A) + m. Thus, the entrant would make positive profits
contradicting the original the assumption of free entry equilibrium.
The utility for a consumer of type (0 , 6) from consuming the variant of quality
(q+ + A) (the variant offered by the new entrant) is
170++,60 = r — [c(q+ + A) + + 0 (q+ + A) — z16. — 11
and the higher utility that a consumer can obtain from consuming any of the other
variants available in the market is
Vq+ = r — c(q+) + 0 (q+)
AM
6 <
reP° (3.17)
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Substraction of Vq+ from Il(q+ +p) results in the left-hand side of condition (3.16) 8 . This
condition implies that there exists a positive fraction p, of consumers for whom
[0 — max c' (q)] A — m — z(L) > 0	 (3.16)
strictly holds. These fraction ,u of consumers strictly prefer the variant offered by the
new entrant at price c(q+ + A) + in to any other variant offered at marginal cost. Thus,
the entrant sells at least sit units at a markup of m. Consider a value of E such that
Conditional on market shares smaller than e and prices less or equal to r, the maximum
revenue that firms can obtain is ser. In equilibrium,
ser > K(q)	 (3.18)
With p = r the revenue for the entrant is spr, and integration of (3.14) implies
K(q+ ± A) < eP° K(q+)
and so given that
sp,r — K(q+ ± A) > spx — 613°K(q+)
> sta. — eP° ser	 from (3.18)
> spr — slim> 0	 from (3.17)
71-, > 0 and entry will happen. Therefore, we cannot find a free entry equilibrium if we
find that none of the firms have a market share e> 0. In a free entry equilibrium at
8 Where i> 0 is large enough and m is small enough.
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least one of the firms must have a market share bounded away from zero independently
of the size of the market. From this, we can conclude that even when horizontal product
differentiation is allowed, the presence of vertical attributes implies a minimum degree
of concentration in the market.
3.3 Multiproduct competition in a model of ver-
tical product differentiation with endogenous
quality range decision
Champsaur and Rochet [1989] extend the single-product firm models of vertical prod-
uct differentiation presented in section 3.2 to allow for multiproduct competition. Re-
stricting their attention to the demand side (in the costs side no economies of scope
are allowed and production activities of the firm are fully additive) they analyse qual-
ity range and price decisions in the multiproduct duopoly. They consider a two-stage
noncooperative game in which firms take first the quality decision and then the price
decision. They highlight that the quality range decision in the first step is influenced
by two opposite effects. On the one hand, in order to discriminate among consumers
with different characteristics, firms would like to offer a broad range of qualities (as
in the monopoly situation). On the other hand, price competition lowers the profits
of a firm when it offers qualities close to those of its rivals and so firms have an in-
centive to differentiate their products from those of their rivals. They show that for
intermediate quality ranges the second of the effects dominates the first and that in
the Nash equilibrium of the quality game in which firms make positive profits there
is a quality gap between the product lines offered by the two firms. In this model,
it is the assumption of price competition among homogeneous product that rules out
head-to-head competition.
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3.4 Multiproduct competition in two-dimensional
models of product differentiation
The next step is to study models of multiproduct competition in which products are
differentiated in two dimensions: quality and horizontal attributes'. We propose here
a general framework to analyse Katz [1984], Gilbert and Matutes [1993] and Canoy
and Peitz [1997]. In Katz [1984] the firms' product line decision is taken as given and
firms choose simultaneously prices and qualities of the products in their product lines.
However, in Gilbert and Matutes 1/9933 and Canoy and Peitz S..2q'r aTa takan
as given and firm choose product line (niche or proliferation) and prices. These last
two papers analyse firm entry decisions using sequential games. Table 3.1 summarizes
the main assumptions and results of these papers.
Let us start by providing a common benchmark for the three papers with respect
to the assumptions about firms and consumers.
Fi7yris
Consider a market in which two firms can produce more than one variant of a good.
In this market variants are differentiated in two dimensions: quality and horizontal
characteristics. It is assumed that there are two goods: a low-quality (good 1) and a
high-quality (good 2). Lets us call Vi
 the space of possible production choices and Ri
the realized choice of the firm i. Firm i sets prices pij , j E Ri such that it maximizes:
7ri = E [pi, - c (qi )].MSij —K&
JERi
9 An important line of analysis of multiproduct competition not explicitely considered here is the
models assuming horizontal product differentiation only. Within this line we can distinguish between
those papers that take firm range decision as given and those papers that analyse the firm range
decision. In the first line we consider specially relevant the analysis of interlaced-product competition
versus head-to-head competition carried out by Klemperer [1992]. Those papers assuming that each
firm produce a given range of products have the limitation of presupposing a particular equilibrium
solution to the product range, i.e. the product line selection is consider as exogenous. Within the hor-
izontal product differentiation literature papers considering endogenous rank selection are for example
Shaked and Sutton [1990], Dobson and Waterson [1996] and Lal and Matutes [1989].
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where M Sii is the market share of the variant of quality j produced by firm i and c (qi)
the unit cost of production of this variant (with c' (q3 ) > 0). As regards the fixed cost
of production K the assumptions differ across papers: Katz [1984] does not introduce
any fixed costs, Canoy and Peitz [1997] assume weak economies of scale and Gilbert
and Matutes [1993] strict economies of scale.
Customers
Each consumer buys one unit of one of the variants and none of the other variants.
His indirect utility function is given by:
vii	 r Oqi — z 16 — li 1 — pii	 (3.19)
where r is the basic willingness to pay for the product. Each consumer type its defined
by its willingness to pay for quality (0) and its parameter for horizontal specification
(6). In all the three papers it is assumed that consumers' preference for horizontal
specification is distributed in the interval [0, L] with density d. Whereas in Gilbert
and Matutes [1993]'° and Canoy and Peitz [1997] is assumed that at each location 6,
consumers' willingness to pay for quality is uniformly distributed over [0, 0], Katz [1984]
assumes a finite number of 0-types in the market (here, we will assume two: high 0 and
low 0-types). z usually interpreted as transportation cost could be interpreted here as
a measure of the intensity of the consumer's firm preference.
A consumer located at 6 with a willingness to pay for quality 0 will buy the product
j from firm i if:
(j,i) = arg max [r -± 0 qj — z 16 — lii — pii]
All the three papers assume maximum differentiation. In Katz [1984] and Gilbert
and Matutes [1993] the firms (describing the horizontal characteristic of the variant)
10 Actually, Gilbert and Matutes [1993] do not make any assumption about the shape of the distri-
bution, we make the assumption here to make comparisons with the other two models.
CHAPTER 3. SURVEY	 44
are located in the end points of the linear segment of L length, and in Canoy and Peitz
[1997] variants are located in the corner points of a symmetric triangle.
3.4.1 A model with homogeneous brand preferences
Gilbert and Matutes [1993] present two different models. In the first of them, two
duopolists compete in a one-stage game in which they set the prices for all the possible
variants. The second model is a three-stage sequential game in which the firms can
make credible commitments of not producing one or more products.
They set the quality of the low-quality variant to zero (qi= 0) and that of the high-
quality variant to 1 (q2
 = 1). In their model z does not vary with 0 and it is assumed
to be equal to one. The density of consumers in each location 8 is assumed to be equal
to	 Therefore, their indirect utility function takes the following form:
= r + Oqi
 — IS — ii I — Pii
Then, using this utility function and by means of the condition defining the cus-
tomer indifferent between any two particular variants they obtain the sales regions
(markets shares) for each one of the variants.
They assume that each one of the firms has a cost function
Ci(xib xi2 ) = c(qOxii + c(q2)xi2 + F cixi i + c2x22 + F
where xii denote the sales of quality variant j by firm i. This function is assumed to
show strict economies of scope. The cost advantage of the low-quality over the high
quality variant is defined as D = c2 — c1.
Let us consider first the one-stage game in which the two firms set simultaneously
the price for the low-quality and high-quality variants and firms have no ability to
precommit to their product offerings. Gilbert and Matutes show that in a symmetric
Nash equilibrium the profits of firm 1 are
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N	 ‘n	 \I	 n\
—	 —	 t1u1 + kp12 — c ) t2 k 1 — uoi
and the profit of firm 2 are
=	 Rp23. — ci) (L — ti) + (p22 — c) (L — t2) (1 — 00]
where:
P21 — Pll + L
2
P22—P12 + L
t2 = 2
0 1
 = P12 Pll
The equilibrium prices obtained from solving the system of FOCs resulting from the
maximization problems of firm 1 and 2 are: Pii = P21 = L c1 and P12 = P22 L + C2.
Therefore in the symmetric equilibrium: both firms set the same prices, the mark-up is
the same for each one of the products (m 11 = m12 = L and m21 = m22 = L), this mark-
up is the same that in the single product competition and profits are independent of the
number of variants produced'. In equilibrium mark-ups are independent of consumer
tastes for quality. Although firms are not better off by offering the product line than by
offering a single product, this symmetric Nash equilibrium in pure strategies involves
both firms producing the product line (qi and q2 ). This is because if one firm is
producing just one variant, for any product choice of the other firm, this firm could
introduce a second variant with the same mark-up that would generate additional sales
with no loss of profits from the consumers that switch from one variant to the other.
The sales of the new variant come frOm consumer switch from the variant that the
firm was already producing and from consumer switch from the variant of the same
11 This result contrast with the higher mark-ups for the high-quality variant obtained in the analysis
of vertical product differentiated-only models by Mussa and Rosen [1978] and Moorthy [1988].
The equilibrium price when each firm sells only the same quality variant is p = c + L. It is assumed
that O<D< 0 and that therefore in an efficient equilibrium both variants would be produced.
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quality produced by the other firm. Consumer switch between variants produced by
the firm has no cost for the firm and the additional sales to consumers previously
buying form the rival represent additional profits'. Therefore, in a one-stage game
of product-choice and pricing and without possible commitments to product choices,
firms introduce the maximum number of product variants but they do not benefit from
the production of more goods.
They model product commitment as a three-stage sequential game in which firms
can commit to withhold one or more quality variants from his production possibilities
set. The stages of this game are as follows: in the Stage 1 firm 1 takes the necessary
actions to produce 1,2 or the product line; in Stage 2 firm 2 takes the same decision
with full information about the actions taken for firm 1; in Stage 3 firms choose prices
simultaneously and can decide whether or not drop one or more quality variants from
their actual production. Two specifications of this sequential game are analysed. In
the first specification firms 1 and 2 incur in the sunk cost of entry before Stage 1. In
the second specification, in order to analyse the possibility of entry in an industry with
an established incumbent, it is assumed that firm 1 incurs in the sunk cost of entry at
Stage 1 and firm 2 at Stage 2 before choosing their products. In both specifications,
the choice of niche or product line strategy depends on the degree of firm-specific
differentiation, we will focus on the analysis of the second one that we consider more
interesting. For small firm-specific differentiation (L) (relative to vertical differentiation
(19)) incumbent (firm 1) optimal strategy is specializing in one of the quality variants
and allowing entry to occur in the other. In the limit when L --4 0 firms profits
are zero for the quality variant they both sell, so in Stage 1 firm 1 will commit to
produce only one of the quality variants, and knowing that, in Stage 2 firm 2 will
12 Given that in this symmetric Nash equilibrium both firms produce the product line if the intro-
duction of any new product involves any overhead cost the firms are worse off as multiproduct firms
than as single product firms.
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choose the other quality variant. For large firm-specific differentiation entry happens
and both firms produce both quality variants. For intermediate values of firm-specific
differentiation the incumbent chooses the product line as a defensive strategy even if
conditional to entry both firms would be better off if the incumbent would choose a
niche strategy. The incumbent is choosing the product line strategy in order to avoid
product proliferation by the entrant. If the incumbent choose a niche strategy then the
entrant will choose a product line strategy and the incumbent will be worse off than
by having chosen a product line strategy. This strategy deters entry when the level
of profits when both firms produce the product line is lower than the fixed costs of
entry. Even though entry would be profitable under specialization by both firms, for
the incumbent product line is a dominant strategy. Gilbert and Matutes [1993] find
an exception to the general result of Judd [1985] 13 about the inability of multiproduct
firms to deter entry by product proliferation. In this model, when firms are able to
precommit to a given product choice and the level of firm specific differentiation is
sufficiently large, product proliferation is a credible strategy to deter entry.
3.4.2 A model of separate quality submarkets
Katz [1984] assumes that the purchasing decision of the consumer can be broken into
two stages. First, for each firm the consumer chooses her preferred quality variant. In
the second stage, after having calculated the optimal quality variant of each one the
firms, the consumer chooses the firm whose optimal quality variant yields the higher
surplus. Therefore, in the fiist stage the quality variants of a given firm compete
against one another. In the second stage the products of a firm compete against the
products of the other firms.
13 Whilst, Schmalensee [1978] and Eaton and Lipsey [1979] suggested that product proliferation
could be used as an strategy to deter entry, Judd [1985] shows that multiproduct firms are specially
vulnerable to entry. Entry does not affect only the profits of the variant facing direct competition by
the entrant but also the profits obtained by the variants neighbouring it.
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In this model firms choose price and qualities simultaneously with quantities deter-
mined by consumer demand. Before analysing multiproduct competition he analyses
the two polar cases of vertical product differentiation only and horizontal product dif-
ferentiation only. By assuming that r > 0 and z = 0 in (3.19) for both the high-0
and low-0 consumers he analyses the quality and pricing decision of a multiproduct
monopolist. In Appendix A we show the two main results of this analysis. First, dis-
crimination between consumers that differ in their willingness to pay for quality leads to
the monopolist providing suboptimal quality (below the social optimum) to the low-0
consumers 14 . Second, the monopolist's price-cost margins are greater for the high-
quality than for the low-quality variant. The multiquality monopolist discriminates
against the high-0 consumers.
In order to analyse the horizontal product differentiation case in isolation, the
existence of some exogenous mechanism that allows each of the firms to prevent a given
03-type from consuming any other variant that the variant of quality 613 is assumed.
This assumption allows the market to be divided into two independent submarkets,
one for each one of the two 0-types considered. The analysis is restricted to symmetric
equilibria (pij = p2i and qij = q23 for j = 1,2) and two further assumptions are made:
all the 0i-type have the same intensity of firm preference (0 2
 > 0 1 z2 > zi ); there
are Nj 0j-consumers uniformly distributed in the interval [0,L] with L=1. Given the
assumption of the exogenous allocation mechanism, firms do not need to set q1 lower
than the efficient quality for low-0 consumers to discriminate between high and low 0-
type consumers. Thus, qualities will be set at the efficient level in the two submarkets
(q7, A) 15 . The analysis of each one of these independent submarkets is identical to the
141n general the multiquality monopolist provides suboptimal quality to all the 9-types but the
highest 0-type.
"For the 9i-type consumer the efficient level of quality is the ql that maximizes Bi g — c(q) and
therefore ei = ei(q1).
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analysis of the standard linear-city model of horizontal product differentiation assuming
transportation costs equal to zj . This analysis reveals that the higher the intensity of
consumer's firm preference (zj ) the greater the market power of each one of the firms,
competition less intense and consequently the higher the price-cost margin.
Thus, both the analysis of the price and quality setting for the multiquality monopo-
list and for the horizontally differentiated only submarkets suggest that firms' price-cost
margins will be higher for the high-quality variant than for the low quality variant16.
This entails that firms will be specially concerned about possible downwards switching
of high-0 consumers from consumption of the high-quality variant to consumption of
the low-quality variant. Katz shows that in any symmetric equilibrium this possibility
of downwards switching results in firms serving qualities (qj ) that are lower or equal
than the optimal levels of quality and it has two additional effects over the pattern
of competition across variants. On the one hand price competition for the low-quality
variant may be blunted by strong firm differentiation in the high-quality variant. If
prices (p i, P2) and efficient qualities (qT, q) that result in the equilibrium of the model
with an exogenous types-allocation mechanism violate the quality discrimination re-
quirements needed in absence of this exogenous mechanism and it is not true that the
high-0 do not prefer the low-quality good, then firms to prevent switching must either
increase the surplus that the high-0 consumers obtain from the high-quality variant or
decrease the surplus that they obtain from the consumption of the low-quality variant.
As reducing the price of the high-quality variant would reduce the profits of the variant,
firms will opt for increasing the price of the low-quality variant. Therefore, it is likely
that competition between product line firms engaged in quality discrimination will be
softer than between single product firms. The result is that price-cost margins for the
16 This result contrast with the equal price-cost margin result obtained in Gilbert and Matutes [1993]
presented before.
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low-quality variant will be higher when firms engaged in quality discrimination than
when there exists an exogenous allocative mechanism that makes it unnecessary17.
On the other hand if the low-quality segment of the market is sufficiently large,
firms will compete for sales in this segment even though this competition may involve
a reduction of the prices for the high quality variants. The presence of low-0 consumers
confers a positive externality to high-0 consumers.
3.4.3 A model with heterogeneous brand-preferences and qual-
ity determined horizontal differentiation
Canoy and Peitz [1997] propose a differentiation triangle to analyse the trade-off be-
tween strategic (nature of resulting price competition and possibilities of entry deter-
rence) and cost factors to explain firms' product choice between niche and product line
strategies. They assume that variants are positioned in the corner points of a sym-
metric triangle and that firms i = 1, 2, 3 can choose their product from the following
product set Vi = {0, (Li ), (Hi), (Li , Hi )}. In order to limit the first-mover advantage
of incumbent 1 it is assumed that firms cannot produce the two high-quality variants.
As in Gilbert and Matutes [1993] they set the quality of low-quality variants equal
to 0 and the quality of the high-quality variant equal to 1. However, whereas in Gilbert
and Matutes [1993] the horizontal characteristic is independent of the quality level they
make the horizontal characteristic depend upon the quality level by assuming that the
low-quality variant cannot be horizontally differentiated from any other variant of the
same quality. Each one of the variants is described by two numbers qi ,li E [0, 1] and
so variant L is described as (0,4), Hi. as (1, 0) and H2 as (1,1).
With respect to the customers, they assume the willingness to pay for quality (0)
to be uniformly distributed in the interval [0, 1] and that customers with willingness
17 The presence of high-0 consumers may be a negative externality for low-0 consumers because the
surplus they obtained from the consumption of the low-quality variant can result reduced.
CHAPTER 3. SURVEY	 51
Figure 3.1: The Differentiation Triangle
H1=(1,0)	 H2=(1,1)
L=(0, 9
to pay for quality 0 are uniformly distributed in the interval [0, 1]. As in Katz [1984],
they assume that intensity of consumer's firm preference (z) is increasing in 0 and so
they make z = 0q3 in (3.19).
They propose a sequential game similar to the three-stage sequential game proposed
by Gilbert and Matutes [1993] in which an additional intermediate stage is added to
allow for the possibility of entry of a third firm. In Stage 1, incumbent 1 develops {L},
{H1 }, {L, H1 }, or {0} and incurs in the associated fixed costs; in Stage 2, incumbent 2
develops {L}, {H2 }, {L, H2 }, or {0} and incurs the associated fixed costs; in Stage 3
the potential entrant (firm 3) develops {L}, {H1}, {H2}, {L, H 1 },
 {L, H2} or {0} and
incurs the associated fixed costs; finally at Stage 4, firms set prices simultaneously (at
this stage fixed costs are sunk).
In the model, for a particular combination
are positive, only customers of one particular type are indifferent between the three
_
variants that are offered. Therefore, by identifying the conditions characterising the
_ _
customer type that is indifferent between any two variants it is possible to calculate
the market shares that correspond to each one of the variants.
"Canoy and Peitz follow two steps to find the perfect equilibrium in the game. In
PL)PH1)PH2 such that all market shares
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the first they show that only four scenarios such that all corner points are occupied
are candidate to subgame perfect equilibrium and using numerical methods calculate
the prices, market shares and profits before deduction of fixed costs that correspond
to each one of them. In the second step, assuming that fixed costs are sufficiently
small for all the corners to be occupied in equilibrium, they show that there exists a
unique subgame perfect equilibrium that is characterised by a scenario and associated
price equilibrium. Which of the scenarios constitute the equilibrium depends on the
interaction between costs (economies of scope) and strategic (pricing and product choice
as an entry deterrence instrument) factors. In order to understand this interaction they
distinguish between the motivations of each one of the firms to develop a product line
or niche strategy. On the one hand, incumbent 1 will choose to produce the vertical
product line or a single variant with basis on the costs structure (the first mover
advantage allows to guarantee himself profits at least as high as the profits of incumbent
2). Therefore, if economies of scale are very strong incumbent 1 will choose the product
line. If the production of the low-quality variant is very favorable the incumbent
1 chooses a niche strategy producing only the low-quality variant and the resulting
market structure is a three-firms oligopoly. Otherwise, incumbent 1 follows a niche
strategy with the high-quality variant. On the other hand, the choice of incumbent 2
is restricted by the choice of the incumbent 1. If incumbent 1 develops the product
line, incumbent 2 choose the only option in the market and choose a high-quality niche.
However, if incumbent 1 chooses a high-quality niche strategy, incumbent 2 will choose
between niche and product line strategies with basis in entry deterrence principles
(whereas brand proliferation is an entry deterrence strategy for incumbent 2 it is not
for incumbent 1). With respect the predictions about prices, they show that the firm
producing the vertical product line sets a higher price for its high-quality variant
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than the firm that follows a niche strategy. The reason is that in this way a firm try
to relax competition between the two quality variants produced.
3.5 Discrete choice models of product differentia-
tion
From Bresnahan [19871 18
 a main stream in the empirical analysis of oligopoly models
with product differentiation has been the joint analysis of a demand function and a
supply relationship using discrete-choice models of product differentiation 19 . Major
works in this area are Berry [1994] that establish the theoretical benchmark for the
treatment of not observed product characteristics and Berry, Levinsohn and Palces
[1995a] 2° that carries out an equilibrium analysis of the automobile industry in the US.
In this paper, BLP empirically implement the theoretical framework proposed by Berry
[1994] when carrying out the joint estimations of demand and supply relationships.
Hence, we devote this section to the analysis of the framework proposed by Berry
[1994] with some references to BLP.
3.5.1 A benchmark for the estimation of discrete choice mod-
els of product differentiation
On the basis of Berry [1994] in this section we carry out a brief description of the models
used in the empirical analysis of discrete choice models of product differentiation. The
objective of these models is the joint estimation of supply and demand equations in
markets with product differentiation. With respect to the general framework of these
models: on the demand side, consumer's' utility depends both on product characteristics
18 Whereas most of the analysis using dicrete-choice models of product differentiation are non-address
models (all the products are in competition with all others), Bresnahan [1997] that uses a discrete-
choice model with vertically differentiated products is an address model (each product compete just
with its neighbours).
19 For an extensive revision of the discrete-choice models of product differentiation Anderson, de
Palma and Thisse [1992].
20 From now on this paper will be referred as BLP.
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and on consumers characteristics and demand of each product is obtained as the result
of the aggregation over all the consumers that prefer this product to all the other
products; on the supply side, firms are modelled as price setting oligopolists and the
existence of a Nash equilibrium in prices is assumed. The characteristics of the products
are taken as given.
We start our analysis by the demand side of the problem. The utility of consumer
i for product j depends both on a vector of unobserved (by the econometrician) indi-
vidual characteristics (vi) and on a vector of characteristics of the product,
=	 61)
where pi is the price of the product j, xi is the vector of observed product characteris-
tics, &i is a vector of unobserved (by the econometrician) product characteristics, and
o is the vector of parameters determining the distribution of consumer characteristics.
Let us assume that this utility function is additively separable in a term (8i ) that
depends exclusively of the characteristics of the products and in an individual spe-
cific term (vii ) that for the moment, we consider as resulting from the interaction of
consumer and product characteristics,
uji =	 vii	 for j = 0,1, ..., J	 (3.20)
j = 1, J represent the purchase of competing differentiated products, and j 0 the
outside option, i.e. the consumer does not purchase any of the products available in
the market. The term Si can be interpreted as the mean utility that consumers obtain
from the purchase of product j. Furthermore, if we assume a linear specification for
we can express the mean utility level for product j as:
xii3 al3.1 ei
	 (3.21)
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Each consumer purchases one unit of the good that gives him the higher utility,
{uji > uir for j = 0, 1, ...r}. If we define the set of unobservable taste parameters,
vii , that result in the purchase of product j as Ai (5) = {v/83 vii > Or + vir; Vr j},
the market share of firm j is given by the probability that vi
 falls into the region Ai.
Given the distribution of consumer preferences over the product characteristics, F ,
the discrete choice market share of product j is21:
si (8(x , p, 6), x; 0) 
=f
	 f (v, x) dv	 (3.22)
Ai (b)
If the number of consumers in the market is equal to M, the demand of product j
is given by:
q3 = MS3(X )e7P; 19)
Let us consider the following demand equation relating observed market shares (Si)
to the market shares predicted by the model (si),
Si = si (x,p, 0)	 (3.23)
Unobservable product characteristics are expected to be correlated with Prices and this
makes price endogenous. The traditional solution to the problem of endogenous prices
(when prices and unobserved characteristics enter in a linear fashion in the demand
equation) is the use of instrumental variables. However, from (3.22) is possible to ob-
serve that unobserved product characteristics enter (3.23) in a non-linear fashion what
prevents the application of this approach. Berry [1994] solves this problem by using a
transformation so that market shares are linear in unobserved product characteristics.
Just for a matter of simplicity, let us start assuming that the distribution of consumer
21 1n other words, the discrete-choice model market share for product j can be calculated as the
probability of purchase of product j given the distribution of consumer preferences over the product
characteristics.
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unobservables (vij ) is known (by the econometrician) so market shares depend only on
mean utility levels
Sj = si (6)	 for j = 1, ...,n	 (3.24)
Using the fact that at the true values of 6 the above equation must hold exactly, if it
is possible to obtain closed form solution for the integral in (3.22) we can invert (3.24)
to obtain the vector 8 = (8). Thus, the vector of mean utility levels is uniquely
determined by the vector of observed market shares. From (3.21), at the true values
of the parameters (0, a) the demand equation is
6i
 (S) = x/3 api +	 (3.25)
If in (3.25) we consider 6j as an unobserved error term, we can obtain the unknown
parameters (0, a) by instrumental variable regression of 6j (S) on (x3 , p3).
An alternative to assume that the distribution of consumer unobservables is kiaown
is to assume that the density of vij is unknown and depends on a vector of unknown
parameters (a) to be estimated. With this assumption, the market share function and
the implied mean utility levels depend also on a, S = (6, a). - As above, inverting this
last equation we can obtain the demand equation as
6(S, a) = xjf3 — apj+
We can still make use of instrumental variables to estimate the above equation.
Now, we have an additional parameter to estimate, a.
Different assumptions about the consumers' preferences lead to different specifica-
tion of the utility function and as a consequence to different demand specifications and
patterns of substitution. The simplest one is the assumption of homogeneous prefer-
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ences across consumers. Under this assumption the utility function (3.20) takes the
form
= x.0 — api	 Eii
where can be understood as the mean of consumer's valuation of an unobserved
product characteristic and Eii that represents the distribution of consumer preferences
about this mean is assumed to be independently and identically distributed across
consumer and products with zero mean. Furthermore, if we assume that E ii follows a
extreme value distribution and normalize the utility of the outside good to zero, the
probability of purchase of product j (market share of the product j) is
esj
1 ±
and from (3.26) we can obtain the following linear model in price and product charac-
teristics22
ln(Si ) — In(S0) = = xj/3 — apj
 +(i 	 (3.27)
Therefore, if we consider &i
 as an error term we can estimate by instrumental variables
the structural form demand parameters (0, a).
The main problem with this simple logit specification is that it does not allow the
interaction of consumer and product characteristics. Products are just differentiated
by mean utility levels (6j ) and so, market shares and own and cross price elasticities are
determined exclusively by them. The result is unreasonable patterns of substitution:
in the logit model substitution effects are the same independently of the degree of
similarity between product characteristics23.
sj ((5) = for all j = 0, 1, ...n	 (3.26)
23 In the logit model the general expresion for the cross price elasticity is given by 77 ir —
dpr
—
s j
22 The transformation requires to weight for the outside option and to take logs.
ds j pr
s3 (6,o-) —
Dc; [Eg DL1-0]
-
Ds — E el—jEJ9
(3.29)
-
-2_
el-a
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A possible solution to the problems shown by the logit model is to remove our as-
sumption of homogeneous consumer preferences and allow for heterogeneous consumer
preferences. In discrete-choice models, we can generate heterogeneous preferences by
interacting consumer and product characteristics. A first possibility is the use of nested
logit models that although in a restricted way allow consumer tastes to be correlated
across products. In the nested logit models, prior to the estimation products are
grouped in sets of products of similar characteristics and it is imposed a higher cor-
relation for the products within the same set than for product belonging to different
sets'''. Thus, the utility of consumer i from buying product j that belongs to group g
is:
Uii =	 Cig ± (1 - 0-)Eij	 (3.28)
For consumer i , the variable is common to all products in g and has a distribution
that depends on cr. The parameter a. (0 < a- < 1) can be interpreted as a substitution
parameter. The perturbations (cij ) that (as in the logit model) follows a maximum
value distribution are assumed correlated for products belonging to the same set but
uncorrelated for products belonging to different sets. In this nested Iogit model the
probability of purchase of product j (market share of good j) is given by:
This market share of product j (j E .19) can be expressed as the product of the
share of product j within group g (conditioned share) and the share of group (g) over
the total of products (marginal share), i.e.
apt. s r , and so a change in the price of the Ford Fiesta will have the same effect over the market shares
of the Ford Scorpio and Fiat Punto.
24 G 1 exhaustive and mutually exclusive sets, g = 0,1, ...G. The outside good is assumed to be
the only product in group 0.
§i/s(6 , a) = n for j E g	 (3.31)
6
e 1-
DL1-') for g	 0,1,...,G	 (3.32)9(6 ,	 =
[Eg DL11
If we normalize the mean utility level the outside good to zero, then Do = 1 and
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si = Ejig • §g 	 (3.30)
where:
so(S , a) = 	 	 (3.33)
E g .E4
Using (3.31), (3.32) and (3.33), and after rearranging (3.30), we can obtain the linear
model used for the estimation of the parameters of the model (0, a, a).
1n(S) — in(S0) = xj ,8 — api aln (Sj/g) +j	 (3.34)
The estimating equation of the nested logit includes an endogenous extra term on the
market share of the model with respect to the group of products to- which model j
belongs. Estimation of the parameters (a,13, a) can by obtained by linear instrumental
variables regression.
In contrast to the simple logit model, the nested logit model generates reasonable
patterns of substitution. Cross price elasticities between products belonging to the
same set (with similar characteristic) are greater than between products belonging to
different sets (with more heterogeneous characteristics).
If we think of quality as the criterion used to group the products, the parallelism
between the nested logit model and the models of vertical-horizontal product differen-
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tiation presented in the previous sections are obvious. Those models could be thought
as nested logit models with two groups: a low and high-quality group.
The main limitation of the nested logit is that correlation patterns between products
and consumer characteristics depend on grouping of products carried out previously to
the estimation and therefore it is imposing some a priori patterns of substitution. The
random coefficients model proposed by BLP that allows for full interaction between
consumer and product characteristics solves this problem and obtains sensible patterns
of substitution at the cost of a substantial complication in the calculation of the market
share equation (3.22). In their model the vector of consumer taste parameters, 0, for
observed characteristic k is model as:
Oik = 13k + akCik
	 for k = 1, K	 (3.35)
where I3k is the mean of the taste parameter for characteristic k and Cik is assumed to
have an identically and independently distributed standard normal distribution.. Thus,
the utility function can be expressed as:
Ujj = X JO — apj	 vii = o5j-Fqj	 (3.36)
and vii = EKk_i akxik Cik cij with cii independently and identically distributed across
consumers and products.
The main drawback of the random coefficient models is that the market share
equation (3.22) is difficult to calculate and usually it is necessary to use simulation
procedures.
Until now we have considered just the analysis of the demand-side of the economy,
therefore the next step will be to consider the supply side of the economy. Let us con-
sider a market with N firms each one of them producing just one product. In order to
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simplify, we can assume that fixed cost are equal to zero, and that marginal costs are
independent of output levels and linear in a vector of cost characteristics. Furthermore
it is assumed that costs characteristics can be decomposed in observed product char-
acteristics (wj ) and unobserved (by the econometrician) product characteristics (w3)25.
Given these assumptions the cost function takes the following form
c = w +
	 (3.37)
and profits of firm j are
flj = (pi - ci )Msi (x,p, e; 0)	 (3.38)
If following Caplin and Nalebuff [1991] it is assumed that a pure strategy Nash
equilibrium exist for this pricing game, the price set by firm j must satisfy the following
first order condition
[733	 c3l rasi (x, p, e; 0)]
+ si(x, p, e; 0) = 0[
	 api
that after rearranging can be expressed as:
S •3	 	 Sipi = +	 +wy 	
I asilaPi I	 asi /api
(3.39)
From (3.21) and (3.22), asi /api = -aasi /a6i , and so (3.39) can be rewritten as
a function of asi lasj . Given the vector 6 obtained from the inverse market share
function, 6 = s- 1 (S), it is possible to obtain asiosi by analytical or numerical dif-
ferentiation of the market share evaluated at the adequate value of S. Therefore, 6i
and asi /a6j can be treated as known transformations of the data and (3.39) can be
rewritten as,
25 1n general it is expected xi to be part of wi and ei to be correlated with wi.
CHAPTER 3. SURVEY	 63
1
P3 = W37 ± Tt [s31(as313617)] + co3 (3.40)
We can now study the pricing equation (3.40) for the three models considered
above: logit, nested logit and random coefficients model. For the logit model, from
(3.26) asilasj
 = si) and so using (3.40) the pricing equation for the logit model
is given by
1 (  1  )
+	 (3.41)
Pi == wi7 + a (1 — Si)
where the parameters to estimate are (7, a). The logit joint estimation problem is
given by (3.27) and (3.41).
For the nested logit model, from (3.29)
as3 _ 	 1
— (1) 
s
3 
[i
	
— (1 — CIA]
as,
	 a
and so using the pricing equation, the estimation equation for the nested logit model
is given by
wi-y [ 1_
a
 
a)
/ [1 —agiig — (1 — a)Si]] +	 (3.42)
where the parameters to estimate are a, -y, a. Therefore, the estimating equations for
the joint nested logit estimation are given by (3.34) and (3.42).
Whereas, both for the logit and the nested logit specifications with an analytical
solution for 61; there exists also an analytical solution for asi Iasi , for the full random
effects model it is needed the use of numerical differentiation'.
26 For an extension of the supply equation to the case of multiproduct firms see BLP.
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Table 3.2: Summary II
Logit Nested Logit Full Random Coefficien
Consumer Preferences Homogeneous Heterogeneous Heterogeneous
Advantages Simplicity of
estimation
Reasonable
patterns of substitution
Reasonable Patterns
of substitution
Inconvenients Unreasonable
patterns of substitution
Patterns of substitution
determined by
a priori grouping
No analytical solution
for the market
share function
3.6 Concluding Remarks: Learning from the em-
pirical results
The main shortcoming of the discrete choice models described is that they take as
starting point a equilibrium situation without considering product range decisions ex-
plaining this equilibrium. Keeping it in mind, the aim of this section is to use the
empirical results obtained in recent empirical work to suggest the direction that future
theoretical modelling on competition in markets in which products are differentiated
both vertically and horizontally should follow. For their relevance in the recent empir-
ical work, we will focus our attention on the results obtained when analysing the car
market. The car industry is a good example of a market in which horizontally differ-
entiated variants of a given quality compete with horizontally differentiated variants of
the same quality and with variants of another quality.The most important application
of discrete choice models of product differentiation to the car market is BLP. BLP in
their study of the US automobile market propose a model with heterogeneous consumer
preferences using a full random coefficients model to interact consumer and products
characteristics. Goldberg [1995], also for the US automobile market, uses nested logit
models to capture consumer sequential choice characterising the car purchase decision.
Her analysis focuses on the study of the effects of a voluntary export restraint and ex-
change rate pass-through. Verboven [1996] uses a two-level nested logit model to study
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the causes of international price discrimination in the European automobile market.
First cars are grouped by segments and then by country of origin with the aim of
explicitly modelling the national segmentation of the European automobile market27.
Common results of these three papers relevant for our aim are:
1. own price elasticities are decreasing with quality
2. cross price elasticities are decreasing with quality
3. mark-ups are increasing in quality
One possible explanation for the observed quality-dependence of price elasticities
and mark-ups is that in general customers' preference for diversity is more intense for
the high than for the low quality products, i.e. whereas the purchasing decision of a
consumer buying the low-quality variant will be mainly determined by the price, the
horizontal characteristics of the variant play a relevant role to determine the purchasing
decision of a consumer buying the high—quality variant. Hence, the possibilities of
horizontal product differentiation will be directly related with quality.
It would be desirable that the theoretical models described in section 3.4 (in which
variants are both vertically and horizontally differentiated) would incorporate these
features with the aim of generating results matching with the observed facts.
Let us consider a model with two firms that produce two variants of a good: a high
and a low quality variant. The quality of the high and the low quality variants are
the same in the two firms. The horizontal characteristic of the variant is given by the
firm selling it. Likely, the easiest way of catching the relationship between horizontal
product differentiation and quality is to assume that variants are located in the four
27 0ther applications of discrete choice models of product differentiation are: Barry, Levinsohn and
Pakes [1995b] study of the effect of a voluntary export restraints placed on exports of automobiles from
Japan to the US (May,1991) over the US automobile industry and welfare; Berry, Grill and Lopez
de Silanes [1992] analysis of the possible effect on the automobile industry of a free trade agreement
between Mexico and the US; Berry, Spiller 'and Carnall [1996] analysis airline competition
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corners of a trapezoid. The low-quality variants would be located in the corners of
the short side and the high-quality variants in the corners of the long side. Among
the three papers reviewed in section 3.4, only Canoy and Peitz [1997] considers this
possibility. However, they take this possibility to the limit: it is assumed that the low
quality variant cannot be horizontally differentiated of a variant of the same quality
and so that only one firm can produce the low quality variant in equilibrium. Although,
this assumption probably simplifies the analysis, it prevents to carry out predictions
about cross price elasticities within the low quality variant.
A possible way of including in the model that consumers' preference for diversity
is increasing in consumers' willingness to pay for quality (0) is to make the parameter
representing consumers' intensity of firm preference (z) depend on consumers' willing-
ness to pay for quality such as in Katz [1988] and Canoy and Peitz [1997]. Katz that
considers a discrete distribution for 0 establish a one to one relationship between 0 and
z; i.e. if 02 > 01 then z2 > z1 . This assumption contributes in his model to generate
lower price elasticities and higher mark-ups for the high-quality variant. However, the
main problem of Katz [1988] is that assumes that there are as many products as con-
sumer types and actually the products are less than consumer types. -Canoy and Peitz
[1997] solve this problem assuming a continuous distribution of consumer types and
making z an increasing function of 0. Gilbert and Matutes [1994] locate the low-quality
variants at the same horizontal distance that the high-quality variants and assume a
constant z that does not vary with 0. The result of these assumptions is that in the
symmetric equilibrium mark-ups are independent of quality.
Therefore, it seems that of the three models considered in section 3.4, the more
realistic one is Canoy and Peitz [1997]. However, the introduction of the elements
described before complicates the model and closed form solutions cannot be worked
out; the authors have to use numerical methods to solve the problem.
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In this PhD dissertation we do not try to develop a theoretical model including
three quality variants with different possibilities of horizontal product differentiation.
The reason is that we believe that most of the framework of Canoy and Peitz [1997]
match with our ideas about the modelling of multiproduct competition in presence of
product differentiation.
Along the next four chapters of this PhD dissertation we will empirically analyse
using a sample of prices, the pricing decisions of supermarkets selling three quality vari-
ants. These variants are differentiated both vertically and horizontally. The vertical
dimension is given by the different quality of the three variants sold by each supermar-
ket. The horizontal dimension is given by the characteristics of the supermarket selling
the variants. Furthermore, as in the models described above in our empirical investi-
gation of the multiquality supermarkets pricing decision we consider that a variant of
a given quality sold by a supermarket competes both withvariants of the same quality
sold at other supermarkets and with variants of different quality sold at the same and
other supermarkets.
We carry out this analysis using a sample of product prices that was directly taken
in three adjacent supermarkets in the south of Coventry.. The ideal framework to
model empirically multiquality supermarkets competition would be the discrete choice
models of product differentiation as described in the former section. However, the un-
availability of data about quantities prevents this approach. The absence of data about
quantities also prevents to test the models of vertical-horizontal product differentiation
described in section 3.4. Therefore, 'in the next Chapters, we will use our price data to
empirically analyse the implications of:
1. supermarket multiproduct nature
CHAPTER 3. SURVEY	 68
2. different possibilities of horizontal product differentiation for each one of the
quality variants
over supermarket price setting
Whenever it is possible along the next chapters we will describe the implications of
the vertical and horizontal characteristics of our products over the patterns of super-
markets price competition using as benchmark the models described here.
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3.7 Appendix
A: The monopolist price-quality decision
In this Appendix we solve analytically the efficient and multiproduct monopolist
price-quality problems for the case of a vertical product differentiation only model as
the one described by Katz [1984]
Let us assume that each consumer buys one unit of the variant and none of the
others. His indirect utility function is given by
vi = Oiqi — pi for j = 0, 1, ...n
where qi = 0 = pi denotes the outside option.
As in Katz [1984], it is assumed a discrete distribution for consumer willingness
to pay for quality: there are only two types of consumers with willingness to pay for
quality, 0 1 and 02 , with 02 > 01 . Let N the number of consumer with willingness
to pay for quality 9. It is also assumed that firms offer only two products q1 and q2,
with q2
 > qi.
In order to capture the idea of marginal cost increasing with quality, the marginal
cost of producing a good of quality qi is C(q) = aq. This is the simplest specification
capturing the idea of marginal costs increasing with quality28.
Efficient Solution
The efficient quality for the 03 -consumer is the quality that maximizes the total
surplus from serving her, i.e. the quality that maximizes the difference between her
willingness to pay for quality, 03 q, and the marginal cost of providing this quality,
c(q) = aq2 . (TS=CS+PS; CS=Oiq —pd ; PS = pi — c (q); TS = 03 q — c(q)). Therefore,
it is the quality that maximize consumer Oi surplus under marginal-cost pricing.
28 This quadratic specification of the marginal costs is also used in Moorthy [1988].
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The efficient qualities in an industry with two products are given by the solution to
2
max E	 - aqPi
ql,q2
0These efficient qualities are qg = -2- and the associated prices p=	 Another3 2a	 3 4a
interesting characteristic of the efficient solution is that consumer surplus is greater for
1 02	 02the 02-consumers (CS2 = - -a ) than for the 0 1 -consumers (CSi =	 i.e. consumer4a
surplus increase with willingness to pay for quality.
Monopolist Solution
Let us consider the price and quality decisions of a monopolist producing the two
quality variants. The monopolist would like to charge to any consumer its reservation
price but it cannot observe the willingness to pay for quality of any given consumer
directly. In order to induce to the 0 1-type consumer to buy the quality variant qi and
to the 02 —type consumers to buy the quality variant q 2 , the monopolist must set prices
Pi and p2 satisfying the following conditions:
01 q1 — = 0
0242 — P2 = 024'1 — Pi
Therefore, the optimum quality choices for the multiproduct monopolist (qr, q72n)
are given by the solution to
max FL, = Ni (pi — aq?) + N2 (p2 — aq3)
91,42
s.t.	 Pi ='01,71
P2 = °2 (q2 - ql) ± 01q1
	
01 N2 (02 ± 01)	 02These optimum quality choices are qin =	 2Aria and ql2n = —2a . Whereas2a 
the monopolist serves to the 0 2-type consumers with their efficient quality, the quality
	
(	 01served to the 01-consumers is lower than the efficient one q; =. —2a) . Equally, it is
i=1
PCM2 = p2 — a4 = RN]. + 2N2) (02 — 0 1 ) 2 + NOT]4aNi
1
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possible to prove that when the multiproduct monopolist produce n quality variant to
serve n consumer types, it provides to all consumer types except the highest one with
qualities lower than the efficient ones.
The prices that maximize profits of the multiproduct monopolist serving qualities
gri and qr are
1
PT = 2aN1 [(N1 + N2 ) (02 — 9) 2 — NINA]
The price-cost margins for each one of the quality variants are
m 01 (N1 01 + N2(02 — 01)) 131 = 2aNi
PCM1
 = p1 — osi =
1	 2 2
	 2[No — N2 (02 — 0)1]47\r2
1
and d = PCM2 — PCM1 = 	 2 (91 — 02) 2 (N1+ N2 ) 2 > 0. Therefore, the multi-4aN1
product monopolist obtains a higher price-cost margin for the high quality variant than
for the low quality one. This is a consequence of the fact that higher quality variants
serve higher quality types, and higher quality types (as we saw above) bring with them
higher consumer surplus (see Moorthy, 1988).
Chapter 4
Price Competition and Price
Dispersion in the UK
Supermarketsl
Abstract
This chapter investigates using micro level price data the determinants of the dif-
ferences in price dispersion and intensity of price competition across the three quality
variants sold at the UK supermarkets: branded products, high quality own brand prod-
ucts and low quality own brand products. The results of the analysis confirm that
intensity of price competition is greater for those quality variants with less possibilities
of horizontal product differentiation: branded products and low quality own brand prod-
ucts. Therefore, we explore the role played by the High Quality Own Brand Products
to explain the coexistence of tight between-supermarkets competition (as claimed by the
supermarket managers) with high levels of profits.
4.1 Introduction
There has been in the recent years a recognition of the important economic implications
of the own brand product phenomenon. Although, the own brand products (OBP)
initially appeared in the supermarkets as a cheap alternative to the branded products
(BP), in the UK the natural evolution of these original own brand products lead to
1 I would like to thank to Jordi Jamandreu and seminar participants at the University of Warwick-
Workshop of Industrial Economics, 24th EARIE Congress (Leuven) and XIII Jornadas of Economia
Industrial for helpful coments. A preliminar version of this paper was awarded with the Young Econo-
mists' Essay Competition prize in the 24th EARIE Congress.
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products of similar quality to the branded products with a slight price discount, that
we will call high-quality own brand products (HQ). From the middle of the nineties
and as a reaction to the arrival in the UK of the discounter formula, the supermarkets
introduced a second own brand product variant, the low-quality own brand products
(LQ). The importance of the own brand product variants in the UK supermarkets sales
increases year after year and at the moment they represent no less than 36% of the
supermarkets sales (the highest own brand product share in the EU).
The purpose of this chapter is to carry out a preliminary empirical approach to our
data and investigate price dispersion and price competition among UK supermarkets
chains with the novel feature of considering the supermarket as a multiquality firm. In
this chapter we define price dispersion and price coordination indexes and analyse the
causes of their differences across quality variants. However, it is in Chapter 5 that we
present an econometric model of price competition between multiquality supermarkets.
We argue that the utility obtained by consuming a given product does . not depends
only on the quality variant but also on the supermarket in which the product is pur-
chased2 . This difference is explained by the characteristics of the product that are
intrinsic to the supermarket in which it is sold. It is in this framework that we study
between-supermarket differences in the degree of price dispersion and price competition
across quality variants. As regards price dispersion we are interested in discriminat-
ing between cost-side and demand-side factors3 as possible sources of the differences
in the degree of between-supermarket price dispersion observed across quality vari-
ants. With respect to price competition we are interested in analysing the relation-
ship between the possibilities of supermarket product differentiation and intensity of
between-supermarket price competition across quality variants.
2 Dobson and Waterson [1996] in a theoretical paper take a similar approach with two product
variants and two firms, but they consider two products of the same quality.
3 Possible differences in cross and own brand price elasticities across supermarkets.
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Additionally, we also explore the role played by the own brand products to explain
an important paradox in the UK food retailing. system: while the managers of the
supermarkets usually claim the existence of a tight price competition across supermar-
kets, the profits of the UK supermarkets are the highest in the EU [The Economist,
1995].
Particular novel features of this chapter include (i) consideration of the supermarket
as a multiproduct-multiquality retailer, (ii) use of a micro level data set of prices
directly taken in three superstores in the south of Coventry that correspond to three
of the four supermarket chains with largest market share in the UK (Tesco, Sainsbury
and Safeway) and (iii) use of non-parametric tests for all the statistical analysis to
avoid possible problems that can arise if the samples do not satisfy the distributional
assumptions of the parametric te,sts4.
The results of the empirical analysis suggest that whereas differences in the degree of
between-supermarket price dispersion across quality variants are cost driven, between-
supermarket price competition is less intense for the quality variant with greater pos-
sibilities of supermarket product differentiation, the HQ. The joint consideration of
this last result and the fact that the market share of the HQs in the UK is greater
than in any other EU country offers a new explanation of the higher profits of the UK
supermarkets in comparison with their continental counterparts.
The chapter is organized as follows. A brief characterization of the UK retailing
system is offered in section 2. Section 3 describes the data used in the analysis. Section
4 includes an analysis of between-supermarket price dispersion. Section 5 deals with
the analysis of between-supermarket price competition. Finally the conclusions are
presented in section 6.
4 Even if the samples do not satisfy the distributional assumptions of the parametric tests, the
non-parametric tests used here are still valid.
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4.2 Brief characterization of quality variants and
outlets
4.2.1 Characterization of the quality variants in a UK super-
market
As explained in Chapter 2, all the major UK supermarkets chains offer three quality
variants for a big range of products: a brand product variant (BP) and two own brand
products variants (OBP). These are the high quality own brand product variant (HQ)
and the low quality own brand product variant (LQ).
We argue that the utility provided by the consumption of a given good does not
depend only on the quality of the good but also on the supermarket providing the good.
If we assume quality equivalence within quality variants across supermarkets', other
supermarket characteristics' of the product are the only factor left to explain the dif-
ferences in the utility obtained when consuming a product of the same quality variant
at different supermarkets. These supermarkets characteristics include: level of service
quality provided by the supermarket, physic characteristics of the product intrinsic to
the supermarket other than quality, and location of the supermarket. Whereas the
last two of these characteristics can be considered as horizontal attributes of the prod-
uct, the level of service quality is definitely a vertical attribute. By service quality
we understand the characteristics of the shopping environment and services provided
by the supermarket when selling the products such as loyalty cards, assistance when
packaging, etc. Shopping environment and services provided by the large UK super-
market chains in their superstore's can be considered as homogeneous. Most of these
superstores are located out of town with large parking areas. All of them offer a large
5 For example, we assume that Tesco HQ Baked Beans are quality equivalent to Sainsbury HQ
Baked beans and to Safeway HQ baked beans. When introducing the characteristics of each one of
the quality variants we argue about the reasons behind this assumption.
6 From now on, when talking about supermarkets characteristics of a product, we will refer to the
characteristics of the products intrinsic to the supermarket it is sold other than quality.
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range of food and non food products in a nice shopping environment and with wide
opening hours. Services provided do not vary from one large chain to the other: all
of them offer loyalty cards and associated discounts, accept debit and credit cards,
they are involved in charities, etc. Furthermore, we should take into account that any
new service provided by one of the supermarkets that successfully attracts shoppers
can be quickly copied by the other supermarkets and the only final effect will be an
increase in costs for all competitors and/or increase of consumer surplus [Corstjens et
al, 1995]. Therefore, we should agree that for the large UK supermarket chains the
possibilities of differentiating their products from those of other supermarket chains
by means of service quality are limited8 . However, we think that the supermarket
can differentiate their products by means of the introduction of elements of horizontal
product differentiation, and that supermarket possibilities of introducing elements of
horizontal product differentiation (others than location) vary across quality variants.
The BPs are supported by intense manufacturer advertising and product devel-
opment and provided with identical specifications to all the supermarkets, therefore
supermarket differentiation for this quality variant is restricted to service quality and
location. As we explained above, we consider the level of service as virtually ho-
mogeneous across supermarkets chains. Hence, the only possibility of supermarket
differentiation for the products of the BP variant is given by the supermarket location.
As explained in Chapter 2, the quality level of HQs has been improving over the last
years and now is considered very close, if not identical, to the quality of the BPs. The
supermarket uses the HQs to compete against the BPs for those consumers located
in the upper and medium segment of the consumer distribution that are willing to
7 Example of this phenomenon in the recent times is the extension of the opening hours or the
clerck assistence to pack the shopping.
8 However, we will see in Chapter 7 that level of service quality is a key element in the differentiation
between supermarkets and discounters.
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exchange the brand name for a price discount.
An important consequence of the increasing importance of the HQs in the UK is
that the supermarkets have de-stocked second brands. In most of the product spaces
analyzed in this paper the only branded product sold at the supermarket is the brand
leader. Therefore, competition within the supermarket between branded products has
lost importance in favour of the competition between BPs and HQs. The HQs man-
ufactured by own brand manufacturers9
 to the requisites of the supermarkets are the
quality variant that allows for more supermarket differentiation. For the HQs the
supermarkets have the possibility of introducing elements of horizontal product differ-
entiation by means for example of advertising, taste, packaging, etc. i.e. we can find
Heinz Baked Beans in all the supermarkets but Tesco Baked Beans with its particular
packaging colours and taste only at Tesco.
The own aim of the LQs is limiting their possibilities of supermarket differentiation.
The LQs are very basic products introduced to face the competition of continental dis-
counters for the lowest segment of the consumer distribution. The relevant competition
dimension is the price and so any product refinement that could contribute to differ-
entiate the product is avoided in order to get the lowest possible price. The result is
products that are very similar across supermarkets even in packaging and names (Es-
sentials, Value, Savers). Unlike, the HQ variant whose package tries to mimic that of
the BPs, the packaging of the LQs is basic with the aim of reducing production costs,
signalling its "cheap" attribute and avoid confusions with the HQ variant.
In order to understand better 'the differences in the possibilities of introducing ele-
ments of horizontal product differentiation for the two categories of own brand prod-
ucts we can appeal to the asymmetric consumer distribution noted by Katz [1984] and
9 The own brand product manufacturer can be a firm that produces exclusively own brand products
or alternatively a production division of a BP manufacturer.
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Canoy and Peitz [1997]. While the upper segment of the consumers distribution is
concerned about the horizontal attributes of the products, the lower one is concerned
mainly about the prices. Offering the lowest possible price hampers the introduction
of supermarket product differentiation attributes.
As regards the assumption of quality equivalence within quality variant across su-
permarkets, BPs are necessarily identical across supermarkets. Supermarkets' compe-
tition for the LQs is focused on price, the need to reduce costs to adjust price leads to
the supermarkets to offer products that as we noted before are extremely similar even
in their basic packaging. With respect to the HQs, during the eighties Sainsbury's HQs
were recognised as products of higher quality than Tesco's or Safeway's HQs, however
in the last years Tesco and Safeway have replicated Sainsbury's high quality approach
moving upwards the quality perceptions of their HQs [Cortsjens et al, 1995; KeyNote,
1997].
Another important factor that distinguishes BPs and OBPs is the process of for-
mation of their wholesale price. As in Giulietti [1996] we think that supermarket
wholesale prices respond to a model of bilateral bargaining involving a vertical rela-
tionship between the upstream supplier and the downstream supermarket. The final
wholesale price will be the result of the relative bargaining power of manufacturer and
retailer. In general we can think of the UK food retailing system as a retailer-led system
[Cotterill, 19971 10 , and hence the large supermarket chains considered in the analysis
enjoy an advantageous position in their bargaining process with the manufacturers.
Notwithstanding, the supermarket bargaining strength varies across quality variants.
In the bargaining process determining the BP wholesale prices, the retailers interact
with powerful producers' (Kellogs, Coca-Cola, etc.) leaders of the retailing food sys-
In The UK retailing system is characterized by Cotterill as if "relatively few very large market share
supermarket retail firms serve as marketing channel captains in the food system".
"The analysis as BP producers considers only the leaders in their respective product categories.
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tern in other countries (e.g. the USA). Even though size, information about consumers
needs and tastes, and marketing of own brand products with very similar character-
istics (HQ variant) confer to the supermarkets a substantial bargaining power, this is
limited by the impossibility of de-listing the BPs. Removing the BP variants from the
supermarket shelves would involve losing the segment of brand-loyal consumers that
would look for these products at other supermarkets. As no differences are expected
in the bargaining power of the three supermarkets considered in this analysis (three
of the four supermarkets with the highest market share in the UK), we expect very
similar BP wholesale prices for all these supermarkets except for special deals offered
by the BP manufacturer to a subset of supermarkets related with occasional product
promotions.
As regards the own brand products, retailers control most of the bargaining power.
Most of the times the OBP wholesale price results from a bidding competition among
producers to supply a product tailored to the supermarkets specifications. Among the
bids the supermarket will choose the one that meets its requirements (quality, con-
ditions of delivery, adoption of particular technologies...) and offers the lowest price
[Dobson, 1997]. Furthermore, the supermarket usually requires an exclusive supply
agreement with the own brand product manufacturer. OBP wholesale prices are ex-
pected to differ across supermarkets because they are set via different supply contracts,
with different conditions and mostly with different manufacturers. Moreover, whereas
for the BPs the timing of change of wholesale prices is expected to be homogeneous
across supermarkets, this timing for the OBPs is linked to a supplying contract with
specific start and duration.
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4.2.2 Characterization of the outlet structure in the analysis
The analysis considers three of the four supermarkets chains with highest market share
in UK. Listed from the largest to the smallest they are: Tesco (23.6%) 12 , Sainsbury
(19.6%) and Safeway (10.8%).
These supermarkets have highly developed lines of both high quality and low quality
own brand products. Sainsbury is the retailer in which the own brand products have
the largest share of the sales (Table 4.1). The proportion of sales HQ/LQ in the
own brand products sales of these three supermarkets are shown in Table 4.2. When
analysing the small share represented by the LQ sales over the total own brand sales
it should be taken into account that on the one hand these products are much cheaper
than the HQs and sales are calculated in value; and on the other hand that the LQ
range of products is smaller than the HQ range of products.
Table 4.1: Own Label Sales in Major Supermarkets (%  in value)
SAFEWAY SAINSBURY TESCO 
1995 54.2	 65.6	 55.1
Source: Nielsen 1996.
Table 4.2: Proportion HQ-LQ own brand products (% over total own brand sales in
value). March-96
HQ LQ
SAFEWAY 88.6 11.4
SAINSBURY 97.6 2.4
TESCO 91.5 8.5
Source: Marketing Week, 28th June 1996
It is also relevant for further 'analysis to note the high profits enjoyed by the UK
supermarkets in comparison with their continental counterpart. The Economist (6-2-
99) reports that net profits margins of British supermarkets (averaging 6%) are double
those of the supermarkets in the continent. In Table 4.3, we provide the only data
12 Market Shares in 1997.
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about net profit margins we have been able to gather. The traditional factors used
to explain this phenomenon are: more advanced supply management system, proac-
tive store development programs, exploitation of scanner data [Wrigley, 1997] and the
existence of high property costs that act as barriers to entry [The Economist, 1995].
Table 4.3: Profit Margins-Net Profit after tax in per cent (1994)
1994
Carrefour 1.3
Promo des 0.8
Casino 0.8
Sainsbury 5.2
Tesco 4.8
Safeway 4.8
Source: Keynote 1996
4.3 The data
The data used in this analysis are micro level data about prices that were taken directly
in three selected superstores in the south of Coventry: Tesco, Sainsbury and Safeway.
There is no other superstore belonging to these chains or any other chain geographically
located closer to any one of them. Asda, the third biggest supermarket chain in the
UK, with a market share (13.5%), was not included in the analysis because it has no
superstore in the south of Coventry. The closest Asda superstore is located more than
five miles away from these supermarkets, in the north of the city (Walsgrave triangle),
an area which is quite different from a socioeconomic point of view. Although it is
known that price levels can differ across geographical areas depending upon socioeco-
nomic variables, in general we expect that the patterns of price competition among
supermarkets will be similar to the patterns found in the area under study.
The data set comprises 27 price observations for each one of the products taken
from November 1995 to March 1997. Prices have been taken every two weeks but for
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the Christmas periods. For each one of the products considered the price of the BP,
the HQ and LQ variants were taken.
Table 4.4: Distances between supermarkets (miles)
Distance(miles)
TESCO-SAFEWAY 2.8
TESCO-SAINSBURY 1.4
SAFEWAY-SAINSBURY 1.5
In order to select the products to include in the sample the following criteria have
been used:
- a BP, a HQ and a LQ should be available in the three supermarkets considered.
The BP considered is the brand leader of its product space ;
- most of them should be present in the shopping basket of the representative
English consumer;
- given that usually the LQ is available in only one package size, this size was chosen
for the analysis.
If more than one price for a product was shown on the shelves the lowest one has
been used for the analysis because this is the price at which the product is available
for the consumers.
The list of the products used in the analysis is included in the Appendix F.
4.4 An analysis of supermarket price dispersion
In imperfectly competitive markets price dispersion can arise either from heterogeneities
in own and cross-price elasticities among firms or from cost asymmetries. Previous re-
search about price dispersion in the supermarkets sector has focused exclusively on the
analysis of price dispersion for the branded products 13 [Giu]ietti and Waterson, 1997
13 Among others:
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and Walsh and Whelan, 1999' 4]. When analysing price dispersion for multiquality re-
tailers as the UK supermarkets, we should keep in mind differences in characteristics
across quality variants that can have an influence in price dispersion as: possibilities of
supermarket-differentiation for each one of the quality variants and differences in the
process of formation of the wholesale price for I3Ps and OBPs.
In order to carry out the price dispersion analysis we use as analytical tool the
Degree of Price Dispersion Index (DPDI) 15 . We define the Degree of Price Dispersion
between supermarkets J and K for product i in fortnight t as:
DPDIC
,K
	
Fit • J	 K
1 - Tit if P >
	
it 	 Pit
,J
I	 Fit
 if K	 J
	
-	
1 1 Pit	 > Pitpit
where:
: is the price of product i in fortnight t at supermarket J.
t =1,...,27 fortnightly taken observations and i = 1,...,46 products
The Degree of Price Dispersion index between supermarkets J and K for product
i is defined as:
v----n27
DPDV-K. = -
27 
2_, DPD,ilt.-K
t=1
We calculate this index for each one of the products and for each one of the super-
market pairs (TE-SA, TE-SF and SA-SF). The results is three series of DPDIs for
Shepard [1991] studies price dispersion in the context of gasoline stations considering full and self
service pumps as two different quality variants. However, her analysis considers the fact of being
a single or multiple service station as- the main source of price dispersion across gasoline stations.
Possible causes of price dispersion for a given quality varians across gasoline stations serving both
quality variants are not analysed.
Borenstein and Rose [1994] study of the price dispersion in the US airline industry is involved with
the study of intra-carrier and no inter-carries price dispersion.
14 They extend Holmes [1989] model to the case of heterogeneous costs and heterogeneous own and
cross price elasticities, to analyse price dispersion in the Irish Independent Grocery Sector.
/5 The characteristics of this index are explained in Appendix C.
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each one of the three quality variants considered in the analysis. For example the series
DPDIVQ-SA would contain DPDIT, E1Q-SA for i=1,...,46.
We start the price dispersion analysis by checking if differences in price dispersion
across quality variants are caused either by cost or demand asymmetries (section 4.4.1),
then we analyse for each supermarket j of the sample and for each quality variant, if
there is any difference in the degree of price dispersion of this supermarket with the
other two supermarkets of the sample (section 4.4.2). Evidence in favour of a similar
level of price dispersion across supermarket pairs would signal no differences in the
degree of asymmetries across supermarket pairs.
4.4.1 Between-supermarket price dispersion across quality vari-
ants
The aim of this section is to disentangle if price dispersion is either based on asym-
metries in costs or on asymmetries in demand (own and cross price elasticities hetero-
geneities). Hence, we should start by analysing the impact of these two possible sources
of price dispersion over each one of the quality variants considered in the analysis:
1. Asymmetries in demand. If we assume quality equivalence of quality variants
across supermarkets, differences in own and cross-price elasticities can be only
originated by differences in the supermarket attributes of the product. As HQ is
the quality variant with the greater possibilities of supermarket differentiation, it
is also the variant for which differences in own and cross-price elasticities should
be greater. Hence, if price dispersion across supermarkets is driven by differences
in cross price elasticities, price dispersion should be greater for HQs than for BPs
or LQs,
DPDIJ-KHQ
DPDIJ-KHQ
DPDIJ-KBP
DPDIJ-KLQ
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2. Cost asymmetries. Because the BP supplier is the same for all the supermarkets
it was argued in section 4.2.1 that differences in the BP wholesale price across
supermarkets should be very small and caused for special deals offered by the BP
producer at a subset of the supermarkets considered in the analysis. However, the
OBP supplier can vary across supermarket and so the existence of asymmetries in
costs across supermarkets is more likely for the two OBP quality variants sold at
the supermarket. Therefore, greater price dispersion for the HQs and LQs should
be interpreted as evidence in favour of cost asymmetries driven price dispersion.
DPDIJ-K >HQ -
DPD1J—K >LQ
DPDIJB-pic
DPDIJB-pic
Both under the hypothesis of demand-asymmetries driven price dispersion and un-
der the hypothesis of cost-asymmetries driven price dispersions, it should be true that
the degree of price dispersion is higher for the HQs than for the BPs. Hence, a prior
step to the discrimination between hypothesis should be to check this common pre-
diction. We carry out this verification by means of a battery of one-sided Wilconxon
tests for Matched Pair Observations 16 for which the alternative hypothesis is just the
common prediction to both hypothesis (Test I):
H0 : On average, there is no difference between DPDIJH-QK and DPDIJB-pK.
H1 : On average, DPDIHJ-QK is greater than DPDIK.
Observation of Table 4.5 reveals that the null hypothesis of no differences be-
tween the average level of DPDI for the BPs and the HQs is rejected for all the
three supermarket pairs (TE-SA, SA-SF, TE-SF). Thus, the results of the tests con-
firm the common prediction of both hypothesis about price dispersion: on average,
DPDIJH-QK > DPDIL-F,K
"The Wilconxon. Test is described in Appendix C.
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Table 4.5: Wilconxon Test for Differences in Price Dispersion across Quality Variants
Test I BP-HQ T CV 5%* CSS One/Two-Sided
TE-SA 171 389 46 One-Sided
TE-SF 130 389 46 One-Sided
SA-SF 94 389 46 One-Sided
Test II HQ-LQ
TE-SA 507 371 45 One-Sided
TE-SF 398 371 45 One-Sided
SA-SF 455 389 46 One-Sided
Test III BP-LQ
TE-S A. 204 371 45 Oae-Siclecl
TE-SF 275 389 46 One-Sided
SA-SF 295 389 46 One-Sided
*Critical Value at 5% significance level. Rejection of the Ho if T < CV5%.
Corrected Sample Size (CSS)= Sample size — Number of Zero Differences
In order to discriminate between the two hypotheses presented above, we can use a
sequence of two one-sided Wilconxon tests based on the comparison of the predictions
of these two hypotheses about the degree of price dispersion for each one of the quality
variants. The first one of these tests compares the degree of price dispersion of the two
OBP variants: HQ and LQ (Test II). The null hypothesis of this test is based on the
cost-asymmetries hypothesis, this hypothesis does not establish any a priori difference
in the degree of price dispersion between the two own-brand product variants (H 0 : On
average, there is no difference between DPDIlicic and DPDILQ,K). The alternative
hypothesis is based on the demand-asymmetries hypothesis. This hypothesis predicts
that price dispersion should be higher for the own-brand product variant with greater
possibilities of horizontal product differentiation: the HQ (H 1 : On average, DPDIJITQK
is higher than DPDIL2K). The results of Test II (Table 4.5) imply not to reject the
null hypothesis for each one of the supermarket pairs. Therefore, they are evidence in
favour of the cost-asymmetries hypothesis.
The second one of the tests compares the degree of price dispersion of BP and
LQ (Test III). The null hypothesis of this test is based on the demand-asymmetries
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hypothesis. This hypothesis does not establish any a priori difference in the degree
of price dispersion of the two quality variants with low possibilities of supermarket
product differentiation: BP and LQ (Ho : On average, there is no difference be-
tween DPDILQK and DPDIL-pK). The alternative hypothesis is based on the cost-
asymmetries hypothesis that expects price dispersion to be higher for the own-brand
product variant (H1 : On average, DPDILQK is higher than DPDIBJ-plc ). As it is
possible to observe in Table 4.5, the results of the tests for each one of the supermar-
ket pairs (rejection of the null hypothesis) confirm the prediction of the cost-driven
hypothesis: on average, DPDILQK > DPDIL-pic
Hence, the results of Tests I, II and III are evidence in favour of the cost asym-
metries hypothesis. Price dispersion is greater for the OBP variants than for the BP
variant. This empirical result is just identical to the prediction of the cost-asymmetries
hypothesis. Consequently, we should conclude that the main explanatory factor of the
degree of price dispersion is the extent of cost asymmetries across supermarkets for
each one of these quality variants.
4.4.2 Analysis between-supermarket price dispersion
Once we have detected that the main cause of differences in price dispersion across
quality variants is the extent of cost-asymmetries between the supermarkets, in this
section, we analyse for each supermarket J of the sample and for each quality variant,
if there is any difference in the degree of price dispersion of this supermarket with the
other two supermarkets of the sample. We perform this analysis by using a two-sided17
Wilconxon test for Pair Matched Observations with the following null and alternative
hypotheses:
Ho : On average, there is no difference in DPDIqJ-K and DPD1q-I-L (for J K
17 Two-sided because we do not have any a priori belief.
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and K
H1
 : On average, there is a difference in DPDIg-l-K and DPDI . -L (for J 4 K
and K
Table 4.6: Wilconxon Test for Differences in the Degree of Between-Supermarket Price
Dispersion
BP T CV 5%* CSS One/Two-sided
TE-SA vs. TE-SF 511 343 45 Two-sided
TE-SA vs. SA-SF 385 294 42 Two-sided
TE-SF vs. SA-SF 373 310 43 Two-sided
HQ
TE-SA vs. TE-SF 419 343 45 Two-sided
TE-SA vs. SA-SF 337 327 44 Two-sided
TE-SF vs. SA-SF 459 327 44 Two-sided
LQ
TE-SA vs. TE-SF 390 327 44 Two-sided
TE-SA vs. SA-SF 480 343 45 Two-sided
TE-SF vs. SA-SF 407 310 43 Two-sided
*Critical Value at 5% significance level. Rejection of the Ho if T < CV 5%.
Corrected Sample Size (CSS). Sample Size — Number of Zero Differences
The results of this battery of test shown in Table 4.6 always advice not to 'reject the
null hypothesis. The degree of price dispersion among the supermarkets considered in
the sample is homogeneous within each of the quality variants. Therefore, no difference
in the degree of asymmetry across supermarket pairs is found. If we accept that
price dispersion is mainly driven by cost asymmetries, the results of the test suggest
homogeneity of cost asymmetries between supermarket pairs, e.g. for the HQs the
degree of asymmetry in costs between Tesco and Sainsbury is no different from the
degree of asymmetry between Tesco and Safeway.
18 With this test, we could be testing for example if for the HQs there is no difference in the degree
of price dispersion between the pairs TE-SA and TE-SF.
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4.4.3 Disaggregated analysis of price dispersion
We can divide the products of the sample in six groups: canned products, groceries,
household sundries, hygienic products, alcoholic products and soft drinks. Because the
small size of the last two categories (one and two products respectively) does not allow
any statistical inference, we exclude them from the disaggregated analysis.
We address this section to analyse whether we can detect different patterns of price
dispersion within each one of the quality variants for the groups of products considered.
In order to carry out this analysis, we use first a Kruskal-Walis test i° to check if the
data suggest differences in price dispersion for different groups of products. Then, if the
Kruskal-Wallis test finds the existence of any difference we use a multiple comparisons
technique (Dunn's technique) 20 to detect which groups are more different in degree of
price dispersion.
As null and alternative hypotheses for the Kruskal-Wallis test we propose:
Ho : Within a given quality variant and for a given supermarket pair, there is no
difference in the average level of DPDI for the four groups of products considered,
e.g. there is no difference in the average level of DPDITA-SA for the four groups of
products
Hl :Within a given quality variant and for a given supermarket pair, there are some
differences in the average level of DPDI for the four groups of products considered,
e.g., there are some differences in the average level of DPDITHEQ-SA for the four groups
of products.
and, as null and alternative hypotheses for the multiple comparisons test:
H0 : Within a given quality variant and for a given supermarket pair, there is no
19 The Kruskal-Wallis is described in Appendix B.
20 The Dunn's Technique is described in Appendix B.
CHAPTER 4. PRICE COMPETITION AND PRICE DISPERSION 	 90
difference in the average level of DPDI for groups i and j, e.g. there is no difference
in the average level of DPDITHEQ-SA for canned and grocery products
H 1 : Within a given quality variant and for a given supermarket pair, there is some
difference in the average level of DPDI for groups i and j, e.g., there is some difference
in the average level of DPDITHEQ SA for canned and grocery products.
The results of this analysis are shown in Figure 1 in Appendix E. In this Figure
the groups of products have been ranked according to their mean rank. Star lines are
drawn to join together groups of products that the multiple comparisons test have been
unable to separate.
The analysis of the price data leads for the BP quality variant to reject the null
hypothesis of no differences in the degree of price dispersion in two out of three pairwise
comparisons (Figure 1). In order to define common patterns we look for the similarities
among the results of the tests carried out for each' one of the pairwise comparisons:
1. for all the three comparisons the rank of groups of products from higher to
lower degree of price dispersion is the same: hygienics, groceries, household
and canned;
2. according to the multiple comparisons test there is no difference in the degree
of price dispersion among: groceries, household and canned;
3. in the two comparisons in which Dunn's technique distinguish between
groups of products price dispersion for hygienics is significantly higher than
for the household and' canned products.
These similarities among pairwise comparisons indicate that price dispersion is sig-
nificantly greater for the hygienics group of products. Probably this is the group of
products for which interpurchase time is longer and tastes more important in the buying
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decision (deodorant, shower gel, toothpaste, etc) 21 . Their lower frequency of purchase
and smaller share in the family budget could imply that the consumer is not sensitive
to small price differences among supermarkets. The supermarket could use this lower
price sensitivity to set higher prices for some products in this group and obtain higher
profits.
With respect to the HQ variant the null hypothesis of no difference in the degree
of price dispersion is always rejected. It is still true in all three pairwise co-mparisons
that the group for which price dispersion is higher is hygienics. However, this time
the multiple comparisons test joins always in a single group hygienics with groceries,
two groups of products with quite different characteristics. This location of groceries
could be due to its heterogeneity as a group. We have included in this group products
that differ both in their interpurchase time and in the consumer sensitivity to price
differences (bread, tea or cornflakes vs. drinking chocolate or evaporated milk). The
location of household products as the group with lower degree of price dispersion (alone
or jointly with canned) is probably explained by the character of "frequently purchased"
of all the products included in the group.
As regards to the LQs, the Kruskal-Wallis test always suggests the acceptance of the
null hypothesis of no differences in average level of DPDI, i.e. no differences in price
dispersion. We could always think that the very price sensitive consumers purchasing
this quality variant products are equally concerned about small price differences across
all the groups of products.
21 We can consider these products closer to being credence goods rather than experience goods in
which case supermarkets may differ in their reputation.
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4.5 Analysis of the patterns of competition among
supermarkets
When considering the supermarket as a multiquality-multiproduct firm it is important
to analyse differences in intensity of between supermarket price competition for the
different quality variants sold. If price competition is relatively less intense in a quality
variant than in the others, and a supermarket fails to develope a range of products for
this quality variant, this could result in lower profits.
As a proxy for the degree of between-supermarket price coordination we use the
Dynamic Degree of Price Matching Index (DDPMI) 22 . We build this index in the
following way:
Let be pirt the price set by supermarket J in fortnight t for product i. Where:
i = 1,...,46 products included in the sample and t = 1,...,27 fortnightly taken price
observations
J = TE, SA, SF stores included in the sample.
then if we define:
J	 J
= pit 
git 
pit-1
the Dynamic Degree of Price Matching between stores J and H (for all J H) for
product i in fortnight t is calculated as:
DDPMft -H =
1 if g4 = gff = 0
if Igg l	 Igftlgit
4 if Ig;iti >
git
Igitl
and the Dynamic Degree of Price Matching Index between supermarkets H and J for
product i along the period of the sample as:
22 The characteristics of this index are explained in Appendix C.
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DDPMItH =	 DDPMft-H
26
We calculate a DDPMI for every product and every supermarket pair (TE-SA,
TE-SF, SA-SF). The result is three series of DDPMIs for each one of the three quality
variants considered in the analysis. For example, the DDPMITa-SF would contain
DDPMILY,TsF for i = 1, ..., 46.
4.5.1 Between-supermarket price competition across quality
variants
By means of the DDPMI we catch the simultaneity in the pricing behaviour between
supermarket pairs and the extent of this simultaneity when prices change. High values
of this index for a given quality variant can be the result of both simultaneous move-
ments in wholesale prices for all the three supermarkets translated into final prices,
and of the recognition of an intense price competition between supermarkets for this
quality variant. In order to discriminate between these two possible sources of between-
supermarket price coordination, we can compare the predictions arising from the two
possible sources of price coordination with the real patterns of price coordination for
each one of the quality variants.
If price coordination is due to simultaneous movements of wholesale prices trans-
lated into final prices the quality variant that should show a greater degree of price
coordination is the BP:
DDPMIJ P—K > DDPMIJ—KB 	 HQ
DDPMIJB—pK > DDPMILQK
As explained in section 2 the supplier of the BP is the same for all the supermarkets and
given the similar bargaining power across the supermarkets considered in the sample
t=2
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usually wholesale prices for this quality variant will not vary across supermarkets. As
regards the OBP quality variants, their supplier usually varies across supermarkets
and therefore wholesale prices for the OBP quality variants will differ most of the
times across supermarkets. Notwithstanding, when studying price coordination we
are interested not only in wholesale price levels but also in the timing of change of
the wholesale price. There exists no a priori reason to think that the BP producers
will not change simultaneously the wholesale price offered to the three supermarkets
considered in the analysis. However, the existence of heterogeneous OBP suppliers
across supermarkets makes much more unlikely the event of simultaneity in the changes
of the wholesale price faced by the supermarkets for the products of the two own brand
quality variants. Furthermore, supermarkets when negotiating the supplying conditions
with the OBP producer use their greater bargaining power to establish the price over
a period of time, and the OBP producer bears the risk of changes in the raw material
prices.
If price coordination varies with intensity of price competition, we expect price com-
petition to be more intense for those quality variants with less possibilities of super-
market product differentiation: BP and LQ. For the HQs, greater supermarket product
differentiation reduces the degree of substitutability and allows to the supermarkets to
exercise some power over their price in the market. Hence, between-supermarket price
competition should be less intense for the HQ variant than for the variants with less
possibilities of supermarket product differentiation: BP and LQ.
DDPMIJ-K >BP
DDPMIJ-K >LQ
DDPMIJ-KHQ
DDPMIJ-KHQ
Summing up, the DDPMI could be interpreted as an indicator of price competition
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if its average level is greater for the two extreme quality variants (BP and LQ) than for
the intermediate quality variant (HQ). Nevertheless, if the average level of DDPMI is
significantly greater for the BP quality variant that for the OBP quality variants then
DDPMI should be interpreted as measuring price coordination due to simultaneity in
cost changes.
Both hypotheses about the possible sources of between-supermarket price coordi-
nation predict that this should be higher for the BP than for HQ. Hence, any attempt
to discriminate between these two sources of price coordination must include as a pre-
vious step the verification of this prediction. We examine it by means of a one-sided
Wilconxon test for Pair Matched Observations (Test IV). The alternative hypothesis
of this test is just the prediction we are checking:
Ho : On average, there is no difference between DDPMIL-pH and DDPMIL-QH,
i.e. on average, there is no difference in the degree of price coordination between su-
permarkets J and H for BPs and HQs.
H1 : On average, DDPMIL-pli is greater than DDPMIL2H, i.e. on average, the
degree of price coordination between supermarkets J and H for BPs is greater than for
HQs.
The results of the tests comparing the degree of price coordination for BP and HQ
are shown in Table 4.7. Observation of this table reveals that on average the degree
of price coordination is significantly greater for the BP than for the HQ except for the
TE-SA pair and so the common prediction to both theories seems to be true except
for this supermarket pair.
In order to discriminate between the two possible hypotheses explaining between-
supermarket price coordination, we make use of a sequence of two one-sided Wilconxon
test for Pair Matched observations. The null and alternative hypotheses of these tests
arise from the comparison of the predictions of these two hypotheses about the degree
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of price coordination for each one of the quality variants.
Table 4.7: Wilconxon Test for Differences in Price Coordination across Quality Variants
Test IV BP-HQ T CV 5% CSS One/Two Sided
TE-SA 408 389 46 One-sided
TE-SF 290.5 389 46 One-sided
SA-SF 320 389 46 One-sided
Test V LQ-HQ T CV 5%
TE-SA 335 336 43 One-sided
TE-SF 317.5 389 46 One-sided
SA-SF 351.5 389 46 Orie-skled.
Test VI BP-LQ T CV 5%
TE-SA 490.5 353 44 One-sided
TE-SF 488 371 45 One-sided
SA-SF 577 389 46 One-sided
*Critical Value at 5% significance level. Rejection of the Ho if T < CV 5%.
Corrected Sample Size = Sample Size — Number of Zero Differences
Thus, the first one of these tests compares the degree of between-supermarket price
coordination of the two OBP variants (Test V). The null hypothesis of this test arises
from the hypothesis that relates between-supermarket price coordination with simulta-
neous movements of the wholesale prices, this hypothesis does no establish any a priori
difference in the degree of between-supermarket price coordination of the two own-
brand product variants (H0 : On average, there is no difference between DDPMILQK
and DDPMECH-Q1c ). Likewise, the alternative hypothesis arises from the hypothesis that
relates between-supermarket price coordination with intensity of price competition.
Under this hypothesis, between-supermarket price coordination should be higher for
the LQs than for the HQs (H 1 :On average, DDPMItaK is higher than DDPMITH-QK).
The results of this test lead to reject the null hypothesis for the three supermarket pairs
considered (Table 4.7). On average DDPMILQK is higher than DDPMIL-QK and the
prediction of the hypothesis that relates the degree of between-supermarket price co-
ordination with intensity of price competition is confirmed.
The second one of the tests compares the degree of price coordination of BPs and
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LQs (Test VI). The null hypothesis of this test is based on the hypothesis that re-
lates between-supermarket price coordination with intensity of price competition, this
hypothesis does not signal any difference in the degree of between-supermarket price
coordination between the two variants with low possibilities of supermarket product dif-
ferentiation: BP and LQ (Ho : On average, there is no difference between DDPMILI,K
and DDPMIL2K). The alternative hypothesis arises from the hypothesis that relates
between-supermarket price coordination with simultaneous movement of the wholesale
costs. This hypothesis predicts that price coordination should be higher for the BPs
than for the LQs (IL : On average, DDPMILT,K is greater than DDPMIL2K). We
can observe in Table 4.7 that the null hypotheses of Test VI is not rejected for any
of the supermarket pairs. Hence, the results of this test are evidence in favour of the
hypothesis relating price coordination with intensity of price competition.
The results of the sequence of test carried out suggest that on average price coordi-
nation is higher for BPs and LQs than for HQs. These results confirm the predictions
of the hypothesis relating between-supermarket price coordination with intensity of
price competition (except in Test IV for the pair TE-SA) and advice to interpret the
DDPMI as an indicator of price competition. Higher levels of between-supermarket
price coordination for a given quality variant are the result of higher price competition
and not of a similar pattern of wholesale price variation across supermarkets. In gen-
eral we can say that there exists a negative relationship between supermarket product
differentiation possibilities for a given quality variant and between-supermarket price
competition for this quality variant. Therefore, horizontal product differentiation can
be used by the supermarket to relax price competition.
We can use these findings to explain the paradox "tight competition-high profits"
presented in the introduction. We cannot neglect that UK supermarkets are facing
tough price competition for those variants with less possibilities of horizontal product
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differentiation: BP and LQ. However, it is also true that price competition is signifi-
cantly softer for the HQs, a variant that represents no less than 48% of the sales of the
three supermarkets considered in the analysis (see Tables 4.1 and 4.2) and for which
the gross profit margins are in average 20-30% higher than for the BPs [Hoch, 1996].
Whereas the main UK supermarkets have been successful in developing a whole range
of HQs most of the continental supermarkets have failed in the attempt [Corstjens et
al, 1995]. Therefore, the joint consideration of the greater HQ percentage over sales
(see table 4.8) and the lower degree of competition for this variant is a key factor to
explain the high profits enjoyed by the English supermarkets in comparison with their
continental counterparts.
Table 4.8: Own Label Market Share (% in value), 1994.
Country % in value Country % in value
UK 30 Belgium 17
Germany 25 Holland 16
France 21 Spain 8
Denmark 18 Italy 8
Source: The Econonust,4th March 1995
4.5.2 Analysis of between supermarkets price competition
Once we have shown that the DDPMI should be interpreted as a proxy for the in-
tensity of between-supermarket price competition, in this section we examine for each
supermarket j and for each quality variant if there is any difference in the intensity
of price competition of this supermarket with the other two supermarkets of the sam-
ple. We perform this analysis by using a two-sided Wilconxon Test for Matched Pair
observations with the following null and alternative hypotheses:
Ho : On average, the level of DDP1V11q-1-11 is similar to the level DDPM11'
(for J 4 H and J L), i.e. on average, there is no difference in the degree of price
competition of supermarket J with supermarkets K and L for quality variant q
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H1
 : On average, there is a difference between the level of DDPMIqJ-H and the
level of DDPMIqJ-L (for J 74 H and J 74 L), i.e. on average, there is a difference
in the degree of price competition of supermarket J with supermarkets K and L for
quality variant q.
With this battery of test we are checking, for example, if we can say that there
is no difference in the degree of competition of Tesco with Sainsbury and Safeway for
each one of the quality variants considered.
Table 4.9: Wilconxon Test for Differences in the Degree of Between-Supermarket Com-
petition
BP T CV 5% CSS One/Two-sided
TE-SA vs. TE-SF 397 310 43 Two-sided
TE-SA vs. SA-SF 342 264 40 Two-sided
TE-SF vs. SA-SF 324.5 294 42 Two-sided
HQ
TE-SA vs. TE-SF 474.5 310 43 Two-sided
TE-SA vs. SA-SF 339.5 327 44 Two-sided
TE-SF vs. SA-SF 392.5 327 44 Two-sided .
LQ
TE-SA vs. TE-SF 384.5 310 43 Two-sided
TE-SA vs. SA-SF 288 294 42 Two-sided
TE-SF vs. SA-SF 227.5 264 40 Two-sided
*Critical Value at 5% significance level. Rejection of the Ho if T < CV 5%.
Corrected Sample Size (CSS). Sample Size — Number of Zero differences
For the BPs, observation of Table 4.9 reveals that for each supermarket j there is no
difference in the average level of DDPMIkplc and DDPMFB-pL . This is just signalling
that the intensity of between-supermarket price competition is homogeneous among
the three supermarkets considered. Except for location BPs are homogenous across
supermarkets and so consumers perceive them. There is no a priori reason to think of
the degree of supermarket/horizontal product differentiation for any supermarket pair
as different from the degree of product differentiation for the other supermarket pairs.
Therefore, the result of homogeneous price competition is not surprising. Even though,
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we think that the main determinant of DDPMI is intensity of price competition, we
do not rule out the possible influence of the almost homogeneous wholesale price for
the BPs across supermarkets to explain the homogeneity of the DDPMI.
As for the BPs, for the HQs the average level of DDPMIL-QK never differ from
the average level of DDPMIL-Q/J . Although, the greater possibilities of supermarket
product differentiation of the HQ variant give to the supermarkets some market power
when setting prices, price competition is still homogeneous across supermarkets for this
quality variant.
The own nature of the LQs, as basic products, make them homogeneous products
but in location and so we would expect the average level DDPMI to be similar across
comparisons. However, the results of the tests involving the LQs are conditioned by
Tesco's "Unbeatable Value". This is a low price guarantee offered by Tesco for a subset
of the products included in the sample from fortnight 16 onwards. The effects of
this low price guarantee can explain that on average DDPMITZ -SA
 is greater than
DDp ATSA-SF
, and that on average DDPMI SFTZ-
 is greater than DDPMIsA-sFLQ	 •
The degree of price competition between Safeway and Sainsbury is less intense than
the degree of competition of each of them with the LPG actor (Tesco). The results are
indicating that Tesco's low-price guarantee is disciplining the market.
To sum up, we should say that degree of price competition among supermarkets is
in general homogeneous for the BPs and HQs. Therefore, distance between products
in terms of supermarket/horizontal product attributes are similar among products
belonging to the same quality variant sold at different supermarkets. For the LQ the
presence of a "low-price guarantee" is distorting the results and further analysis is
needed23.
23 Twenty-two over the forty-six LQs of the sample are subject to the low price guarantee for twelve
over the twenty seven fortnights of the sample. In order to check if the results are independent of
the LPG in Appendix D we carried all the aggregated analysis using only the data for the fortnights
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4.5.3 Disaggregated analysis of price competition
We devote this section to check whether it is possible within a given quality variant
to find out different levels of between supermarket price competition for the groups of
products considered in the analysis m . We perform this analysis in two steps:
1. Kruskal-Wallis test to check for differences in the average level of price competi-
tion for the different groups of products.
2. Multiple comparisons technique (Dunn's technique) to detect for which groups
differences in average level of price competition are greater.
As null and alternative hypotheses for the Kruskal-Wallis test we propose:
H0 : Within a given quality variant and for a given supermarket pair, there is no
difference in the average level of DDPMI for the four groups of products considered,
e.g. there is no difference in the average level of DDPMITIEQ SA for the four groups
of products
H1 : Within a given quality variant and for a given supermarket pair, there are some
differences in the average level of DDPMI for the four groups of products considered,
e.g., there are some differences in the average level of DDPMIIEQ- SA for the four
groups of products
and, as null and alternative hypothesis for the multiple comparisons test:
Ho: Within a given quality variant and for a given supermarket pair, there is no
difference in the average level of DDPMI for groups i and j, e.g., there is no difference
in the average level of DDPMITHEQ-SA for canned and grocery products
before the start of the LPG.
24 For the reasons explained in Section 4.4.3 for the disaggregated analysis we only use four of the
six groups of products included in the sample: canned products, groceries, household sundries and
hygienic product.
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H 1 : Within a given quality variant and for a given supermarket pair, there is some
difference in the average level of DDPMI for groups i and j, e.g., there is some
difference in the average level of DDPMITEQ-sA for canned and grocery products.H
In Figure 2 (Appendix E) we have ranked the groups of products according to their
mean rank. Star lines are drawn to join together groups of products whose average
degree of price competition the multiple comparisons test have been unable to separate.
For the BPs, the Kruskal-Wallis test does not reject the null hypothesis of no differ-
ence in the average level of between-supermarket price coordination among groups for
the TE-SA comparison. However, the null hypothesis of no differences in DDPMI is
rejected for the other two pairwise supermarket comparisons (TE-SF and SA-SF). For
these two last comparisons, the Dunn's procedure distinguish two groups with different
average level of price competition: the group of low price competition is formed by hy-
gienics and grocery and the group of high price competition is formed by canned and
household. The only surprising fact about this classification is the presence of grocery
in the group of low degree of price competition. However, it is likely that the heteroge-
nous composition of this group of products, (as it was explained when analysing price
dispersion) could explain this phenomenon.
As regards to the HQs, although the Kruskal-Wallis test leads to reject the null
hypothesis only for the SA-SF comparison, it is true in all the three pairwise compar-
isons that the ranking of the groups from lower to higher degree of price competition
is: hygienics, canned, groceries, and household. Nevertheless, the only clear conclusion
obtained from the Dunn's procedure is that for the SA-SF pairwise comparison the
average degree of price competition is greater for the household than for the other
groups of products.
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To sum up the results for the BPs and HQs suggest that hygienics is the group
for which average degree of price competition is the lowest. For this group of prod-
ucts characterized by a longer interpurchase time, a high importance of the tastes in
the purchasing decision and comparatively reduced importance in the family shopping
budget, price competition seems to be weaker than for the other three groups of prod-
ucts analysed. As regards the LQs, the intensity of price competition seems to be
homogeneous across groups of products (the null hypothesis of the Kruskal-Wallis test
is never rejected). Price competition for the lowest quality variant does not depend on
the group of products considered but to the attribute of essential products they are
linked with.
4.6 Concluding Remarks
The empirical confirmation of heterogeneity in the degree of between-supermarket price
dispersion and price competition across quality variants sheds light about the impor-
tance of considering the supermarket a multiquality firm and analysing its different
patterns in the price setting for each one of the quality variants.
Our results indicate that differences in the degree of price dispersion across quality
variants are mainly explained by cost-asymmetries. Price dispersion is greater for HQ
and LQ variants. The existence of a common BP supplier for all the supermarkets while
the OBP supplier varies across supermarkets can explain greater cost asymmetries in
the OBP variants. As regards the disaggregated analysis of price dispersion within
each one of the quality variants, both for BPs and HQs price dispersion seems to be
directly related to the importance of other factors different from price in the buying
decision. The more important are tastes in the buying decision (as for hygienics), the
higher is price dispersion. Within the LQ variant, we do not find differences in price
dispersion between groups of products; we could think that the very price sensitive
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LQ variant purchasers are equally concerned about small price differences for all the
groups.
Independently of differences in the process of formation of the wholesale price be-
tween BPs and OBPs, price competition is more intense for those quality variants with
less possibilities of supermarket product differentiation, the BP and the LQ variants
than for the HQ variant. The main results of our work confirm empirically the effec-
tiveness of supermarket/horizontal product differentiation as an instrument to relax
between-supermarket price competition.
We use this finding about heterogeneity of intensity of price competition across qual-
ity variants to explain the existence of the economic paradox "tight competition-high
profits" in the UK food retailing system. Whereas it is true that the UK supermar-
kets are facing tight competition for those quality variants with less possibilities of
supermarket product differentiation (BP and LQ), it is also true that competition is
significantly softer for the HQ variant. The sales of this quality variant represent no
less than 48% of the sales of the three supermarkets considered in the analysis and its
gross profit margins are in average 20-30% higher than for the BP. Furthermore, the
joint consideration of the greater market share of the HQs in the UK supermarkets
and the lower intensity of price competition for this variant provides an innovative ex-
planation of the high profits enjoyed by the UK supermarket in comparison with their
continental counterparts.
With the aim of checking the predictions of this work, further research of between-
supermarket competition should consider the influence of within-supermarket competi-
tion among quality variants on the supermarket price setting for each one of the quality
variants. This is the task that we carry out in Chapter 5. It is in this chapter that we
propose an empirical model to analyse between supermarket price competition.
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B: Description of Non-Parametric Tests
Wilconxon Test for Matched Pair Observations
This non-parametric test should be used to detect differences in average between
two samples when each observation in one sample has some kind of natural link with an
observation in the other sample. In our case, if we are detecting differences in average
between DP D ITHEQ- S A and DPDILTQE -SA , the price dispersion index that corresponds
to the Baked Beans in the first series is matched with the index that corresponds to
the same product in the second sample (and so with all the products).
The Wilconxon test is based in ranking the differences of each pair of observations
and then summing the rank of the positive and negative differences. If H1 is one-sided
then the T statistic is given by that sum of ranks that is expected to be smaller if the
Hi were true. If H1 is two sided then T is whichever of the sum of ranks that turned
out to be smaller. If any of the differences between pairs of observations is zero we
ignore them and reduce the sample size accordingly. A correction of the T is needed if
any tied differences exists. Therefore, in each one of the tables referred to a Wilconxon
test, we will state if Hi is one-sided or two-sided and specify the corrected sample size
that we obtain as the difference between the original sample size and the number of
zero differences. We reject the null hypothesis of no difference on the average level of
the variable under analysis for the matched samples considered if T < critical value.
A complete description of this test can be found in Neave and Worthington [1988]; the
critical values of the test in Table D of the same book.
Kruskal—Wallis Test and Dunn's Technique
This non parametric test should be used to test for differences in average between
more than two independent samples. For independence, we understand that the ob-
servations in any sample are not related to the observations in any other sample. In
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our case, we could be using the Kruskal-Wallis test to check if there is any difference
in the average DDP MITHEQ—SA of canned, household, groceries and hygienics groups of
products.
The Kruskal-Wallis test ranks the observations corresponding to each one of the
groups as belonging to a single sample, then compares each group mean rank with the
mean of all the ranks. The H statistic can be obtained as:
H=  12  vqc	 p	 \N(N+1)	 1L)2
where: Ri is the sum of the ranks for group i (i = 1, ...k) ; ni is the size of group i;
N =  ni and if? = ( 1 + 2+  + N)/N. A correction of the statistic H is needed if
there exist any tied observations. The null hypothesis of no difference in the average
level of the variable under analysis for the groups is rejected if H > xL / . A full
description of the test can be found in Neave and Worthington [1988].
Using as starting point the ranking of observations carried out in the Kruskal-Wallis
test, the Dunn's technique compares the means of the ranks assigned to the groups.
For all the pair of groups, i and j, Dunn's procedure defines the absolute difference
=	 —	 . It is possible to show that the standard deviation of this difference
under the 1/0
 of no difference between the two groups is o-u = N(N-I-1). 1 1 ± -9 and12	 ni	 ni
the mean 0. As Dij is approximately normally distributed Tij = -4; has approximately
the standard normal distribution. The Ho of no difference in the average level of
the variable under analysis for groups i and j is rejected if IT.; I > z where z is the
percentage point that corresponds to the upper probability a/k (k — 1) in the standard
normal distribution, a is the significance level corresponding to a two-sided alternative
hypothesis.
If we were carrying a single test, the probability would be —1 a however with the2
1Dunn's procedure we are performing —2 k(k — 1) tests. In order to share out the risk
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1	 1
equally between these tests the appropriate probability is —2 a/-2 k (k — 1) = a/k (k — 1) .
On the basis of this rule with k = 4, we choose an a ----= 30%. The z that corresponds
to an upper probability a/k (k — 1) = 0.025 is 1.960. Therefore, we will reject the null
hypothesis when ITij 1 >1.960. Some correction of the standard deviation is needed in
presence of tied observations. The full description of the test and the critical values
can be found in Neave and Worthington [1988].
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C: Price Dispersion and Price Coordination Indices
The Degree of Price Dispersion Index (DPDI)
We use as proxy for the degree of between-supermarkets price dispersion the DPDI.
As explained in the main body of the paper, we define the Degree of Price Dispersion
between supermarkets J and K for product i in fortnight t as:
DPD IC = {
P .Z_ i f	 ,Kj 11 Fit =
Pit
if vK >K	 it	 it
Pit
where:
/34 : is the price of product i in fortnight t at supermarket J.
t =1,...,27 fortnightly taken observations and i = 1,...,46 products
The Degree of Price Dispersion index between supermarkets J and K for product
i is defined as:
27
DPDV-K —27 E. DDPKt=1
The properties of DPDV-K , defined as a mean along the time of DPD4-K , are
determined by the properties of DPD K , so we start by examining the properties of
this index,
• If supermarkets J and K are setting the same price for product i in fortnight t
then DPD1-K takes value 0.
• The larger the difference between the prices set by supermarkets J and K for
Pitproduct i in fortnight t the smaller the ratio	 (we assume in this example that
Pit
pit > Ian and the higher DPD4-K.
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Pit
• By construction DP134-1( cannot take negative values. In the ratio 	 the
pit
higher price is always in the denominator and so it cannot be greater than 1.
Pfc
• For strictly positive prices DPD4-K is bounded away from 1 because	 is
pit
bounded away from zero.
Therefore, both DPI:14-K and DPDV-K take values in the interval [0,1[
The Dynamic Degree of Price Matching Index (DDPMI)
We use as proxy for the degree of between-supermarkets price coordination the
DDPMI, we built this index in the following way,
Let be 734 the price set by supermarket J in fortnight t for product i. Where:
i = 1,...,46 products included in the sample and t = 1,...,27 fortnightly taken price
observations
J = TE, SA, SF stores included in the sample.
then if we define:
,J ,Jj
	
it - Pit—i 
git =
pit-1
the Dynamic Degree of Price Matching between stores J and H (for all J H) for
product i in fortnight t is calculated as:
DDPM 11 =
1 if gft
 = gff 0
4, if Igffi  lettgit
9411 if led > Igglgit
and the Dynamic Degree of Price Matching Index between supermarkets H and J for
product i along the period of the sample as:
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27
1	 -nDDPMItH = = x-  DDPM1t-11
26
t=2
DDPAIII-11 can be defined as a mean along the time of DDP1\44-H . Hence, from
the properties of this last index we can infer directly the properties of the first index,
• If in a given fortnight t both supermarkets J and H increase (decrease) the price
of product i, DDPM4-11 takes a positive value and contributes positively to
DDPMII-H. This positive value is just reflecting that simultaneous movements
of the prices in the same direction at the two supermarkets are interpreted as
signal of price coordination and so they should contribute positively to a price
coordination index. In the limit, when the rate of growth of the prices is the
same in the two supermarket the index takes value 1. .
• If in a given fortnight t one of the supermarkets increases its price for product
i while the other is decreasing it (or viceversa), DDP1\44-1/ takes a. negative
value and contributes negatively to DDPM11-11 . We are just catching the idea
that divergent price movements should have a negative impact over a price co-
ordination index. In the limit, when the rate of growth of the prices at the two
supermarkets is the same but with opposite signs DDPM4-11 takes value -1.
• When neither supermarket J nor supermarket H change their prices DDPM i`lt-H takes
value 1. The fact that no one of the supermarkets change the price contributes
positively to the price coordination index.
Therefore, both DDPM H and DDPM:11-11 take values in the interval [1,-4
DDPMV-H have the desirable property of catching the simultaneity in the pricing
behaviour between supermarket pairs and the extent of this simultaneity when prices
change.
CHAPTER 4. PRICE COMPETITION AND PRICE DISPERSION 	 112
D: Pre-policy period analysis
In order to show that the results obtained in this paper do not depend of Tesco's
LPG, in this appendix we replicate the aggregated analyses of price dispersion and
price competition using only the data that corresponds to the fifteen fortnights before
the start of Tesco's LPG. The numbering of the tables correspond to that of the main
body of the paper and an a is added to distinguish them.
Table 4.5a: Wilconxon Test for Differences in the Price Dispersion across Quality Vari-
ants
Test I BP-HQ T CV 5%* CSS One/Two-Sided
TE-SA 199 389 46 One-Sided
TE-SF 136 389 46 One-Sided
SA-SF 128 389 46 One-Sided
Test II HQ-LQ
TE-SA 548 353 44 One-Sided
TE-SF 461 371 45 One-Sided
SA-SF 540 389 46 One-Sided
Test III BP-LQ
TE-SA 216 371 45 One-Sided
TE-SF 274 389 46 One-Sided
SA-SF 288 389 46 One-Sided
*Critical Value at 5% significance level. Rejection of the Ho if T < CV5%.
Corrected Sample Size (CSS)=Sample Size — Number of Zero Differences
The results obtained confirm that for the period before the start of the LPG:
D P D VIQK > DPDILDK
DPDVH-QK DPDII-61c
DPDII,21‘ > DPDIL-pic
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Table 4.6a: Wilconxon Test for Differences in the Degree of Between-Supermarket Price
Dispersion
BP T CV 5%* CSS One/Two-sided
TE-SA vs. TE-SF 396 279 41 Two-sided
TE-SA vs. SA-SF 346 249 39 Two-sided
TE-SF vs. SA-SF 280 249 39 Two-sided
HQ
TE-SA vs. TE-SF 475 343 45 Two-sided
TE-SA vs. SA-SF 435 327 44 Two-sided
TE-SF vs. SA-SF 459 310 43 Two-sided
LQ
TE-SA vs. TE-SF 247 279 41 Two-sided
TE-SF vs. SA-SF 378 294 42 Two-sided
TE-SF vs. SA-SF 315 249 39 Two-sided
*Critical Value at 5% significance level. Rejection of the Ho if T < CV 5%.
Corrected Sample Size(CSS) = Sample Size — Number of Zero Differences.
For the period before the start of the LPG it is true that:
DPDI5E-sA r-.--, DPDI5E-sF for J=BP,HQ
DPDI7-sA R-, DPDI5A-sF for J=BP,HQ,LQ
DPDgE-sF R-,' DPDI5A-5F for J=BP,HQ,LQ
The only difference with the full sample analysis is that in this case we reject the
null hypothesis of DPDQ-SA ,=,--, DPDITZ-SF
. Table 4.7a: Wilconxon Test for Differences in Price Coord. across Quality Variants
Test IV BP-HQ T CV 5% CSS One/Two Sided
TE-SA 338.5 371 45 One-sided
TE-SF 265.5 389 46 One-sided
SA-SF 287 371 45 One-sided
Test V LQ-HQ T CV 5%
TE-SA 373 389 46 One-sided
TE-SF 364.5 371 45 One-sided
SA-SF 385 389 46 One-sided
Test VI BP-LQ T CV 5%
TE-SA 407 336 43 One-sided
TE-SF 474.5 371 45 One-sided
SA-SF 458 371 45 One-sided
*Critical Value at 5% significance level. Rejection of the Ho if T < CV 5%.
Corrected Sample Size (CSS) = Sample Size — Number of Zero differences
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As for the whole-period analysis in the period before the start of the LPG it is true
that:
DDP1\4113-pic > DDP1VIII/QK
DDPMPLI:ax > DDPMIkalc
DDPMIkpic DDPMFIV
Table 4.9a: Wilconxon Test for Differences in the Degree of Between-Supermarket
Competition
BP T CV 5% CSS One/Two-sided
TE-SA vs. TE-SF 336.5 264 40 Two-sided
TE-SA vs. SA-SF 289.5 208 36 Two-sided
TE-SF vs. SA-SF 274 249 39 Two-sided
HQ
TE-SA vs. TE-SF 436 310 43 Two-sided
TE-SA vs. SA-SF 379.5 279 41 Two-sided
TE-SF vs. SA-SF 334.5 249 39 Two-sided
LQ
TE-SA vs. TE-SF 339 279 41 Two-sided
TE-SA vs. SA-SF 384 279 41 Two-sided
TE-SF vs. SA-SF 267 235 38 Two-sided
*Critical Value at 5% significance level. Rejection of the Ho if T < CV 5%.
Corrected Sample Size (CSS) Sample Size — Number of Zero Differences
In the period before the start of the LPG,
DPDI7J'E-sA DPDI5E-5F for J=BP,HQ,LQ
DpDITE-sA	 rvrSA-SF for J=Bp,HQ,LQ
DPDITE-sF DPDI5A-sF for J=BP,HQ,LQ
In the whole period analysis,
DPDI2-5A
 DPDIT-E2-sF
DPDITZ-sA
 > DPDII:c42-sF
DPDIL1- > DPDILI-SF
The fact that in the period before the start of the LPG the DDPMI for the LQs is
similar for the three supermarket pairs confirms that the cause of the greater degree
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of price coordination of Sainsbury and Safeway with Tesco than between them in the
whole period analysis is Tesco's LPG.
- Price Dispersion -3 I
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E: Figures Disaggregated Analysis
Figure 1: Disaggregated Analysis of Price Dispersion
I <-+ Price Dispersion
TE-SA BP H=5.7985
HYGIENICS	 GROCERIES	 HOUSEHOLD
	 CANNED
*************************************************************************************
TE-SF BP H=8.4942*
HYGIENICS
	 GROCERIES
	 HOUSEHOLD	 CANNED
******************** ***************************************************************
******************************************
SA-SF BP H=9.2947*
HYGIENICS	 GROCERIES	 HOUSEHOLD	 CANNED
******************** ***************************************************************
******************************************
TE-SA HQ H=9.9281*
HYGIENICS
	 GROCERIES	 CANNED	 HOUSEHOLD
****************************************** ******************************************
***************************************************************
TE-SF HQ H=9.3003*
HYGIENICS
	 GROCERIES	 CANNED	 HOUSEHOLD
***************************************************************** *******************
SA-SF HQ H=13.0723*
HYGIENICS
	 GROCERIES
	 CANNED	 HOUSEHOLD
****************************************** ******************************************
******************************************
TE-SA LQ H=4.3963
CANNED	 HYGIENICS
	 HOUSEHOLD
	 GROCERIES
*************************************************************************************
TE-SF LQ H=1.9000
HYGIENICS	 CANNED	 GROCERIES	 HOUSEHOLD
*************************************************************************************
SA-SF LQ H=1.8560
CANNED	 HYGIENICS
	 GROCERIES	 HOUSEHOLD
*************************************************************************************
* Significant at 5% level. Figures have been built using 30% level of significance for the
Dunn's Procedure. See Appendix B.
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Figure 2: Disaggregated Analysis of Price Competition
- Price Competition 4 II E-+ Price Competition
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TE-SA BP H=6.0165
CANNED	 HOUSEHOLD	 GROCERIES	 HYGIENICS
*************************************************************************************
TE-SF BP H=9.0503*
CANNED	 HOUSEHOLD	 GROCERIES	 HYGIENICS
****************************************** ******************************************
SA-SF BP H=10.4520*
CANNED	 HOUSEHOLD	 GROCERIES	 HYGIENICS
****************************************** ******************************************
TE-SA HQ H=4.7990
HOUSEHOLD	 GROCERIES	 CANNED	 HYGIENICS
*************************************************************************************
TE-SF HQ H=3.3498
HOUSEHOLD	 GROCERIES	 CANNED	 HYGIENICS
*************************************************************************************
SA-SF HQ H=8.3215*
HOUSEHOLD	 GROCERIES	 CANNED	 HYGIENICS
******************** ***************************************************************
TE-SA LQ H=0.0687
HYGIENICS	 CANNED	 GROCERIES	 HOUSEHOLD
*************************************************************************************
TE-SF LQ H=0.1905
HOUSEHOLD	 HYGIENICS	 CANNED	 GROCERIES
*************************************************************************************
TE-SF LQ H=0.4903
CANNED	 GROCERIES	 HOUSEHOLD	 HYGIENICS
*************************************************************************************
* Significant at 5% level. Figures have been built using 30% level of significance for the
Dunn's Procedure. See Appendix B.
Deodorant (Sure 24 hours Apa 150 ml )
Hair Shampoo (Timotei Herbs Shampoo 400grs)
Sanitary towels (Always 16)
Shower Gel (Imperial Leather 500m1)
Soap (Dove 250 grs )
Toothpaste (Colgate Total 100m1)
HYGIENIC PRODUCTS (6)
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F:List of Products in the sample
CANNED PRODUCTS (5)	 Baked Beans in Tomato Sauce (Heinz 425 grs)
Canned Peas (Hartley's Garden Peas)
Canned Spaghetti (Heinz 200 grs)
Canned Sweet Corn (Green Giant 340grs)
Canned Tomatoes (Napolina Chopped Tomatoes 400grs)
HOUSEHOLD SUNDRIES (8) Bleach (Domestos Bleach 21)
Conditioner (Lenor Ultra Plus Fabric Conditioner 21)
Kitchen Foil (Bacofoil 450mm x5m)
Kitchen Towel ( Andrex Kitchen Towel Twin Pack)
Tissues (Ultra 90. Kleenex)
Toilet Roll (Twin Andrex 4)
Washing Powder (Ariel Future 2kgs)
Washing Up Liquid (Fairy Excel Plus 500m1) 
ALCOHOL PRODUCTS (1) Beer (Heineken 330 ml) 
GROCERIES (24)	 Bread (Mighty White. 800 grs)
Cat Food (Whiskas 400grs)
Coffee (Nescafe 200grs)
Cornflakes (Kellogs Cornflakes 500grs)
Dog Food (Chum Original Large 400gr)
Fish Fingers (10 Birds Eye)
Flour (Homepride Flour 1,5kgs)
Frozen Peas (Birds Eye 340 grs)
Ice Cream (Walls Vanilla 750grs)
Ketchup (Heinz 340grs)
Margarine (Flora 500 grs)
Mayonneise (Hellmans 400 grs)
Oven Chips (McCain 1810 grs)
Pasta Sauce (Dolmio Pasta sauce Original 475 grs)
Peach Halves in Natural Juice ( Del Monte 415 grs)
Rice (Uncle Ben Long Grain Rice 1 kg)
Salad Dressing (Heinz Salad Dressing 285 grs)
Smoked Back (Danepack 8s)
Spaghetti (Buitoni 500grs)
Strawberry Jam (Robertson 454 grs)
Tea (PG Tips 250 grs)
Tuna in Oil (John West 200grs )
Walkers Crisps (Variety Multipack. 6 packs)
Yogourth (Muller Strawberry 200 grs) 
SOFT DRINKS (2)	 Coca-Cola (2 1)
Orange Juice (Del Monte 1 L)
Chapter 5
Pricing Behaviour at the UK
supermarkets: Does Quality
Matter?1
Abstract
We use an econometric model of simultaneous equations with error components to
analyse the influence of between supermarket and within supermarket competition to
determine supermarket patterns of price setting for the different categories they sell:
brand products, high quality own brand products and low quality own brand products.
The use of panel data allows the multiproduct-multiquality nature of the supermarket to
be taken into account. In addition, the use of EC3SLS estimator provides efficient and
consistent estimations of the parameters representing between supermarket and within
supermarket price competition. The results confirm that between supermarket price
competition is more intense for those categories with less possibilities of supermarket
product differentiation: brand products and low quality own brand products. On the
basis of these differences in intensity of price competition across supermarkets, we
provide an alternative explanation to the fact of higher profits of the UK supermarkets
in comparison with their continental counterparts.
5.1 Introduction
As explained in previous chapters, the UK supermarkets offer to the consumer three
quality variants for most of the products they sell. These are, listed from higher to
lower quality: brand products (BP), high quality own brand products (HQ) and low
quality own brand products (LQ). When setting the price of a given quality variant of
'We would like to thank to seminar participants at the University of Warwick Workshop of Indus-
trial Economics, 25th EARIE conference (Copenhagen), XIV Jornadas de Economia Industrial and
XXIII Simposio de Analisis Economico for helpful comments.
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a product, supermarkets have to take into account not only the competition within the
supermarket by variants of different quality but also the competition by variants sold
at other supermarkets.
In Chapter 4, we analysed price setting for each one of the quality variants just
taking into account the influence of the price setting by other supermarkets for the
same quality variant. The aim of this chapter is to take also into account the influence
in the price setting for each one of the quality variants of the price setting of the other
quality variants sold within the supermarket.
We consider the price setting decision by the supermarket as the final stage of
a multistage game. In the first stage of the game the supermarket takes the long
run decision about the range of quality variants to sell and the specific quality of the
variants. In the second stage the supermarket sets prices 2 . Most of the studies carried
out about retailing ignore either between or within supermarket competition. Bliss
[1988] deliberately does not consider the existence of own brand products and therefore
the existence of different quality variants competing within the supermarket. However,
the increasing market share of sales represented by the own brand products (around
36% of the total sales in value) makes it essential to consider within supermarket
competition in the analysis of the supermarket price setting. Mills [1995] sets the
conditions under which it is profitable for the supermarket to sell an own brand product
in addition to the BP, but does so assuming it to be a multiproduct monopolist. Hence,
he ignores the influence of the competition among supermarkets when the supermarket
chooses quality and price sequentially. For the purpose of this paper, we consider just
the second stage of the game, the pricing decision
We hypothesize that the consumers according to their willingness to pay for quality
make an a priori decision about the quality variant to buy before going to the super-
2 See Moorthy [1988] for an explanation of this multistage game.
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market. However, the final quality variant bought will depend on the comparison in
the supermarket of the prices of the different quality variants. As regards the con-
sumers' decision about the store, we believe that the variables influencing this decision
vary across consumers depending on the quality variant they are more likely to buy. As
BPs are homogeneous across supermarkets, for those consumers whose shopping basket
contains mostly BPs, location and supermarket average level of prices will be the main
determinants of the store decision. Because of their character of very basic products
the possibilities of supermarket differentiation for the LQs are very small. As a result,
for those consumers whose shopping basket contains mostly LQs, location and average
level of prices are again the main variables considered when choosing the supermarket.
The HQs are the quality variant with greater possibilities of supermarket differentia-
tion, hence those consumers whose shopping basket is mainly composed of HQ products
will consider an additional choice variable: the supermarket-characteristics of the prod-
ucts3.
Therefore, we assume that the supermarket will set prices for the three quality
variants to maximize profits taking into account the competition by other supermarkets,
i.e. the prices set by other supermarkets.
In this chapter, we build an econometric model that allows for control of both
the effects of between and within supermarket competition on the price setting of
the different quality variants considered. In addition, we analyse relevant points for
supermarket pricing policies and competition issues such as:
- the relationship between product differentiation possibilities and price setting
interdependence between supermarkets;
- the detection of supermarket price leadership for the different quality variants;
3 While we can find Heinz Baked Beans at all the supermarket we only can find Sainsbury Baked
Beans with its particular taste and packaging at Sainsbury.
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- the interdependence between the price setting of the different quality variants
within the supermarket;
- assessing the importance of direct and indirect between supermarket price effects,
where we understand as indirect price effect those that take place through the within
supermarket price readjustment;
In addition, we explore the role played by the differences in intensity of price com-
petition across quality variants to explain the higher profits of the UK supermarkets
with respect to their continental counterparts [The Economist, March, 1995].
The analysis is performed using a panel of micro level price data. These prices
were directly taken in three adjacent supermarkets that correspond to three of the
four chains with largest market share in the UK: Tesco, Sainsbury and Safeway. We
obtain efficient and consistent estimations of the system of simultaneous equations
characterising the supermarket behaviour by using an EC3SLS estimator. In addition
the joint consideration of both structural and reduced form parameters of this system
of equations allow us to control for both direct and indirect between supermarket price
effects.
The empirical work detects the presence of price leadership by Tesco for the high
quality own brand products. This fact is not surprising if we consider that in the
last years Tesco has taken over Sainsbury's leadership in the sector. As expected, the
results confirm the existence of an inverse relationship between supermarket product
differentiation possibilities and supermarkets price interdependence. Price interdepen-
dence between supermarkets is higher for the categories with less scope for supermarket
differentiation: branded products and low quality own brand products. Within super-
market, it is true for all the three supermarkets that the price setting of the intermediate
quality (HQ) is affected more by the price setting of the higher quality (BP) than by
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the price setting of the lower quality (LQ). This is just reflecting the objective of the
supermarkets when introducing the HQs: competing with the BPs.
The joint consideration of the high market share of the HQs and the comparative
lower degree of between supermarket competition for this variant provides an additional
explanation to the higher profits of the UK supermarkets in comparison with other EU
supermarkets.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the theoretical
framework. Section 3 describes the data used in the analysis. Section 4 is devoted to the
methodology. Section 5 deals with the analysis of the results. Finally the conclusions
are presented in Section 6.
5.2 Theoretical Framework
A supermarket product faces both competition from variants of different quality sold
at the same supermarket as well as competition from variants of the same and different
quality sold at other supermarkets. In our study the first form of competition will be
referred to as within supermarket competition. The idea is to model the competition
that takes place within the supermarket between the quality variants they sell: BP, HQ
and LQ, e.g. DelMonte Orange Juice vs. Sainsbury Orange Juice. The competition
from variants sold at different supermarkets will be referred to as between supermarket
competition. The between supermarket competition assumes quality equivalence of
quality variants across supermarkets, e.g. the quality of the Tesco HQ Orange Juice is
the same that the quality of Sainsbury HQ Orange Juice4.
In order to set up an econometric model taking into account both the effects of
within and between supermarket competition, we present first a model controlling
just for the effects of within supermarket competition. Then we redefine this model
4 The reasons behind this assumption were explained in Chapter 4.
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to introduce the influence of between supermarket competition in supermarket price
setting.
5.2.1 Within supermarket competition
In order to analyze within supermarket competition we can consider the supermarket
as a multiproduct monopolist [Mills, 1995] selling three variants of the same product
with perceived qualities qBp > qHQ > qw at prices pB p > p > pLQ . With the aim
of simplifying the notation we make qBp = q3 , qHQ = q2 and qw = (h.
Let us consider a continuum of consumers identical in tastes but differing in their
willingness to pay for quality. Consumers' willingness to pay for quality (0) is assumed
to be uniformly distributed with density equal to 1 on [a,b]. The consumer makes
indivisible and mutually exclusive purchases among the three goods sold at the su-
permarket. It means that the consumer buys either exactly one unit of the good or
none. Utility from consuming a good of quality qk is assumed to take the specific form
[Gabszewicz et al, 1986]
Uk = qk( Ok Pk)
the utility obtained for consuming nothing, Uo, is referred -as q00 . 5
Let Ok be the willingness to pay for quality such that the consumer with this par-
ticular willingness to pay for quality is indifferent between buying the good of quality
k and the good of quality k — 1
qk	 qk-1 
Ok -	 Pk	 Pk-1
qk qk-1	 qk qk-1
We can make use of this willingness to pay-splitting property (everyone within a
specific willingness to pay band buys a given quality) to write demands for each one of
the qualities as:
5 Uo can be interpreted as the utility of the outside option.
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DLQ = 02 —
D HQ 03 — 02
D Bp =-- b — 03
The profits of the monopolist multiproduct supermarket are given by:
7r s = DLQ(PLQ CLQ) DHQ(PHQ CHQ) DBP(PBP CBP)
and from the first order conditions that solve the maximization problem of the monop-
olist multiproduct supermarket we can derive the "within supermarket" best response
functions. In these best response functions the price setting for each one of the qualities
depends on the price setting for its quality neighbour/neighbours6.
ONBP
	 = 0; PHQ 02 ± 721PBP+722PLQ
ON
BP
'Fs 0; PLQ al + 73123HQ
The supermarkets carry out their price-quality space maximization bSr choosing
price for the BP variant and quality and price for HQ and LQ variants. For the purpose
of this analysis we will take the long run quality decision as given. The existence of
brand loyal consumers force the supermarkets to keep in stock BPs. The role played
by the HQs is to compete against the BPs for those consumers located in the upper
and medium segment of the market that are willing to exchange the brand name for a
6 The parameters have the following functional form:
=
 (1 + 43
1
(-1- , 
q143 — 42 
	
2 
'\1	 2
_L  42 — 4143 722 =	 )721 =
	 'q2 (q3	 2	 42 (43 — 41) J
1	 2
731 = (1+ qi qlq°
ql (q2 0))
07r,
-= 0; PBP = al + "YllPHQ
apLQ
CHAPTER 5. DOES QUALITY MATTER?	 126
price discount buying a product of very similar objective quality. The cost advantage
enjoyed by the supermarket as a multiproduct firm (economies of scale in advertising
and product development, umbrella branding, etc.) and its advantageous position in
the bargaining process determining the OBP wholesale price allows it to offer a product
of similar quality to the BP at lower price.
However, when introducing the LQ variant the main concern of the supermarkets
was not quality but price. In order to fight back against the discounters for the lower
and more price sensitive segment of the market, the supermarkets introduced a range
of products of manifestly lower quality than BPs and HQs sold at a very low price. To
avoid the risk of sales cannibalization between the two ranges of own brand products,
the supermarkets from the beginning established a clear distinction in terms of quality
packaging, advertising and brand name.
The different supermarket strategies when introducing each one of the two own-
brand quality variants determine the distribution of qualities within the UK super-
market. The result is a distribution in which the quality of the intermediate quality
(HQ) is closer to the quality of its upper quality neighbour (BP) than to the quality
of its lower quality neighbour (LQ). This has two main implications for the within su-
permarket best response functions: on the one hand, HQ price setting should be more
influenced by BP price setting than by LQ price setting (i.e. 
'Y211 > -y22 ); on the other
hand, HQ price setting should influence more BP price setting than LQ price setting
(i.e. 'Yli > '731).
5.2.2 A model of within and between supermarket competi-
tion
The problem of considering just within supermarket competition is that we are ignoring
the effect of the competition by other supermarkets on supermarket price setting.
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Therefore, the next step will consist of defining an econometric model that allows for
joint consideration of both forms of competition.
In order to define this model we assume that supermarket J when setting the prices
for the three quality variants of product m at time t has perfect information about the
prices at time t — 1 for the three quality variants of product m at supermarkets H and
K. Using this information and given qualities, supermarket J choose prices according
to the following structural system of simultaneous equations:
,JBP	 L	 _L RJ ,,HBp _L fqJ „KBp
Fit =	 _ 111Fit	 N11Fit-1	 f-'12Fit-1
,J „JBP	 ,,,,J „AQ	 fq..7
Pit	 - `-`2	
,,
121Fit	 122.Pit	 P21Pit-1	 P22Fit-1
JLQ	 J _L ,,j _JHQ 0J	 ,,KLQ
Fit = (13 m /311-lit	 P31Pit-1	 P32Fit-1
where:
J, H, K: supermarkets considered in the analysis ; i = 1, n products considered
in the analysis ; t = 1, T number of periods considered in the analysis ; p ij: :price of
the variant of quality q of product i at supermarket J in period t.
We will consider as many systems of equations as supermarkets included in the
analysis. In this case three.
In this structural system of simultaneous equations describing price setting behav-
iour we control for within supermarket competition by means of the within-supermarket
best-response functions. In order to control for the effects of between-supermarkets
competition we have added to the right-hand 'side of each one of the within-supermarket
best-response functions the price effects of supermarket-differentiated variants of the
same quality. For example, in the first of the equations we make the price of the BP
at supermarket J in the period t to depend on the price of the BP at supermarkets H
and K in the period t-1. As the horizontally differentiated variants of the same quality
sold at different supermarkets are strategic complements we assume that the /3's>0.
(5.1)
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The structure of this model describing supermarket pricing behaviour is given by
our assumptions about price effects between supermarket differentiated variants. We
consider the price effects between supermarket differentiated variants of the same qual-
ity as direct price effects (e.g. pillt 1 7,PiKt Bf have a direct price effect on p iJtBP ) and in-
clude them in the right-hand side of the relevant within-supermarket best-response
function. However, the price effects between supermarket differentiated variants of dif-
ferent quality are considered as indirect price effects and assumed to act through direct
price effects. In order to illustrate this assumption we can use as example the effect of
HB p	 JI-1Q	 Hgp	 J1-1Qpit_i on pit . pit-1 affects pit through the within supermarket price readjustment
that its direct price effect on piJtBP starts.
The total price effects between supermarket differentiated variants of the same
quality (e.g. piKt Bf on piJtBP ) are not just exhausted by the direct price effect caught the
structural form coefficient. We must consider that the supermarket is selling more than
one quality variant and account for the indirect price effect that takes place through
the within supermarket price readjustment that any direct price effect starts.
The structural form coefficients gives us just direct price effects between supermarket-
differentiated variants of the same quality without considering within supermarket price
readjustment, e.g. the effect of p over pij: assuming the prices set by supermarket J
for the other two quality variants are constant. Therefore, in order to assess properly
both price effects between supermarket differentiated variants of the same quality and
price effects between supermarket-differentiated variants of different quality we have
to determine the reduced-form of the system.
A	 „RBI.	 Hgc?	 KgQ
	
p BP
 = 1 m 7r 11Pit —1	 +"121-'1 713Pli_ i 	714Pt-i
Jgc?	 ,,HBP
	
H Q
.N
7r24._int_
L	
Hic?
.jp	 = A2
 ± 21Pit-1	 " 22Pit-1	 "23.eit-1
t4	 HBP	 HHQ
	
= A3 ± 731Pit-i	 " 32PiKt-13 1P 733Pit-1	 7	
,_
34Pit-1
HLQ,	 KLQ
+ 715P	 1-ik_i 	 IrisPit_i
,,,-1-1 LQ _i_.	 KLQ
± 725Pit_i -r- 726P it-1
HLQ, ...,.	 K LQ7r35Pit —1 -I- "36Pit-1
(5.2)
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In this reduced-form system7 , supermarket J prices at time t for each one of the
quality variants are expressed as a function of the prices set by the other two super-
markets (H and K) at time t-1 for each one of the three quality variants they sell.
The highlighted parameter in this system correspond to total price effects (once within
supermarket price readjustment has been allowed) between supermarket-differentiated
variants of the same quality. The rest of parameters correspond to price effects between
supermarket-differentiated variants of different quality that here are assumed indirect
price effects.
We capture the multiproduct nature of the supermarket 8 by means of a panel data
set of supermarket product prices'.
Using this econometric model we are interested in exploring the following questions:
- detection of possible price leaderships in the price setting of each one of the three
quality variants considered;
- analysing the effects of supermarket differentiation possibilities on the intensity
of the price effects between supermarket-differentiated variants of the same quality;
- comparison of the intensity of between supermarket price effects for supermarket-
differentiated variants of the same quality and supermarket-differentiated variants of
different quality
- within supermarket: exploring the price relationships between the different quality
variants sold by the supermarket;
7 The existence of a reduced form of the model requires 1 — I 11 31 722731 0 0. The expressions
for the reduced form parameters can be seen in Appendix A.
8 Multiproduct in the sense that the supermarket sells the three quality variants for a full range of
products.
8 The use of panel data provides additional advantages as controlling for individual hetereogeneity
[Hsiao, 1986].
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5.3 The data
The data set used in the analysis was already described in Chapter 4.
5.4 Methodology
5.4.1 Estimation Model
The final simultaneous equation model describing the pricing behaviour of each one of
the supermarkets is as follows:
Tesco's Structural System of Simultaneous Equations
+ 0T1 .2E.piStF_Bip + ur E
P
TEBP = Eaf ± „llTE 7.1itTEHt	 I l'	 Q ± OT11EPiStA-'ii
	
TEHQ 
=. aTE 4_ 7
21 pit	
_i_ 
722 pit	
_L fq TE ,S A I/ Q ...L aTE,SFHq ± TE
Pit	 2	 1 / F 	 ' / F 	 ' P21 F it-1	 ' P22 Pit-1 
TELQ ,TE _i_ „TE TEHQ _i_ 0TE SALQ _L f4TE„SFLQ _i ,TE
Pit	 = '-`3	 I /31 Pit	 m P31 Pit-1 -1- P32 Pit-1 ' _ '-'3
Sainsbury's
SABPSAPit	 alSAHQ	 SAPit	 = a2
SALQ ,SA
Pit	 — a3
Structural System of
SA SAHQ0SA TEBP711 Pit ± P11 Pit-i
,SA,SABP „SA,SALQ
	
/21 Fit	 122 Fit
	
_1_ 
7u Pit	
_L r4SA„,TELQ
-1-
	 F 	 ' P31 Pit-1
Simultaneous Equations
rqSA,SFBP
P12 Fit-1 I “1.
aSA TEHQ I aSA SFHQ
m P21 Pit-1 m P22 Pit-1
f4SA,SFLQ ,SAP 3 2 Fit-1 ' ".3
+
Safeway's Structural System of Simultaneous Equations
1.4SF,SABp _i_ ,SFSFBp _ ,SF _i_	
P t	 P11
 f4SF ,TE.Bp _j_
Pit	 — `-`1	 , /11 Fi 	 1  Fit-1 -1 P12 Fit-1	 ' "'i
SFHQ
 ,SF i ,SF,SFBp _L
 722 pit	
_i_ fqSF,TEHQ
Pit	 = '-'2 _ '_ /21 Fit	 / I  F 	 P21 Fit-1 -1- 1-11-4 2S2FPiSt	 Uill Q ± SF2
SFLQ 
— SF iSF SFHQ _L aSF TELQ _L f4SF,SAL4 _i ,SF
Pit	 — '-'3 
_ 
1_ 1
„
31 Pit	 m P31 Pit-1 m P32 Fit-1 ' 
_ 
`"3
Variable definition:
ptjtq : logarithm of the price of the quality variant q of product i in fortnight t at
supermarket J; J: Supermarkets considered: Tesco, Sainsbury, Safeway ; q: quality
variants: BP, HQ and LQ; i= 1, ..., 46 products in the sample ; t = 1, ..., 27 fortnightly
observations.
In each one of the structural-form systems above, we assume a one-way error com-
ponent for the disturbances. Thus, the disturbance of the j structural equation is given
by:
= Z[Li vi for j = 1,...,3
and[crt2iij
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where Zt, = (IN it ) 1°and = (pu ,	 ihNi) and
/
jV • = (v11j ) 142j • • • 7 V1Tj, • • • 7 VN1i 7 VN2j, •••, VNT) are random vectors with zero mean and3
covariance matrix
12 ./  — E(uiu) = cr2 (IN 0 JT) 0-2Vji (IN 0 IT)3., —
The consideration of the vector of product specific effects (pi ) as random arises
from the fact that the random effect model seems to be the appropriate specification
when the sample is drawn from a large population as it is our case. Furthermore, it is
assumed that the product specific effects are different for each one of the supermarkets,
which will allow us for the separate estimation of the system of simultaneous equations
that correspond to each one of the supermarkets.
The variance-covariance matrix for the set of Mil structural equations is given by:
= E (uu') =	 (iN JT. ) + Et, 0 (iN 0 IT)
where u' -=	 u'2. ....u) is a lx MNT vector of disturbances. E i, =
E, = [o 1 ] are M x M matrices.
5.4.2 Identification and estimation method
Identification
Before proceeding to estimation we need to study identification.
We assume that at time t supermarket J, when setting the prices for the three
quality variants of product m, has perfect information about the prices at time t — 1
of the three quality variants of product m at supermarkets H and K 12 . Using this
NIN : identity matrix of dimension N with N=46
vector of ones of dimension T with T=27
JT : matrix of ones of dimension T
: Kronecker product
11 1n our particular case M ---- 3.
12 This seems quite reasonable when we find advertising like this one by Tesco: " We check more
than 18000 prices every week so you do not have to do it"
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information and given qualities, supermarket J chooses prices to maximize profits.
With this assumption, we can consider as exogenous for the estimation of supermarket
J system the variables representing the prices set by supermarkets H and K at time t —
1. The simultaneously decided prices of the three quality variants sold at supermarket
J are considered as endogenous variables.
Given the identical structure of the structural form of the three systems of si-
multaneous equations specified above, we will illustrate identification using Tesco's
structural system of simultaneous equations. For this system we consider as endoge-
E
nous variables: piTtEBp p itTHQ and pTitELQ . We consider as exogenous variables for the
SABp SAHQ SALQ SFBp SFHQ	 SFLQestimation of Tesco's system: pit_i , p2t_1 , pit_l , pit-1 , ptt_i and ptt_i .
We say that structural equation i is identified if the number of excluded exogenous
variables (k2 ) is larger than or equal to the number of right hand side endogenous vari-
ables (g 1 ) 13 . All the three equations of the identically structured systems of equations
considered above satisfy this condition and therefore we can proceed to the estimation.
Estimation
Because the endogenous variables included in the right-hand side of each structural
equation are correlated with the disturbances, usual OLS procedures provide incon-
sistent estimates of the structural parameters. We can consider two approaches that
solve the inconsistency problem using instrumental variables. Single equation esti-
mation methods like two-stage least squares , (2SLS) obtain consistent estimations by
estimating each equation separately. System methods of estimation like three-stage
least squares (3SLS) that allow to control for relationships between equations provide
an increase in efficiency [Greene, 1996].
When using a one-way error component model the equivalent estimation procedures
13 Usually the order condition for identification is expressed as k2 > gi for each one of the equations.
It is also possible to show that each one of the equations satisfy the rank condition for identification.
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to 2SLS and 3SLS are Error Components two-stage least squares (EC2SLS) and Error
Components three-stage least squares (EC3SLS) as described by Baltagi [1995].
Given the efficiency gains of EC3SLS over EC2SLS, we will use EC3SLS as the
estimation method. The estimation of the structural system of simultaneous equations
provides us with estimators for the direct between and within supermarket price effects.
First, we estimate separately the structural form coefficients that correspond to
each one of the supermarket systems using the EC3SLS estimator. Then, from the
coefficients and variance-covariance matrix obtained in the estimation of the structural
system of equations for each one of the supermarkets we can obtain estimations for the
reduced form parameters and their correspondent variance-covariance matrix. We will
use them to carry out tests concerning price effects between supermarket-differentiated
variants of the same quality and price effects between supermarket differentiated vari-
ants of different quality. These reduced form systems take the following form for each
one of the supermarkets:
Tesco's Reduced-Form System of Simultaneous Equations
pTit EB p = ATE
TEHQ = ATE
Pit	 2-3-2
TELQ = ATE
3
TE SABP
7rii Pit-1
_TE,,SABP
m 21 Pit-1
L TEE„SABP
- " 31 Pit-1
_L „,_TE,,SFBP _L E A H Q
- 1- "12 Fit-1
	 '' 13 Pit-1
„TE„,,SFB p _L „TE„SAHQ
"22 Pit-1
	 "23 Pit-1
_L„TE „,,	 _SFB p L
-1- 32 Pit-1 -E ” 3 3 Pit-1
„TE,SFHQ
"14 Fit-1
TE SFHQ
m 724 Pit-1
TE SFHQ
m 734 Pit-1
,„TE...,SALQ
"15 Pit-1
TE SALQ
m 725 Pit-1
SALQ
7r35 Pit-1
,TE,SFLq
" 16 Fit-1
_t_ ,TE,SELQ
" 26 Fit-1
TE SFLQ
-I- 736 Pit-1
Sainsbury's Reduced-Form System of Simultaneous Equations
SAB p	 ASA	 SA TEBP „SA,SFBP _1_ „SA„TEHQ	 SA,SFHQ	 SA,TELQ _L SA ,r,S Q
Pit	 —- 211 -r•	 Pit-i -r•
_r? 72S6ApiSt F2Q1
	
"12 Pit-1 m "13 Pit-1	 " 14 Fit-1	 " 15 Fit-1 -1 "16 Fit-1SAHQ	
_L „SA,TEBP „SA,SFBP _L ,SA,TEHQ _L ,SA,SF114	 2S5 piA TtEPit	 =	 "21 Pit-1 - ' "22 Pit-1	 "23 Pit-1	 "24 Pit-1SALQ
	 ASA _L „SA,TEBP _L „SA,SFBP _L 7rSA TEHQ _L „SA,SFHQ _L ,SA,TELQ _L ,SA,nsFLQ
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Safeway's Reduced-Form System of Simultaneous Equations
7rypiStAjr
7r ,r ApiSt_/33./.
SFEp ASF
	 SF TEBp
Pit	 =	 + ir11 P2_
sFHQ ASF _L „SF,TEBP
Pit	 "21 Pit-1
SFLQ
- ASF ,SF,TEBPPit	 —	 "31 Pit-1
irSFDTEHQ13 it-1
ET HQ571923 it-1
SF TEHQ
"33 Pit-1
SF,,SAH Q
I „" 14 Fit-1
„SF„SAHQ
24 Pit-1
,SF,SAHQ
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75,15F.piTtE_LiQ SF
+ ir16 PiStA-LiQ
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5.5 Analysis of the results
The results of the estimations of the three systems of equations both in their structural
form and reduced form are included in Appendix EVA.
It is possible to observe that except one all the coefficients of the structural system
of equations describing the supermarkets' pricing behaviour are different from zero at
10% significance level (most of them at 5%). Therefore, both between and within
supermarket factors seem to be important to explain supermarkets' pricing behaviour.
We start the interpretation of the results by analysing between supermarket com-
petition in section 5.5.1 and 5.5.2. Section 5.5.1 is devoted to the analysis of price
effects between supermarket-differentiated variants of the same quality. In section
5.5.2 we analyse price effects between supermarket-differentiated variants of different
quality to assess their relative importance with respect to the price effects between
supermarket-differentiated variants of the same quality. Section 5.5.3 is addressed to
test the predictions of the theoretical model about within supermarket competition.
5.5.1 Between supermarket competition: price effects between
supermarket differentiated variants of the same quality
Price effects between supermarket-differentiated variants of the same qual-
ity: direct and indirect effects
When analysing price effects between supermarket-differentiated variants of the same
quality, we can distinguish between the direct price effects caught by the structural
form coefficients and the total price effects caught by the reduced form coefficients.
The difference between direct price effect and total price effect, the indirect price effect,
is given by the price readjustment process that takes place in each supermarket when
facing changes in prices by the other supermarkets.
14We do not provide descriptive statistics for all the price series (414) for a question of space. They
are available on request.
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In Table 5.1, we show both total price effects (TPE) and direct price effects (DPE).
We will use an example to explain how to read this table: 0.354 in the second row of
the first column is the estimated parameter (reduced form parameter) catching TPE
of piStAmpI over piTtEBP whereas 0.336 in the same row but in the second column is the
estimated parameter (structural form parameter) catching only the direct price effect.
It is possible to observe in this table that the DPE always represents at least 90% of
the total price TPE. This evidence suggests us that most of the total effect of a change
in the price of the variant q at supermarket J over the price of variant q at supermarket
H takes place through the direct effect in the price of this quality variant and only a
small portion of the change is explained through the price readjustment for the three
quality variants that the supermarkets carries out to maximize the price quality space.
Table 5.1: Total and Direct Price Effects
piStABPBP	 W'BP	 Pi5t'FBP
TPE DPE TPE DPE TPE DPE
2EHP
it-i 0.403 0.382 0.449 0.420
SABp
Pit-1 0.354 0.336 0.366 0.343
SFBP 0.566 0.538 0.471 0.446
HQ TEHQPit
TPE DPE
sAHQ
Pit
TPE DPE
sPHQPit
TPE DPE
2 EHQ
Pit-1 0.516	 0.486 0.447	 0.414
SAHQ
Pit-i 0.258 0.244 0.123	 0.114
sFHQ
Pit-1 0.282 0.267 0.154	 0.145
LQ TELQPit sALQPit ,sveLQPit
TPE DPE TPE DPE TPE DPE
l'ELQ
SAL Q
pit-
SFLQ
pit-
0.330
0.581
0.328
0.579
0.213
0.268
0.212
0.266
0.500
0.407
0.492
0.401
As we are interested in the total between supermarket price effects once consid-
ered price readjustment within the supermarket, we analyse price effects between
supermarket-differentiated variants of the same quality using the reduced form co-
efficients. One might expect an inverse relationship between the size of 7r's that corre-
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spond to price effects between supermarket-differentiated variants of the same quality
and the possibilities of supermarket product differentiation for each one of the qual-
ity variants. However, it is possible that these 7r's are catching some form of price
leadership. We think that if there exists an explicit dominance of the influence of the
price setting by one of the supermarkets in the other supermarkets price setting, we
should control for the possibility of price leadership. Therefore, the interpretation of
the 7r's that correspond to price effects between supermarket-differentiated variants of
the same quality should first account for price leaderships and then for the possible
inverse relationship between supermarket product differentiation and intensity of be-
tween supermarket competition, where intensity of between supermarket competition
is proxied by the 7r's size.
Testing for price leadership
Before interpreting the estimated coefficients of the variables representing price effects
between supermarket-differentiated variants of the same quality as inversely related
with the possibilities of supermarket product differentiation for each one of the quality
variants considered in the analysis, we should check for price leaderships. We under-
stand that a price leadership of supermarket J for a given quality variant q exists if
there is an explicit dominance of the price setting of supermarket J over the price
setting of supermarkets K and H in this quality variant. On the basis of this definition
of price leadership, we require two conditions for the price leadership of supermarket
J for the quality variant q to existn:
- the influence of price setting by supermarket J at time t — 1 over price setting by
supermarket H (K) at time t has to be significantly greater than the influence of price
setting by supermarket K(H) at time t — 1 over price setting by supermarket H(K)
15 The 71" parameters used in the tests of sections 5.5.1 and 5.5.2 correspond to the parameters of
each one of the supermarkets reduced form systems of equations specified in section 5.4.2.
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at t . For example, to check for price leadership by Sainsbury in the HQ variant we
require that : 7113E
 > 4E and 41 > 74(
- and the influence of price setting by supermarket H(K) at time t —1 over the price
setting by supermarket J at time t has to be significantly smaller than the influence
of price setting by supermarket J at time t — 1 over the price setting by supermarket
H(K) at time t. For example, to check for price leadership by Sainsbury in the HQ
category we require: zy	 and 74t <4(.
The only phenomenon of price leadership that we detect is that by Tesco for the
HQs16 . In order to prove it we can check that Tesco's HQ price setting fulfills the two
conditions that we have imposed for price leadership.
Both for Sainsbury's and Safeway's systems the coefficients that correspond to
TEHQ (0.516 and 0.447) are significantly higher than the coefficients that correspond re-
sFHQspectively to Safeway and Sainsbury HQ price setting in these two systems (p i [0.154]
and pistAr [0.123] respectively). Therefore, the first of the conditions for price leader-
ship is satisfied.
The fulfillment of the second condition, and so the price leadership by Tesco in the
HQ variant, is confirmed when comparing the estimated coefficients that correspond to
and pistF_V in Tesco's system with the coefficients of pTitEr in Safeway's and Sains-
bury 's systems. Both the estimated coefficients for p istAr (0.258) and pistFV (0.282) in
Tesco's system of simultaneous equations are significantly lower than the coefficients
for piTtEr in the other two systems of simultaneous equations (0.516 in the Sainsbury's
system and 0.447 in Safeway's system)
Further insights about a possible Tesco's price leadership in the other quality vari-
ants have a negative result. The estimated coefficients representing the between super-
market influence of Tesco's price setting for BPs and LQs are not significantly higher
"The statistical analysis of Tesco's HQ price leadership is presented in Appendix C.
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than those representing the price settings by Sainsbury and Safeway.
Supermarket product differentiation and price effects between supermarket-
differentiated variants of the same quality.
Once we have accounted for Tesco price leadership for the HQ variant, we are interested
in exploring the existence of a possible inverse relationship between possibilities of
supermarket product differentiation and intensity of between supermarket competition
for each one of quality variants.
Although, we already analysed the possibilities of supermarket product differenti-
ation for each one of the quality variants in Chapter 4, we briefly recall them here.
We explained that for the BPs, provided with identical specifications to all the super-
markets, the only possibility of product differentiation is supermarket location. The
very nature of the LQ variant is limiting their possibilities of horizontal product dif-
ferentiation. The LQs are basic products addressed to compete in price for the lowest
segment of the market. Any additional product refinement would increase, the price
of the product and contradict the aim for which they were created. The result is
products that are hardly differentiated across supermarkets. It is for the HQs that
the supermarkets have the highest possibilities of differentiation. These products are
addressed to compete with the BPs for the upper medium segment of the consumer
distribution. This segment of consumers is concerned not only about the price but also
about the characteristics of the products. Therefore, supermarkets have the possibility
of differentiating their HQs introducing elements of horizontal product differentiation
by means for example of advertising, taste, packaging, etc.
Thus, in absence of any price leadership, as HQs are the quality variant that offers
greater possibilities of supermarket product differentiation, for the inverse relationship
between supermarket product differentiation and intensity of between supermarket
competition to be true the two following predictions should be confirmed for the three
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supermarket considered in the analysis:
1.- The influence of BP price setting by supermarket H(K) on BP price setting by
supermarket J should be greater than the influence of HQ price setting by supermarket
H(K) on HQ price setting by supermarket J. As we are testing separately for the
influences by supermarkets H and K, we will check this prediction by means of two
identical one-sided t-tests with null and alternative hypotheses':
H-Influence K-influence
114	 • inJ — •77-J•	 11	 " 11
yoJ	— 71- .7H, •	 — -11
— 723
— 723
=
>
0
0
H j	 •012 •
H112
(.0
. 12 - 1- 12
= 712
j
— 724
—	 24
= 0
> °
For example, for the Tesco's system of simultaneous equations we could be testing
if Tesco's BP price setting is more influenced by Sainsbury's BP price setting than
Tesco's HQ price setting is influenced by Sainsbury's HQ price setting.
2.- The influence of LQ price setting by supermarket H(K) on LQ price setting by
supermarket J should be greater than the influence of HQ price setting by supermarket
H(K) on HQ price setting by supermarket J. As in prediction 1, the null and alternative
hypotheses are:
H-Influence K-influence
.1102.1 	(DJ	 -— 71--11 • f 21	 35 - 71-13 = 0 H02 2 • 	 `V"I 212 = 73'76 - 7274 °
Hi721 : coA = 745 — 713 >0 111122 212 = > °
For example for Tesco's system of simultaneous equations, we could be testing if
Safeway's LQ price setting affects Tesco's LQ price setting more than Safeway's HQ
price setting affects Tesco's HQ price setting
17With respect to the subindex of the null and alternative hypotheses. The first number of the
subindex is 0 if we are referring to a null hypothesis and 1 if we are referring to an alternative
hypothesis. The two following numbers are test indicators. For example, H01 is the null hypothesis
of test 1.
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Table 5.2: Between supermarket price effects between variants of the same quality
TESCO
Description	 Coefficient Std.Errors.
1-/011
 ; ColT = 0; H111 .	 TE.coii
	
> 0 SA—>TE 0.096** 0.036
11012
	 WEE = 0 ; H112 . ,TE >0•	 Y'12 SF-->TE 0.284** 0.036
I/021
	 (PTIE = 0 ; 11121 . ,TE•	 1'21	 > 0 SA-4TE 0.071** 0.041
I/022
	 WEE = 0; 11122 . ,TE•	 7'22	 >0 SF—>TE 0.299** 0.037
SAINSBURY
1-/o11 ;
	 'J5.14 =
H012
	 Co‘,Y =
0 ;
0;
H111
I-1112
SA
•	 Coil	 >0
. ,SA
•	 Y'12	 > 0
TE—>SA
SF—SA
SA	 n
C°	 u11 
0.317** 0.045
H021 ;
	 = 0; I/121
•	 ,SA
•	 V-'21	 >0 TE-6A *it < 0
I-1-022
	 (P '21 = 0 ; H122 . ,SA•	 Y'22	 > 0 SF—>SA 0.114** 0.035
S AFEWAY
Hon ; Coif' = 0; H,, 1 ; Cog' > 0 TE-->SF 0.001 0.047
1/012 ; go( = 0; H112 COY > 0 SA-6F 0.249** 0.045
I/021
	 C°52'iP 0; H121 (plr > 0 TE—*SF 0.053 0.047
I/022
	 = 0 ; H122 goy > 0 SA-6F 0.283** 0.044
** Rejection of the null hypothesis (5% level of significance);* Rejection of the null
hypothesis (10% level of significance) .
We can observe in Table 5.2 that for Tesco the two predictions made about between
supermarket competition are confirmed. The influence of between supermarket com-
petition18
 on Tesco's price setting is higher for BP and LQ than for HQ (H011; H012 and
I/021, H022 are rejected). Therefore for Tesco, we find an inverse relationship between
•product differentiation possibilities and between supermarket influence in the patterns
of price setting.
Obviously, all the tests concerning Sainsbury and Safeway will be conditioned by
Tesco's strong price leadership for the HQ variant. Whereas Sainsbury's influence on
Safeway's price setting and viceversa confirm the predictions about product differen-
tiation possibilities (H012 and I/022 are rejected), these predictions are not true for
those comparisons in which the coefficients representing Tesco's HQ price leadership
are present.
18 From now on, when talking about between supermarket competition if nothing is specified, it
should be understood that we are referring to price effects between supermarket-differentiated variants
of the same quality.
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To sum up, the analysis of between supermarket competition sheds light on two
facts. On the one hand, the recognition of Tesco's leadership for HQ price setting. On
the other hand, if we isolate this leadership, the hypothesis of a negative relationship
between product differentiation possibilities and intensity of between supermarket price
competition seems to be true. Therefore, the results obtained in Chapter 4 when con-
sidering only the influence of between supermarket competition are confirmed when we
consider both the effects of between and within supermarket competition: whenever it
is possible supermarkets will be interested in the introduction of elements of horizontal
product differentiation to relax price competition.
Just to remember that this result was used in Chapter 4 to explain the higher profits
enjoyed by the UK supermarkets in comparison with their continental counterparts.
The traditional factors used to explain this phenomenon are: more advanced supply
management systems and the existence of high property costs acting as barriers to entry
[The Economist, 1995]. We provide an additional explanation to the higher profits of
UK supermarkets even ignoring the traditional factors. Because the market share of
HQs in total supermarket sales is greater in the UK than in any other country of the
EU, we believe that the softer intensity of price competition for the HQs is a key factor
to understand these higher profits. This seems even more evident when we consider
that gross profit margins are 20 to 30% higher for HQs than BPs.
5.5.2 Between supermarket competition: price effects between
supermarket differentiated variants of different quality.
As a result of the assumptions of the theoretical model, price effects between supermarket-
differentiated variants of different quality only take place through price adjustment
within the supermarket and therefore they are considered as indirect price effects. For
•	 TEHc?example, a change in p it_i only has an effect over pV BP
 through the within super-
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market price readjustment process that starts the direct price effect of pTitEHi
 Q on pistil'? .
'Whereas the structural coefficients do not catch indirect price effects, these are caught
by the reduced form coefficients that correspond to supermarket-differentiated variants
of different quality.
Our aim in this section is on the one hand to compare price effects between
supermarket-differentiated variants of the same quality with price effects between
supermarket-differentiated variants of different quality and on the other hand to assess
the intensity of between supermarket price effects between variants of different quality.
Price effects between supermarket-differentiated variants of the same qual-
ity vs. price effects between supermarket-differentiated variants of different
quality
In order to compare price effects between supermarket-differentiated variants of the
same quality and supermarket-differentiated variants of different quality, we define a
new series of parameters. For each one of the quality variants, we obtain these parame-
ters by substracting to the reduced form parameter representing the price effect of the
supermarket-differentiated variant of the same quality the reduced-form parameter rep-
resenting the price effect of the supermarket-differentiated variant of different quality.
In Table 5.3 we show these estimated parameters and between brackets their standard
errors. Therefore, the first figure in this table (0.323) should be interpreted just as the
parameter resulting from obtaining the difference between the reduced-form parameter
representing the influence of Sainsbury BP price setting over Tesco BP price setting
and the parameter representing the influence of Sainsbury HQ price setting over Tesco
BP price setting; as it was told above the figure between brackets is the correspondent
standard error of the parameter.
In general, we expect price effects between supermarket-differentiated variants of
the same quality to be no smaller and most of the time greater than price effects
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between supermarket-differentiated variants of different quality.
It is possible to observe in Table 5.3 that the BP variant confirms this prediction
at all the supermarkets. The price effects within 19 the BP quality variant are greater
than the price effects over the BPs of any of the other quality variants. Even more,
both for Tesco and Sainsbury other supermarkets LQ prices do not have a significant
effect over the BPs.
Table 5.3: Price effects between supermarket differentiated variants of the same quality
versus price effects between supermarket differentiated variants of different quality 
TESCO
	 SAINS	 SAFE
SA->TE SF->TE TE->SA SF-SA TE->SF SA-SF
BP-BP vs HQ-BP
BP-BP vs LQ-BP
HQ-HQ vs BP-HQ
HQ-HQ vs LQ-HQ
LQ-LQ vs BP-LQ
LQ-LQ vs HQ-LQ
0.323**
(0.027)
-
-
0.110**
(0.032)
-
-
0.317**
(0.035)
0.308**
(0.037)
0.533**
(0.027)
-
-
0.045
(0.038)
-
-
0.561**
(0.028)
0.558**
(0.029)
0.317**
(0.038)
-
-
0.389**
(0.044)
-
-
0.158**
(0.031)
-0.011
(0.037)
'
0.445**
(0.036)
-
0.006
(0.039)
-
-
0.203**
(0.031)
0.201**
(0.032)
0.344**
(0.033)
0.429**
(0.028)
0.323**
(0.050)
0.360**
(0.042)
0.489**
(0.030)
0.459**
(0.035)
0.337**
(0.030)
0.350**
(0.028)
0.022
(0.040)
0.152**
.(0.037)
0.397**
(0.037)
0.395**
(0.037)
** The parameter is significant at 5% level, i.e. rejection of the null hypothesis of no
difference between price effects (at 5% level of significance)
For the HQs, within quality variant price effects are significantly greater than the
effects of LQ price setting (other supermarkets LQ prices do not have a significant influ-
ence over HQ prices at Tesco and Sainsbury). However, BP price effects SFBp -aTHQ,
SFBp -4SAHQ
 and SABp ->SFHQ have a similar importance to their respective within
quality variants price effects. We find two factors explaining this phenomenon: on the
one hand, once we have taken into account Tesco's HQ price leadership, within quality
19 Price effects between supermarket differentiated variants of the same quality.
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variant price effects are significantly smaller for the HQs than for the BPs or LQs,
signalling a lower degree of price competition for this variant; on the other hand, the
within supermarket price effects of BPs on HQs are greater than the within super-
market price effects of HQs on BPs (see section 5.5.3) and in the supermarket price
readjustment process most of the other supermarket BP price effects act through this
within supermarket price effect of BPs on HQs.
As regards the LQs, within quality variant price efikts we significaat( greater tiva\
price effects of supermarket differentiated variants of different quality except for the
price effect of Tesco's HQ on Sainsbury's LQ. The combination of the direct influence
of Tesco's HQ price setting over Sainsbury's HQ price setting (Tesco's HQ price leader-
ship) and the high influence of HQ price setting on LQ price setting within Sainsbury
could explain this result (see section 5.5.3).
Price effects between supermarket-differentiated variants of different qual-
ity.
With respect to the price effects between supermarket-differentiated variants of differ-
ent qualities, we expect price effects to be greater between quality neighbours. There-
. fore, we expect that for a given supermarket price setting, the influence .
 of other super-
markets BP(LQ) price setting will be greater on HQ than in LQ(BP). We can check
these predictions by means of two identical structured one sided t-tests.
In the first, we test if the influence of BP price setting by supermarket H(K) is
greater on the HQ price setting than on the ii,Q price setting by supermarket J.
H-Influence K-influence
He131 : (10 .L = lr 'L	 1=— 7 1.  0 H1032 : C ° .12 = 742 — 7 '72 = 0
lif31
 : co L = 7 T1 — 7 41 > 0 H7i.3 2 : (Pi = 7 '12 — J71- 2 > 0
In the second one, if the influence of LQ price setting by supermarket H(K) is
greater on the HQ price setting than on the BP price setting by supermarket J.
: ç0TE > 0
: COLE > 0
: COLE > 0
: COW > 0
: 
ç E0
:	 0
: 41.4 > 0
: (Pgi > 0
: COV > 0
H042: (PO = 0;H142 : CO54 1 > 0
H051 : VgiA
 = 0 ; H151 :	 0
H052 : ço = 0 ; H152 : coo. 0
Safeway
H031 : cog' = 0; H131 : yog" > 0
1/032
	 = 0 ; H132 : COY > 0
H041 :
	
= 0; H141 : V,SIT > 0
H042 :	 = 0; H142 :	 > 0
1/051 Vir =0; H151 : coy 0
H052 	 = 0 : H152 : COY 0
Tesco
H031 : COW = 0; H131
H032 : (PLE = 0 ; H132
HO41 C°741E = 0 ; H141
H042 : C074T = 0 ; H142
H051 :	 = 0 ; H151
1/052 : WEE = 0; H152
Sainsbury
H031 :	 = 0; H131
H032 : Coh4 = 0; H132
H041 : 414 = °; H141
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H-Influence K-influence
110j4 	 • ,J1 —	 251 • `1"4	 "
IP • ori —141 •	 41 — 725
—	
'I715
— 715
=
>
0
0
Hd42	 co:12 =	 26 i6
H1742 : CP:12 = 7116
= °
7 176 > 0
As it is possible to observe in Table 5.4 the results of the first pair of tests confirm the
predictions in all the cases: for a given supermarket the influence of other supermarkets'
BP price setting is greater over its HQ than over its LQ price setting. Neither BP nor
HQ price setting at Tesco and Sainsbury are significantly influenced by LQ prices at the
other two supermarkets. For Safeway, the results of the second pair of tests described
above confirm the prediction of a greater influence of the LQ price setting by the other
two supermarkets over its HQ than over its BP price setting.
Table 5.4: Price effects between supermarket differentiated variants of different quality
Description	 Coefficient Std.Error
SA—>TE
SF—>TE
SA—>TE
SF--->TE
0.135**
0.217**
0.015
0.020 •
-
SA—>TE -0.009 0.008
SF—>TE -0.010 0.009
TE—>SA 0.071** 0.010
SF--6A 0.083** 0.012
TE—*SA
SF—SA
TE—>SA 0.141** 0.020
SE—>SA 0.042** 0.010
TE—>SF 0.112** 0.020
SA—SF 0.091** 0.016
TE—>SF 0.066** 0.012
SA—*SF 0.054** 0.011
TE—>SF -0.063** 0.018
SA—*SF -0.017** 0.006
** Rejection of the null hypothesis at 5% level of significance
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Hence, these two pair of tests confirm for all the three supermarkets that between
supermarkets, BP and LQ price effects are greater over their quality neighbour variant,
(HQ), than over the variant for which they do not have a direct quality neighborhood
(LQ and BP respectively)
For the HQ variant, with two quality neighbours, we are interested in finding out
if there is any difference between the influence of HQ price setting by supermarkets
H(K) on BP price setting and LQ price setting by supermarket J. We can test if
this difference exists using a two-sided t-test with the following null and alternative
hypotheses:
H-Influence	 K-influence
J
C°51 = 7 J33 — 713 ° 14152 . („J•	 Y-• 52 J— - 34
0'1
u = 7173 0 152 •	 (0•	 , 52 = 734
— 7 174 = 0
— 7.4
As we can observe in Table 5.4, the result of this test varies across supermarkets.
Although both for Safeway and Sainsbury we reject the null hypothesis, further testing
reveals that whereas other supermarkets' HQ price setting affects more Safeway's BP
price setting than Safeway's LQ price setting for Sainsbury the opposite is true. For
Tesco, the result of the tests does not show any difference between the influence of other
supermarkets HQ price setting over its price setting for BPs and LQs. The effect of HQ
price setting by supermarket J on BP and LQ price setting by supermarket H depends
on the direct between supermarket price effect of HQ price setting by supermarket J
on HQ price setting by supermarket H and on the within supermarket H price effect
of HQ on BP and LQ . The study of within supermarket price effects in the next
section reveals that the cause of the differences detected here is differences in within
supermarket price effects of HQ over BP and LQ.
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5.5.3 Within supermarket price competition
In order to analyse within supermarket price competition, we consider as an indicator
of within supermarket price competition the correspondent structural form coefficients,
i.e. we analyse how the change in the price of one of the quality variants sold by the
supermarket affects to the price of its quality neighbour assuming that all the other
prices remain unchanged.
On the basis of the aims for which the two own brand variants were introduced in
the supermarkets (section 5.2.1), we consider two main predictions to be tested about
within supermarket competition:
1.- For a given supermarket J at time t : HQ price setting is influenced more by
BP price setting than by LQ price setting.
If we define tyl =	 — 712 , we can check the prediction above by means of a
one-sided t-test with the following null and alternative hypotheses:
11-6/6 :	 = 0
I/16
 :	 > 0
We can observe in Table 5.5 that the results of this test always lead to reject
H06. For all the three supermarkets, the influence of BP price setting on HQ price
setting is greater than the influence of LQ price setting on HQ price setting. Within
the supermarket, the price setting of the HQ variant mainly depends on the price of
the variant they were created to compete with. Price movements by the LQ variant,
introduced in the supermarket to fight back the discounter, have a much lower influence.
2.- For a given supermarket J at time t: the influence of HQ price setting on BP
price setting should be greater than on LQ price setting. In order to test this prediction
we first define 7 .1 = --nil
 and then we carry out a one-sided t-test with the following
null and alternative hypotheses:
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H,577 :	 = 0
	
:	 > 0
Safeway is the only supermarket that confirms the above prediction. At this super-
market, price adjustment of the HQ variant affects the price setting of the BP variant
more than the price setting of the LQ variant. Sainsbury represents the opposite situ-
ation: when adjusting prices to maximize the price-quality space, given qualities, the
effect of HQ price setting is greater over LQ than over BP price setting. At Tesco,
there is no significant difference between the effect on BP and LQ price setting.
Table 5.5: Within supermarket price effects
Description	 Coefficient Std. Error
TESCO
H06 : -yTE = 0; H16 : 7TE > 0
1107 : -yr = 0; H17 : -yr > 0
Tesco
Tesco
0.374**
0.038
0.020
0.033
SAINSBURY
H06 : llit = 0 ; H16 : -yV > 0
Ho7 : TV = 0; 1/17 : TIA > 0
Sains.
Sains.
0.296**
----SA	 n72	 < u
0.056
SAFEWAY
H06 . SF = 0; H16 : ySF > 0
H07	 = 0 ; H17	 > 0
Safe.
Safe
0.109**
0.142**
0.056
0.040
** Rejection of the null hypothesis (5% level of significance)
For Tesco and Sainsbury, the effect of the price choice for BPs on the price of the
HQs is significantly greater than the effect of HQs on BPs. For Safeway no significant
difference could be found20 . There are two possible explanations for this. On the
one hand, while the supermarkets have the total control over the price setting of the
HQs, the price setting for the BPs is conditioned by the BP manufacturer wholesale
price. On the other hand, if consumer distribution is asymmetric [Katz,1984], for the
20 The results of testing
: 6w =
	 =
H1 :6w= 541 —	 > 0
for J =TE,SA,SF are the following:
TE	 SA	 SF
0.2975	 0.1453	 0.038
Standard Error (0.0363) (0.0417) (0.0435)
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upper segment of the consumer distribution product attributes will be more important
than price when making the purchase decision and so there will exist some kind of
brand preference [Rao, 1991]. If there is brand preference in the upper segment of the
consumer distribution the supermarket has an incentive to follow both increases and
decreases in the price of the BPs caused by an increase/decrease of the wholesale price
with similar changes in the HQs. However, the supermarket will have an incentive to
increase the price of BPs when increasing the price of the HQs but not to decrease the
price of the BPs when reducing the price of the HQs because it could induce losing the
upper part of the usual HQ purchasers.
With respect to the relationship within supermarket between the price setting for
HQs and LQs this varies across supermarkets. The main fact that calls our attention is
that the coefficient of p l  in the third equation of Sainsbury system (0.4401) is much
higher than the correspondent coefficients for Tesco and Safeway systems (0.0829 and
0.0913 respectively). The greater influence of HQ price setting on LQ price setting at
Sainsbury could be signalling that this supermarket managers are specially concerned
about the possibility of consumers' switching between the HQs and LQs due to changes
in HQ prices and so HQ price changes are followed by price changes for the LQs.
5.6 Concluding Remarks
Our econometric analysis shows the relevance of taking into account both the influences
of between and within supermarket competition when analysing supermarket price
setting.
The use of panel data allows the multiproduct-multiquality nature of the super-
market to be taken into account. In addition, the use of EC3SLS estimation provides
efficient and consistent estimators of the parameters representing between supermarket
and within supermarket price competition.
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The analysis performed clearly reveals the price leadership by Tesco in the HQ
variant. This result is not surprising if we consider that in the last years Tesco has
taken over Sainsbury's leadership in the sector. Once this price leadership is taken
into account, the results of the between supermarket analysis confirm the predictions
of the model. Price interdependence between supermarkets seems to be higher for the
quality variants for which the possibilities of product differentiation are smaller: brand
products and low quality own brand products. This suggest that supermarkets can
relax price competition through horizontal product differentiation.
Whereas in other markets as the car market, [Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes, 1995
and Feenstra and Levinsohn, 1995] cross price elasticities are lower in the high quality
segment, for the supermarkets price interdependence between supermarkets is not nec-
essarily lower in the high quality segment. This is related again to horizontal product
differentiation possibilities and its inverse relationship with price competition. While
high quality cars offer the biggest possibilities of horizontal product differentiation, in
the case of supermarkets it was argued above that the biggest possibilities of horizontal
product differentiation do not correspond to the top quality (BP) but rather to the
intermediate quality (HQ).
The softer intensity of price competition for the HQs provides an additional expla-
nation to the traditional explanations of the high profits of the UK supermarket (in
comparison to their continental counterparts) based on the existence of high property
costs that act as a barrier to entry and on the use of more advanced supply systems in
the UK. This additional explanation is based on the joint consideration of the softer
price competition for the HQs and the fact that the HQ market share over the total
supermarket sales is higher in the UK than in any other country of the EU.
Within supermarket results are related to the supermarket perception of the un-
derlying distribution of consumers. The fact that in all the supermarkets HQ price
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setting is more affected by BP price setting than by LQ price setting suggests that the
supermarkets are more concerned about consumers' possible switching between HQs
and BPs due to a change in BP prices not followed by HQ prices, rather than con-
sumers' switching between HQs and LQs due to changes in LQ prices not followed by
HQ prices.
Further research should look deeper into the relationship between the underlying
consumer distribution perceived by each supermarket and the price interdependence
between quality variants within the supermarket.
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5.7 Appendices
A: Reduced Form Parameters
Reduced Form Parameters (Dropping the J superindex)
1st Equation 2nd Equation 3rd Equation
A1 [a1(1 — 
-Y22731)+ A2 [ce2 + 721 a1+ A3 [a3 (1 — 711721)+
a2711
 + a3 -Y11722]/M 722°31M a2731 + cti721731]/M
711 Pii( 1
 — 722-Y31)/M 721 721011/M 7r31 731721011/1'v[
712 012( 1
 — 722731)/M 722 721012/M 732 731721012/M
713 711021/M 723 021/M 733 731021/M
714 711022/M 724 022/111 734 731022/A1
715 'Y11:722031/M 71'25 'Y22031/M 735 031( 1
	0/21711)/A1
716 711722032/M 726 722032/M 736 032( 1
	721711)/A1
M = 1 — 711721 — 722731
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B: Results of the Estimation
Table B.1: EC3SLS estimation results: structural equations
First Equation
1 EBP
Pit
bABP
Pit
SPBP
Pit
al
TEHQ
Pit
0.0601**
(0.0230)
0.1190**
al
SAHQ
Pit
0.0627**
(0.0304)
0.1671**
al
sFHQ
Pit
0.0792**
(0.0369)
0.2337**
(0.01792) (0.0237) (0.0242)
SABp
Pit-1 0.3363** TEBPPit-1 0.3825** TEBPPit-i 0.4203**
(0.0255) (0.0330) (0.0266)
SFBP
Pit-1 0.5387** SFBPPit-1 0.4469** SABPPit-1 0.3430**
(0.0258) (0.0337) (0.0268)
Second Equation
-
2 'EHQ
Pit
SAHQ
Pit
SFHQ
Pit
a2 0.0301 a2 0.1144* az 0.1999"
(0.0718) (0.0665) (0.0818)
TEBP
Pit 0.4165** SABPPit 0.3124** SFBPPit 0.2717**
(0.0345) (0.0382) (0.0442)
TELQ
Pit 0.0420*
SALQ
Pit 0.0169
SFLQ
Pit 0.1628**
(0.0241) (0.0299) (0.0290)
SAHQ
Pit-1 0.2446**
TEHQ
Pit-1 0.4860**
TEHQ
Pit-1 0.4142**
SFHQ
Pit-1
(0.0230)
0.2676** SFHQPit-1
(0.0341)
0.1452** sAHQPit-1
(0.0365)
0.1140**
(0.0245) (0.0274) (0.0301)
Third Equation
1 ELQ
Pit
SALQ
Pit bPLQPit
a3 -0.0593 a3 0.0772 a3 0.0158
(0.0616) (0.0858) (0.0662)
TEHQ
Pit 0.0829**
SAHQ
Pit 0.4401**
SFHQ
Pit 0.0913**
(0.0281) (0.0301) (0.0321)
SALQ 0.3287** TELQpit-i 0.2121**
TEL Q
Pit-i 0.4924**
sFLQ
Pit-1
(0.0325)
0.5794** SFLQpit-i
(0.0280)
0.2665** SALQpit-i
(0.0293)
0.4006**
(0.0265) (0.0280) (0.0352)
Standard errors between brackets.
** Significant at 5% level.* Significant at 10% level
Tesco System Sainsbury System Safeway System
R2 0.9958	 0.9903	 0.9815
With the estimation procedure used R 2
 is not necessarily between 0 and 1.
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Table B.2: Estimations of the reduced form coefficients
First Equation
SABPl 'EBP	 SPB p
pit	 pit	 pit 
A 1
	0.0667** A 1 	0.0868** A 1 	0.1361**
(0.0243)	 (0.0337)	 (0.0436)
P
SABP  0.3539** gtEli3P 0.4038** gt,E Bf:
Pit-	
0.4493**
SFBP 
(0.0261)	 (0.0340)	 (0.0274)
iPit-i	 0.5669** 15.;,FBIP	
s'
0.4715**	
A	
0.3667**
(0.0259)	 (0.0345)	 0.0277)
pistAlifQ 0.0307**	 TEHQ,
	
 pit-1	 13 .0863** plEi 't r 13.11346**
(0.0054)
	
(0.0133)	 (0.0133)
sF Q p istF_HiQ
p
H 	 0.0336**	 0.0258**	 sAHQPit-1	 0.0289**
SALQ 
(0.0058)	 (0.0060)	 (0.0081)
0.0017 TELQ
	
Pit-1	 0.0006	
TELQ
Pit-1	 0.0203**
(0.0010)	 (0.0011)	 (0.0042)
SFLQ	 SFLQ	 SALQ 0.0165**Pit-1	 0.0031	 Pit-i	 0.0008	 Pit-1
(0.0018)	 (0.0014)	 (0.0037) .
Second Equation
TEHQ	 SAHQ	 sPHQ
Pit	 pit	 pit 
A2	 0.0555	 A2	 0.1439** A2
	
0.2431**
	
(0.0742)	 (0.0703)	 (0.0874)
SABPPit-i	 0.1479** gtE f P 0.1273** p TtE 1.3 P 0.1239**
	
(0.0165)	 (0.0184)	 (0.022)
SFBP 0.2369** prir 0.1484** p'ilAir 0.1011**Pit-1
	(0.0227)	 (0.0212)	 (0.018)
SAHQ
Pit-1	 0.2584** piTtEr 0.5168** pTitEr 0.4475**
	
(0.0238)	 (0.0331)	 (0.0369)
SFHQ
1	 0.2826** p _r` 0.1544** pistAr 0.1237**
	
(0.0252)	 (0.0285)	 (0.0323)
SALQ
Pit-1	 0.0146	 p Er 0.0038 piTtEr 0.0870**
	
(0.0087)
	 (0.0068)	 (0.0158)
SFLQ	 SFLQ	 Q 007070.0257	 SALp 	 0.0048	 pit_ i	 .**
	(0.0148)	 (0.0085)	 (0.0141)
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Third Equation
I ELc2	 SALQ	 SPLQ
pit	 pit	 pit
A3
SABPp
SFBPPit-i
SAHQ
Pitl.
SF
Pit-1
HQ
SALQ
Pit-1
SFLQp i
-0.0547 A3 0.1405	 A3 0.0380
(0.0631) (0.0989) (0.0636)
0.0122** .73,7137 0.0559**	 p,TtEfP 0.0113**
(0.0045) (0.0093) (0.0046)
0.0196**
	 pi7ir 0.0653**	 SAB PPit-i 0.0092**
(0.0072) (0.0107) (0.0037)
0.0214** piTtE_IIQ TEHQ0.2274**	 Pit-i. 0.0408**
(0.0076) (0.0196) (0.0149)
0.0234** pistFr? SAHQ0.0679**	 pit-1 0.0110**
(0.0083) (0.0134) (0.0050)
**0.3299 TELQpit-i
TELQ0.2138**	 pit-i 0.5004**
(0.0325) (0.0283) (0.0291)
0.5815** SFL Qpit_ i .**02687	 sALQPit-i 0.4070**
(0.0265) (0.0281) (0.0351)
** Significant at 5% level
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C: Testing for Tesco's price leadership in the HQs
1.- The influence of price setting by Tesco at time t — 1 over price setting by
Sainsbury (Safeway) is significantly higher than the influence of price setting by Safeway
(Sainsbury) at time t — 1 over price setting by Sainsbury( Safeway) at time t.
1.a Tesco-Sainsbury
Ho : Ai
 = 711'i4 - 7 = 0
Hi : Ai = 7T Y —71-'1'11 > 0
aq = 0.5168 — 0.1544 = 0.3624
= 0.05319
0.3624 
t = 0.05318 = 6.8145 —> Re Ho
1.b Tesco-Safeway
Ho : A 2 = 74( — 7 rlir = 0
H1 : A2 = 7rg' — 41' > 0
A2 = 0.4476 — 0.1237 = 0.3239
0.060017
0.3229 
t = 0.06001 = 5.396 -- Re Ho
2.- The influence of price setting by Sainsbury (Safeway) at time t — 1 over the price
setting by Tesco at time t have to be significantly smaller than the influence of price
setting by Tesco at t — 1 over the price setting by Sainsbury (Safeway) at time t.
- 2.a TE-SA
Ho : A3 = 743`1 (Sainsbury System) — 7IP(Tesco System) = 0
Hi. : A3 = 7rY(Sainsbury System) — 7rEE (Tesco System) > 0
A3 = 0.51686-0.25840=0.25846
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-6--- = 0.03187A3 
0.25846
t = 0.03187 = 8.1091 —> Re Ho
2.b TE-SF
H0 : A4 = irY(Safeway System) — 71-W(Tesco System) =-- 0
H1 : A4 = 741' (Safeway System) — 7ir(Tesco System) > 0
A4 = 0.44759-0.28263=0.16496
A4= 0.04468
0.16496
= 3.6917 —> Re Hot = 0.04468
Hence, Tesco HQ price leader has been shown.
Chapter 6
Unbeatable Value: Low-Price
Guarantee or Loss-Leaders
Strategy?1
Abstract
This chapter investigates the effects of a low-price guarantee (price-beating guaran-
tee) on the patterns of price setting of the supermarkets involved in it using micro level
price data. Following recent theoretical developments [Hviid and Shaffer, 1998,1999]
the paper analyses the influence of hassle-costs on the ability of low-price guarantees to
sustain anticompetitive prices. Furthermore, the consideration of the supermarket as a
multiproduct firm, leads to analyse the possible relationship between low-price guarantees
and loss-leaders pricing strategies.
6.1 Introduction
On September 1996 Tesco announced the introduction of the following low-price guar-
antee:
"Lowest Local Value or We'll Refund You DOUBLE the Difference"
As a reaction to this announcement on the eve of the start of Tesco's low-price guarantee
The Times (5th September 96) reads
"Tesco starts a new Price War"
However, Dbdt and Nalebuff [1991] state:
1 1
 would like to thank to seminar participants at the University of Warwick Workshop of Industrial
Economics, FundaciOn Empresa Pliblica, University of Vigo and 26th EARIE conference (Torino) for
helpful comments.
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"Yet although they sound competitive, these promises to beat the rival's price can,
enforce discipline in a price-setting cartel".
Therefore, there is a lack of agreement about the potential effects of low-price guaran-
tees. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of Tesco's low-price guarantee
over the patterns of price setting of three of the four supermarket chains with high-
est market share in the UK: Tesco itself, Sainsbury and Safeway. This analysis is
relevant both from a competition-policy and from a managerial point of view. From
the competition-policy perspective, if it turns out that low-price guarantees allow to
previously competing firm to raise prices to supra-competitive levels then claims for
antitrust action [Sargent, 1993 and Edlin, 1997] should be carefully listened to. From
the managerial perspective, knowledge of other supermarkets' reactions to guarantees
like these are a valuable instrument to devise future price strategies.
To the best of our knowledge, only Hess and Gerstner [1991] have analysed the
effect of a low-price guarantee over supermarket price setting. Whereas their paper
examine the effect of a price-matching guarantee, our work focus on the analysis of a
price-beating one. Both Hviid and Shaffer [1994] and Corts [1995] (using oligopolis-
- tic markets as a framework) recognise the differential effects of these two guarantees:
_
whilst price-matching guarantees allow firms to sustain anti-competitive prices, the in-
troduction in the space of strategies of price-beating guarantees restores the incentive
to compete and removes the ability of price-matching guarantees to sustain supra-
competitive prices. Hess and Gerstner [1991], by means of an analysis of the degree
of between-supermarket price coordination and price levels, conclude that the price-
matching guarantee analysed by them allowed to the supermarkets involved to tacitly
collude on increasing prices to supra-competitive levels.
The analysis carried out in this paper incorporates a novel feature in the analysis of
CHAPTER 6. UNBEATABLE VALUE	 160
low-price guarantees: by explicitly analysing supermarket price policies considering the
supermarket as a multi-product firm [Bliss, 1988]. Tesco's low-price guarantee does not
include all the product sold by the supermarket but only a subset of them. Therefore,
any difference in the patterns of supermarket price setting for the products included
and not included in the low-price guarantee should be carefully examined. It is this
analysis of different patterns of price setting for products included and not included
in the low-price guarantee that lead us to the study of a possible relationship between
low-price guarantees and loss-leader strategies.
Although traditionally ignored in the analysis of low-price guarantees, Hviid and
Shaffer [1998,1999] demonstrate that hassle-costs (costs in which the consumer has to
incur to activate the low-price guarantee) can drastically remove the anticompetitive
effects of low-price guarantees. In this line, this job is the first one in analysing em-
pirically the possible impact of hassle-costs on the effectiveness of low-price guarantees
to raise prices to supracompetitive levels.
In order to perform this analysis, we make use of a micro level set of prices directly
taken in three superstores in the south of Coventry that correspond to three of the
four supermarket chains with highest market share in the UK (Tesco, Sainsbury and
Safeway). This data set consists of products included and not included in the Tesco's
low-price guarantee for the periods before and after the start of it.
Throughout, the chapter we make use of non parametric tests, the reason is that
some of the series we use to check our predicti6ns do not fulfill the normality conditions
required by the parametric tests.
The results of the empirical analysis suggest that in general in supermarket retail-
ing the size of hassle-costs outweighs the potential benefits from activating low-price
guarantees. According to Hviid and Shaffer [1998,1999], this phenomenon drastically
removes the ability of low-price guarantees to sustain supracompetitive prices. In our
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analysis the increase in between-supermarket price coordination caused by the low-
price guarantee goes along with a decreasing trend in the market price of the products
included in it. At first glance, this could be considered as evidence of an empirical
association between low-price guarantees and price wars, however the consideration of
the supermarket as a multiproduct firm lead us a to analyse the possible relationship
between low-price guarantees and loss-leaders strategies. The analysis of the price data
suggest that Tesco could be using the products included in the low-price guarantee as
part of a loss-leaders strategy to lure consumers to the shop.
The paper is organized as follows. A theoretical review of low-price guarantees is
offered in section 2. Section 3 deals with the description of Tesco's low-price guarantee
and characteristics of the data set. Section 4 includes the empirical analysis of the
effects of the low-price guarantee over the supermarkets patterns of price setting. Sec-
tion 5 analyses the empirical relationship between low-price guarantees and loss-leaders
strategies. Finally the conclusions are presented in section 6.
6.2 Literature review
• Low-price guarantees (LPG) are promises by firms to match or beat the price of one
or several competitors. Since Salop [1986], an extensive economic literature has argued
that LPGs facilitate tacit collusion leading to higher prices and profits. On the one
hand by giving an incentive to the customer to report competitors' price cuts LPGs
serve as an exchange information device, on the other hand by reducing the potential
benefits of one-time cheating LPGs act as an incentive-management device discouraging
price-cutting by rival firms. Most of the this literature has concentrated on the analysis
of the effects of the price matching guarantees 2
 using oligopolistic models, and only
2 For theoretical analysis of price matching guarantees see: Png and Hirschleifer [1987], Belton
[1987], Doyle [1988], Logan and Lutter [1989], Edlin [1997] and Zhang [1995].
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in recent years the possible differential effects of the price-beating guarantees have
been analysed. Whereas Dbdt and Nalebuff [1991] and Sargent [1993] conclude that
price beating guarantees are even more effective than price matching guarantees at
supporting high prices, Hviid and Shaffer [1994] and Corts [1995] show that price
beating guarantees restore the incentive to undercut rivals' prices and hence cannot
support any supracompetitive price in equilibrium3 . Hence, once proved the inability of
price beating guarantees to support supracompetitive prices it remains the question of
why they are adopted. Hviid and Shaffer [1998,1999] extend the analysis of the LPGs
by removing the assumption that it is costless to the consumers to activate the LPGs.
They show in their '98 paper that if there are positive hassle costs for the consumers,
the ability of price beating to sustain anticompetitive prices is partly restored.
In order to provide a theoretical framework to explain the results obtained by
Hviid and Shaffer [1994,1998 and 1999] and Corts [1995], let us consider a static game
of complete information in which two firms (1 and 2) choose simultaneously a posted
price and price policy {pi , oi l that conform their strategy, where:
{NPG = No price guarantee
6i = PM = Price Matching
PB = Price Beating
and the effective price of each firm (s i ) under each one of the possible strategies:
INPG s i = pi for i = 1, 2
si = PM si = min {pi , pi
 — (1 + A) (pi — pi )} with A = 0
PB s i = min {pi , pi
 — (1 + A) (pi — pj )} with A > 0
The analysis is based on a Bertrand equilibrium model extended to the case of
differentiated products in which the two firms sell a product that is identical in all
respects but for the location of the sale. It is also assumed that consumers have
diverse preferences regarding the location of the firm. Hence, although the product is
physically identical at the two firms one firm does not capture the entire market by
3 0ther papers analysing price-beating guarantees: Baye and Kovenock [1994], Chen [1995] and
Corts [1996].
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slightly undercutting the other. We start the analysis assuming that for the consumers
it is costless (i.e. zero hassle costs) to activate the low price guarantee
As in Hviid and Shaffer [1994] we will distinguish between:
Case I: Symmetric Market
In absence of PM and PB the unique possible equilibrium is the Bertrand-Nash
equilibrium for differentiated products B = (pr, A3 ) . If the strategies space is widened
and the firms are allowed to choose PM then Hviid and Shaffer [1994] and Corts [1995]
among others conclude that the most profitable Nash equilibrium for the two firms is
to set the collusive price C = , g) and adopt PM4 . By adopting PM each firm is
removing the other firm's incentive to undercut its posted price. The enlargement of
the strategies space to consider PB completely modifies the final equilibrium. Hviid
and Shaffer [1994] determine that when firms can adopt PB all possible equilibria yield
Bertrand selling prices. The possibility of PB restores the incentive to undercut and
renders the PM clauses useless, as they cannot prevent a firm from lowering its selling
price by raising its posted price and adopting PB. Corts [1995] obtains similar results
both for the case of N = 2 and N > 3.
Case II: Asymmetric Market
Asymmetry between firms is assumed to arise from different demand conditions or
differences in marginal costs. Whereas in the symmetric market the unique Bertrand
price equilibrium implies both firms setting the same price, in an asymmetric market
the Bertrand price is not necessarily equal for both firms.
As in Case I if PM or PB are not available the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium for
differentiated products is the only possible equilibrium. If we assume that PM is
available then Logan and Lutter [1989] 5 and Hviid and Shaffer [1994] conclude that
4 1t is always true that pF > pr for i = 1,2.
5 Logan and Lutter [1989] proposed a sequential structure for the game: in the first stage the firms
decide whether to adopt PM or not; the second stage is a Bertrand differentiated price setting game.
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the more asymmetric is the market the lower is the probability of both firms adopting
price matching with the result of supracompetitive prices.
For Small Asymmetry in the market and following Doyle [1988], Hviid and Shaffer
[1994] show that using Pareto Dominance Criterion to select plausible equilibrium
outcomes, the equilibrium yielding higher profits for each one of the firms implies both
firms adopting PM and selling prices6 at Pm . With a Sufficiently Asymmetric market
they show that a Nash Equilibrium exists if and only if the firm with the highest
Bertrand price does not adopt PM and selling prices are PB.
Independently of the degree of asymmetry in the market, the extension of the
space of strategies to consider PB yields Bertrand-Nash Equilibrium (PB ) as the only
possible equilibrium [Hviid and Shaffer, 1994].
Hviid and Shaffer [1998,1999] reconsider the analysis of both Case I and Case
II by removing the assumption that for the consumers it is costless to activate the
LPGs. They introduce the notion of hassle costs (z) that are defined as "any cost run
by the client to make effective the price guarantee : time, discomfort of asking for the
reimbursement, need of visiting two shops...". The introduction of hassle costs arises
from the following considerations: the evidence about their existence in almost all the
markets and the serious doubt about the possibility that any consumer invokes either
PM or PB if the expected gain from doing so is small. Therefore, they substitute the
assumption of automatic activation of the LPG for the following one:
• each consumer foregoes the same amount z > 0 to activate the LPG.
> pi then { if (1 + A) (pi — pi ) > z then the consumers will activate the LPGIf  i if (1 + A) (pi — pj ) < z
 then the LPG is not activated
where A =0 if PM and A >0 if PB.
6pM = pC2 if pC1 > pC2 and pm pci otherwise. Where Pci is the maximization profits
price-pair of firm i over the 45° degree line.
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They show that for any z> (1+ A) (pi —pi ) (i.e. when the LPG is not activated)
a Nash equilibrium exists if and only if the selling price-pair is PB. In Case I it is
always true that pf = g and therefore the existence of any z > 0 implies that only the
Bertrand-Nash equilibrium is possible. Even when we include in the space of strategies
PM and PB, for any advertised price above PB and any z> 0 a firm can increase its
profits by undercutting this price by an amount c such that E (1 ± A) < z . In symmetric
markets, LPGs (PM and PB) cannot support supracompetitive prices if hassle costs
are higher than zero.
•
	
•
_Lame 0.1; main ineureucal rrealcuions
z=0 z>(1+A)(pi—p3)>0 (1+A)(pi—p3) >z>0
NPG PM PB NPG PM PB NPG PM PB
Sym. Mkts PB PMa PB PB pB pB pB pB pB
Asym. Mkts
Small Asy. PB Pmb PB PB pB pB pB pB pB
Asym. Mkts
Suff. Asy pB pB pB pB pB pB pB pZc pZa
pB <pZ <pM
a This equilibrium involves the two firms adopting PM
b This equilibrium involves the two firms adopting PM
C This equilibrium involves either the two firms adopting PM or only the firm with the
higher Bertrand price
d In this equilibrium the firm with the most generous PB has the higher Bertrand Price
With respect to Case II, assuming that (1+ A) (pi
 — p3 ) > z > 0 and that markets
are sufficiently asymmetric, Hviid and Shaffer [1999] show that hassle costs make it
possible for PM guarantees to increase priced to supracompetitive levels. However, in
the presence of hassle costs, the price increase achieved by adopting PM is smaller than
assumed by the traditional literature. Another interesting feature of this model is that
it is consistent with only a subset of firms adopting PM. This subset should include
the firms with the highest Bertrand price. When widening the space of strategies to
consider the possibility of PB, Hviid and Shaffer [1998] show that the presence of
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of positive hassle cost partly restores the ability of PB to support supracompetitive
prices and that in equilibrium the firm with the most generous PB guarantee has the
higher price.
6.3 Unbeatable Value, an empirical case
6.3.1 Description of the Low Price Guarantee
Tesco started its "Unbeatable Value" LPG in September 1996. The slogan of the LPG
was as follows:
"Lowest Local Value or we'll refund you DOUBLE the difference"
Applies to any Unbeatable Product where you buy an equivalent product of the same
quality in the same week within 3 miles. Receipts are required.
Hence, four necessary conditions for the customers to make effective the price guar-
antee:
1. the products should be equivalent
2. the products have to be bought in the same week
3. the lower price should be found in a supermarket located within a 3 miles
rank (4.8 kilometers).
4. it is a necessary condition to produce a proof of purchase.
Unbeatable Value (UV) does not include all the products sold by the supermarket
but a selection of them (six hundred). Within the products called as Unbeatables it is
possible to distinguish two categories:
1. Temporary Unbeatable: group of products included in the price guarantee
for a period of three weeks. They are nothing but the temporary sales of the
supermarket. These products are in most cases Brand Products (BP) and
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a few times High Quality Own Brand Products (HQ). Probably the reason
of using the name of Unbeatable for the temporary sales is addressed to get
economies of scale in advertising.
2. Permanent Unbeatable: group of products that once included in the Unbeat-
able Value campaign remain in for all the period analysed. These products
are mostly Low Quality Own Brand Products (LQ) but sometimes when the
supermarket is not running a LQ in a category the Permanent Unbeatable
is the HQ.
For the purpose of the empirical work only the second category of products is
considered. To consider the first category of products would require a theoretical
framework related with temporary sales out of the scope of this analysis7.
Before proceeding, it is interesting to go deeper into the characteristics of the LQs
that are relevant to the analysis:
1. As regards the sustitut ability of the LQs across supermarkets, they are very
basic products aimed at competing in prices for the lowest segment of the
market. Their very nature as a budget line of products is limiting their•
possibilities of supermarket product differentiation. Any additional product
refinement aimed at differentiating the product from that of the other super-
markets would increase the price of the product and contradict the aim for
which they were created. If following Corstjens et al, 1995, we accept that
any new service provided by one of the supermarkets can be copied by the
other supermarkets, the only possibility of supermarket differentiation for
7 The disctintion between temporary and permanent Unbeatable was quite obvious at the super-
market. The deadline of the sale was shown only in the price labels of the temporary unbeatables.
Whilst Tesco used end-of-aisle display for the temporary unbeatables, it did not modify the initial
shelves situation of the permanent unbeatable.
CHAPTER 6. UNBEATABLE VALUE
	 168
the LQs is given by supermarket location. Therefore, we consider as quality
equivalent the LQ range of products of the three supermarkets considered
in this analysis.
2. As in Giulietti [1996] we think that supermarket wholesale prices respond to
a model of bilateral bargaining involving a vertical relationship between the
upstream supplier and the downstream supermarket. Whereas in the bar-
gaining process determining the BP wholesale prices the retailer interacts
with powerful producers (Kellogs, Coca Cola, etc.), in the process deter-
mining own-brand product wholesale prices retailers control most of the
bargaining power [Dobson, 1997]. This almost total control over the whole-
sale price of the LQs confers to the supermarkets an important degree of
freedom when setting their prices. This clearly facilitates the implementa-
tion of the LPG in the medium term.
6.3.2 Description of the data set
The data used in this analysis are micro level data on prices that were taken directly in
three selected superstores in the south of Coventry, that correspond to the first, second
and fourth biggest supermarket chains in the UK: Tesco (TÈ), Sainsbury (SA) and
Safeway (SF). As can be observed in Table 6.2 the last two supermarkets are located
within the 3 miles rank specified by Tesco's LPG. It would also be interesting to
analyse the effect of" Unbeatable Value" over a superstore belonging to the Asda chain,
the third biggest supermarket chain in the UK. However, there is no Asda superstore
in the south of Coventry. The smallest distance between the closest Asda superstore
and Tesco is more than three miles and therefore even if some customers were able to
present proof of a lower price in Asda they could not activate the LPG.
The data set comprises 27 price observations for 46 products taken from November
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Table 6.2: Distances between supermarkets (miles)
Distance(miles)
TESCO-SAFEWAY 2.8
TESCO-SAINSBURY 1.4
SAFEWAY-SAINSBURY 1.5
1995 to March 1997. Prices have been taken every two weeks but for the Christmas
periods. As Tesco started the Unbeatable Value LPG in September '96, fifteen obser-
vations correspond to the period before the start of the LPG and twelve to the period
after. This interesting fact will allow us to establish comparisons between patterns of
price setting before and after the start of the LPG. Likewise, as the sample includes
both products that are part of the Unbeatable Value LPG (twenty two) and products
that are not (twenty four) it is possible to compare the patterns of price setting of
included and not included products.
The criteria to choose the products were explained in Chapter 4. We include in
Appendix D a classification of the products in Unbeatables (included in the LPG) and
No Unbeatables (Not included in the LPG).
6.3.3 From theory to practice
The aim of this section is to analyse the features of the Unbeatable Value LPG to
establish possible parallelisms with the theoretical models described above. First of
all, it should be made clear that Unbeatable Value is a PB guarantee and not a PM
guarantee, as consumers are promised double the price difference. If we assume perfect
information on the side of the consumers the effective selling price for the supermarket
offering the LPG (Tesco) would be:
sT E = min {pTE , pTE _ 2 (pTE _ p1)} for J= SA,SF
For Sainsbury and Safeway, that do not offer any LPG, the effective selling price will
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pSFbe equal to the posted price and hence, SSA _-= pSA and SSF	 •
With respect to the degree of asymmetry in the market, the theoretical models pre-
sented above consider asymmetries in the market as arising from two possible sources:
asymmetries in demand and asymmetries in costs.
1. Asymmetries in demand. If we assume physical quality equivalence of LQs across
supermarkets, asymmetries in demand between supermarket can only arise from dif-
ferences in the supermarket attributes of the product. These attributes are mainly:
location and mix of services provided by the supermarket (parking space, loyalty cards,
packing assistance, etc.). Asymmetries originated by locational differences (horizontal
component of supermarket differentiation) should be small because the three super-
markets are located close to one another in an area which is quite homogenous from
a socioeconomic point of view. Likewise, as any new service provided by one of the
supermarkets that successfully attracts shoppers can be quickly copied by the other
supermarkets8 , differences in the mix of services provided by the three supermarkets
(vertical component of supermarket differentiation) considered should be very small
and so the possible asymmetries that they can generate.
. 2. Cost asymmetries. In order to analyse cost asymmetries we can divide the su-
permarket costs into two components: wholesale price of the products and all the other
costs (labour costs, distribution and storage costs, advertising, etc.). The wholesale
costs of the LQs respond to a process of bilateral bargaining between the upstream
own brand product manufacturer and the dow'nstream supermarket that concludes in
a supply contract with specific terms. Hence, as the LQ wholesale prices at each one
of the supermarkets are set via different supply contracts, with different conditions
and mostly with different own brand products manufacturers, we expect some de-
gree of wholesale-price dispersion across supermarkets. However, as the LQs are basic
8 Recent examples of this phenomenon are: extension to opening hours and loyalty cards.
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products with very similar characteristics across supermarkets and no differences are
expected in the bargaining strength of the three supermarkets considered in the analy-
sis (three of the four largest supermarket chains in the UK) the scope of the wholesale
price dispersion across supermarkets should be limited and so the wholesale-price based
cost asymmetries. Likewise, there is no reason to think that the second component of
cost should differ substantially across supermarkets. Hence, in terms of Table 6.1 we
should restrict our attention to the central row.
Tesco's Unbeatable Value requires proof of purchase to make effective the LPG,
thus, it is not hassle free. The customer will have to incur a cost to make effective the
LPG (this limits the relevant theoretical prediction to the ones included in sections 2
and 3 of the central row of Table 6.1). Moreover there are several facts that raise some
doubts about the effective use of these price guarantees by supermarket clients:
1. Importance of one-stop shopping in modern societies [Smith and Hay, 1997].
At least two shops have to be visited to make the LPG effective, and this
increases the cost of the shopping in terms of money and time.
2. Small price differences between products (most of the times a few pennies)
lead to only small rewards
Table 6.3: Expected reward from activating the LPG (in pence)
Expected Reward	 Max Reward	 Min Reward
Sainsbury Shopper
Safeway Shopper
6
8
18
16
2
2
As a proxy for the reward that a shopper can obtain if, in order to claim the LPG
whenever it is possible, she visits Tesco after visiting her habitual supermarket, we
calculate the expected reward for a Sainsbury or Safeway consumer buying all the
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Unbeatable products included in the sample in one of these supermarkets and visiting
also Tesco to claim the LPG whenever it is possible as:
1ER= —12 E Rit
where
0 otherwise
J = SA, SF; i = 1, ...,22 are the Unbeatable products included in the sample;
t = 16, ..., 27 fortnights included in the sample after the start of Unbeatable Value
LPG
We show in Table 6.3 along with the expected reward (ERA also the maximum and
minimum reward that an habitual Sainsbury's or Safeway's shopper might obtain from
visiting also Tesco and claiming the LPG whenever it is possible. From observation of
Table 6.3 it is quite clear that the expected reward that a consumer can obtain from
activating the LPG (six pence for the habitual Sainsbury's shopper and eight pence for
the habitual Safeway's shopper) is not enough to compensate any hassle costs (z > 0)
in which he has to incur to activate the low price guarantee 9 . As the Unbeatable Value
LPG requires proof of purchase, previous visit to a supermarket different from Tesco is
required. Therefore the cost of this visit will be an important component of the whole
hassle costs of making effective the LPG. As a result, in general we expect,
z > ER,J
and so the LPG will be rarely requested. This has important implications because
Hviid and Shaffer [1998] conclude that if LPGs are not activated, the only possible
equilibrium remains the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium for differentiated products.
9 Even if we would assume that customers are buying more than one unit of each product the
expected reward of the guarantee would not be enough to compensate any hassle costs. If buying five
units of each product the expected reward from activating the guarantee would be thirty pence for
the habitual Sainsbury's shopper and forty for the habitual Safeway's shopper.
27 22
t=16 i=1
{ 2(pTtE — Alt ) if gtE - p4 > 0
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To sum up, we think that the model that fits better with the case analysed here
is a PB model with small asymmetry in the market and hassle costs as in Hviid and
Shaffer [1998]. In general, we expect for Tesco's Unbeatable Value that the hassle
costs will be higher than the expected reward from activating the LPG (z > E Ri).
However, as it is possible to observe in the central row of Table 6.1 the predictions
of the theoretical model for markets with Small Asymmetries are independent of the
relative size of hassle costs to the expected reward from activating the LPG: in market
with Small Asymmetries PB guarantees do not have any ability to increase price to
supracompetitive levels, i.e. the only possible equilibrium remains the Bertrand-Nash
equilibrium for differentiated products
6.4 Low price guarantees and prices
According to news articles' the adoption of a LPG is synonymous of the start of a
price war; according to Salop's traditional line of analysis (for PB guarantees see Dixit
and Nalebuff, 1991 and Sargent, 1994) PB guarantees are a valuable mechanism to
enforce tacit collusion allowing prices to rise to supracompetive levels; finally according
to the theoretical model that seems to fit better with the Unbeatable Value LPG, PB
guarantees with the characteristics of Unbeatable Value should not have any effect over
prices and supermarket pricing behaviour should remain unaltered after the start of
the price guarantee.
The aim of this section is to investigate Whether Tesco's LPG did have an effect
over the patterns of price setting of both the LPG actor and the two supermarkets
affected by the LPG in the area under analysis. We start this analysis by examining
if Unbeatable Value had any effect over the patterns of between-supermarket price
10 Financial Times, January 18 1996, as a reaction to the Price Watch LPG by Esso (price-matching
guarantee) published "Petrol Rivals on Price-Footing" and The Times, September 5 1996, as a reaction
to Tesco's launch of Unbeatable Value LPG published "Tesco launches a new price war".
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coordination. Then we analyse the effects of the Tesco's LPG over supermarkets price
trends.
6.4.1 Low price guarantees and price coordination
Both under the hypothesis of LPG triggering supermarkets price wars and the hy-
pothesis of LPG facilitating tacit collusion, Tesco's PB guarantee should increase the
between-supermarket price coordination for the products included in the LPG. How-
ever, under the hassle-costs hypothesis Tesco's PB guarantee should not alter signifi-
cantly the patterns of between-supermarket price coordination. Therefore, we devote
this subsection to analyse the effects of Tesco's PB guarantee over the patterns of price
coordination between Tesco and each one of the other two supermarkets affected by
the LPG in the geographical area considered in the analysis.
As an indicator of the degree of between-supermarkets price coordination, we use
the Dynamic Degree of Price Matching Index (DDPMI) 11 . We build this index in the
following way:
Let Aft be the price set by supermarket J in fortnight t for product i. Where:
i = 1,...,46 products included in the sample and t = 1,...,27 fortnightly taken price
observations and J = TE, SA, SF stores included in the sample. Define:
J	 J
J pit - Pit-i 
git =
pit-1
the Dynamic Degree of Price Matching between Tesco and store J (different from
Tesco) for product i in fortnight t is calculated as:
1 if ZE = et = 0
DDPMit-11
11 This index was introduced in Chapter 4.
git Le Iif I nTEI >TE 
git
,TE
Jit •
	 TE
if I git 1 <
git
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As we are interested in detecting possible changes in the patterns of price coordi-
nation between Tesco and Sainsbury/Safeway induced by the LPG, we calculate for
each one of the products two DDPMIs that correspond to the pre and post-guarantee
periods. These two indexes are defined as:
1 "Pre-Guarantee Period Index -+ DDPMITE-J
 — —
14 
E DDPMTE-1iti,PRE
t=2
27
Post-Guarantee Period Index —> DDPMITE-J — —1 E DDPMTE-jOST	 12	 it
t=16
If both for the pre and post-guarantee periods we group together those indexes that
correspond to the products included in the LPG (UNB) and those indexes that corre-
spond to the products not included (NOUNB) the result is four series of DDPMIs
for each one of the two supermarket pairs (TE-SA and TE-SF) considered in this analy-
.	 Tsis. For example, the series DDPMITE-SAUNB,PRE would include DDPMI E-sA for thePRE
twenty-two UNB12.
This index has two advantages with respect to the price matching index used by
Hess and Gerstner [1991], in which a price match for a given product is accounted
for if and only if the price of a given product is the same in the LPG supermarket
and in one of the supermarkets affected by the LPG'. The first advantage is that
we do not use a static but a dynamic index that allows to catch the simultaneity in
the pricing behaviour between supermarkets and the extent of this simultaneity when
prices change. The second advantage is that we allow for gradualism in the dynamic
12 A list of all the variables used in the chapter including descriptive statistics can be found in
Appendix A.
13 The index used by Hess and Gerstner [1991] can lead to misinterpretations. If in a given week,
the number of products for which two supermarkets are charging the same price increases then they
conclude that the degree of price matching between these two supermarkets has increased. However,
this increase in the number of products with the same price could happen simultaneously to an
increase in the degree of price dispersion for the rest of products included in the sample. If this two
events happen simultaneously we need an index allowing for gradualism to be able of extracting any
conclusion about the degree of price coordination across supermarkets.
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price matching: if two supermarkets increase simultaneously their prices for a given
product but by a different amount this will account zero in an index like the one used
by Hess and Gerstner [1991]; nevertheless we take into account that, although not by
the same amount the two supermarkets are increasing their price in the same fortnight
and it will have an impact in the index.
We start the analysis of price coordination by comparing the patterns of price
coordination for UNB and NOUNB in the pre-guarantee period. We carry out this
analysis by means of a battery of two-sided Mann-Whitney tests' with the following
null and alternative hypotheses:
Ho :On average, in, the pre-guarantee period there is no difference in the degree of
price coordination between Tesco and Sainsbury (Safeway) for UNB and NOUNB,
TE—Ji.e. on average there is no difference between DDPMIu NApRE and DDPMITE-JNOUNB,PRE
(for J = SA, SF).
H 1 :On average, in the pre-guarantee period there is a difference in the degree of
price coordination between Tesco and Sainsbury (Safeway) for UNB and NOUNB,
i.e. on average there is a difference between DDPMIMI p RE and DDPME:rE,-,IV L.:UjNB,PRE
-(for J = SA, SF).
14 The Mann-Whitney test should be used to test for differences in average between two independent
samples. For independence, we understand that the observations in any sample are not related to the
observations in any other sample. In our case, we could be using the Mann-Whitney test to check if
there is any difference in average between DDPMIUrBS t, RE and DDPMIT,5,
The Mann-Whitney test is based in ranking the observations corresponding to each one of the two
samples and then summing the ranks of the observations that belong to each one of these samples.
If we define R as the sum of ranks for group i (i = 1,2) and n i
 as the size of group i, then the U
statististic can be obtained as:1
U = R5 — n3 (n3 + 1)
If H1 is one-sided then R, is given by that sum of ranks that is expected to be smaller if the H1 were
true. If H1 is two sided then we calculate U1 = R1 — —1 ni(ni + 1) and U2 = ninz — U1 , and U is2defined as the smaller of U1 and U2. A correction of the U statistic is needed if any tied observations
(belonging to different samples) exist. We reject the null hypothesis of no difference on the average
level of the variable under analysis for the two sample considered if U < critical value. A complete
description of the test can be found in Neave and Worthington [1988]; the critical values of the test
are in Table D of the same book.
Pre-Guarantee
Post-Guarantee
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The results of the tests are shown in Table 6.4. Observation of this Table reveals that
the null hypothesis of no difference between the average degree of price coordination
of UNB and NOUNB is never rejected. Therefore, we should conclude that in the
pre-guarantee period no difference between the degree of price coordination for UNB
and NOUNB is observed.
Table 6.4: Mann-Whitney Test for differences on average DDPMI.UNB-NOUNB
Value of the test (U) Critical Value 5%
TE-SA 209
	 174.64
TE-SF 260.5
	 174.59 
Value of the test (U) Critical Value 5%
TE-SA 182.5
	 188.88
TE-SF 174.5
	 188.91
Rejection of the Ho if U< CV 5%
Both the hypothesis that relate the LPGs with the triggering of price wars and the
hypothesis of LPGs as exchange-information devices facilitating tacit collusion predict
that the LPGs should increase between supermarket price coordination for the UNB.
However the hassle-costs hypothesis establishes that if LPG is rarely activated no
changes in the degree of between supermarket price coordination should be observed.
, Hence, the next step is to check if the introduction by Tesco of the LPG actually
increased the degree of price coordination for the UNB. As a matter of completeness,
and to exclude the possibility of a general increase in the degree of between supermarket
price coordination caused by a factor different from Tesco's LPG, we also check if this
LPG had any effect over the degree of price c6ordination for the NOUNB.
We analyse the effects of the introduction of the LPG by means of a battery of
one-sided Wilconxon test for Matched Pair Observation' s
 with the following null and
15 As explained in the Appendix B of Chapter 4, the Wilconxon test should be used to detect differ-
ences in average between two samples when each observation in one sample has some kind of natural
link with an observation in the other sample. In our case, if we are detecting differences in average
between DDPMInr—BSPRE
 and DDPMITENT3SPAOST , the two series consist of price coordination in-
dexes for the same products for the periods before and after the start of the LPG and so the link
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Table 6.5: Wilconxon Test for differences on average DDPMI. Pre-post policy periods
NOUNB	 T C.V. 5% CSS One/Two Sided
TE-SA 79 75	 22 One
TE-SF 104 91	 24 One 
UNB	 T C.V. 5% 
TE-SA 8	 60	 20 One
TE-SF 41 67
	 21	 One
T: value of the test; CV 5%: Critical Value at 5% significance level ; Rejection of Ho if
T<CV 5%; Corrected Sample Size (CSS). Sample Size — Number of Zero differences
alternative hypotheses:
H0 : On average there is no difference between DDPMI Ep-RJE and DDPMI
,EP-OjS T
(for S = UNB, NOUNB and J = SA,SF).
H 1
 : On average, DDPMI 74-0. IS T is higher than DDPMITE-J (for S = UNB,S,PRE
NOUNB and J = SA,SF).
It is possible to observe in Table 6.5 that whereas for the UNB group of products
the results of these tests lead to reject the null hypothesis of no difference between the
degree of price coordination TE-SA/TE-SF in the periods before and after the start of
the LPG, for the NOUNB this null hypothesis is not rejected. The results of these
tests are evidence in favour of the hypothesis sustaining that the LPG would increase
the degree of price coordination for the subgroup of products included in the LPG. The
fact that the degree of price coordination in the NOUNB group of products remains
unchanged supports Tesco's LPG as the factor causing the increase in the degree of
price coordination for the UNB group of products.
The final step of this analysis of price coordination consists of checking if the in-
crease in the degree of price coordination TE-SA/TE-SF caused by Tesco's LPG has
modified the pre-guarantee period status making the degree of between-supermarket
between the observations of the two series is obvious (e.g. the price coordination index that corre-
sponds to canned spaghetti in DDPMI T; EN-BSPR E is matched with the price coordination index that
corresponds to the same product in DDPMITE–SAOST )UNB,PI•
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price coordination higher for the UNB group of products than for the NOUNB one.
We perform this analysis using a one-sided Mann-Whitney test with the following null
and alternative hypothesis:
H0
 :On average, in the post-guarantee period there is no difference in the degree of
price coordination between Tesco and Sainsbury (Safeway) for UNB and NOUNB,
i.e. on average there is no difference between DDPMITE-J 	 and DDPMITE-JUNB,POST	 NOUNB,POST
(for J = SA, SF).
H1
 :On average, in the post-guarantee period the degree of price coordination be-
tween Tesco and Sainsbury (Safeway) is higher for UNB than for NOUNB, i.e. on
average DDPMIT-Euiv-Bj POST is higher than DDPMI71N1 EO-UjN B,POST (for = SA, SF).
From the results of the tests shown in Table 6.4, we can conclude that in the post-
guarantee period both TE-SA and TE-SF degrees of price coordination are higher for
the UNB group of products than for the NOUNB one.
To sum up, consistent with the news hypothesis relating LPGs with price wars and
the Salop's line hypothesis relating LPGs with collusive outcomes, Tesco's Unbeatable
Value PB guarantee has resulted in an increase in the degree of price coordination TE-
SA/TE-SF for the products included in the LPG, with the final result of making the
degree of price coordination for the products included in the LPG higher than for those
products not included. 'Whereas in the scenery of a price war the increase in the degree
of between-supermarket price coordination should go along a decreasing price trend, in
the scenery of tacit collusion the increase in between-supermarket price coordination
should involve an increasing price trend. Therefore, an analysis of price trends before
and after the start of the LPG is needed to discriminate between hypotheses.
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6.4.2 Low-price guarantees and price trends
Market Analysis
In order to analyse the effect of Tesco's LPG on the overall level of prices relevant for
the client located in the supermarkets' geographical influence area, it is useful to define
the following weighted market average relative price index:
tRELPRItALL PUNB PNOUNBt
where:
PUNBt	Unbeatable Products Basket Market Pricet E [3 H m-su x piUtNBJ
i=1 *=1
22	 3
E
H 4-5,1 X piNtOUNBJ
i=1 •=1
24 [3 3
As the local market shares (MS.') for each one of the supermarkets that are needed
to construct the market weighted average relative price index are not available, we have
assumed equal market shares for all the three supermarkets. The results do not change
substantially if the market share used to build the index are the UK market shares of
•each one of the supermarkets chains.
An ideal construction of the baskets of UNB and NOUNB products will weight
the products according to their weight in the representative consumer budget. Hess
and Gerstner [1991] used as weights those of the consumer price index, however these
weights are not available in the UK with the required disaggregation16.
We analyse the effect of the low price guarantee over the Relative Price Index
(RELPRItALL ) by running the following regression':
16 At least this was the answer of the Office of National Statistics when the author requested them.
In order to show that the results obtained are robust to the set of products used in the analysis, we
carry out in Appendix C a reduced sample analysis excluding from the full sample beer and toiletries.
The reason for excluding these products is that these are the products for which interpurchase time
is longer and/or tastes more important in the buying decision.
"All the standard error provided in the different estimations are the Newey-West heterocedasticity
PNOUNBt = No Unb. Products Basket Market Prices
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RELPRI't4LL = a l ± a2Di	 + 152 (T x Di)
where:
0 from t 1 to t 15
D,=
	
	 and T is a time trend
1 otherwise
We show in Table 6.6 the results of the regression analysis. Figure 6.1 (Appendix
B) shows real and fitted values of RELPRItALL. If in order to examine the effect
of Tesco's LPG , we focus our attention in the analysis of the trend 18 followed by
RELPRItALL , the results obtained for 13 1 (0.0012) and 13posi (-0.0016) reveal that while
RELPRItALL showed an increasing trend before the start of the LPG, after starting
Unbeatable Value this trend becomes decreasing. The real effect of Tesco's LPG (as it
is possible to observe in Figure 6.1) is to invert the trend of RELPRItALL . From a
situation in which the market average level of prices of the UNB basket was increasing
with respect to the market average level of prices of the NOUNB basket we move to
the opposite situation.
This change in trend fits better with the price war hypothesis than with the collusive
hypothesis, otherwise RELPRItALL should show a steeper increasing trend after the
start of Tesco's LPG. The detected change could be caused by changes in the behaviour
of both the prices of the UNB and NOUNB baskets of products or by changes in
only one of the two categories. Therefore, further insight is needed in the behaviour of
and autocorrelation consistent standard errors. As suggested by Pesaran and Pesaran [1997] we have
used Parzen weights to calculate them.
18 1f instead of focusing our analysis on trends we would focus it on mean levels we could obtain
misleading results. Let us use an example in order to illustrate this argument. From Figure 6.1, it
results evident that the effect of Tesco's LPG is to invert the trend of RELPRI"tILL from increasing
to decreasing, this suggests that Tesco's LPG is reducing RELPRV LL . However, the mean level of
RELPRIi4" is higher in the post-guarantee than in the pre-guarantee period. Therefore, an analysis
based on mean levels would conclude that Tesco LPG has lead to an increase in RELPRIi 4" when
the actual effect has been to reduce it. The analysis of means is clearly conditioned for the starting
values in each one of the periods.
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Table 6.6: RELPRI regression analysis_
Dependent Variable : RELPRItALL 
R2 =77.41 r =74.46 
Coefficient Std. Error'
al 0.4249** 0.0025
a2 0.0505** 0.0055
01 0.0012** 0.0003
02 -0.0028** 0.0004
apost 0.4755** 0.0047
0 post -0.0016** 0.0002
Normality	 0.5462 (0.761)
apost = al + a2; 13post = 01 + 02
1 Newey-West Standard Errors;**significant at 5% level
the market average price levels of the UNB and NOUNB baskets of products. We
can perform this analysis using two additional tests:
1. Let us define the following indexes19:
NOINlYtILL =
J NOUNBJ1Ei24 1 [T-r33.= 1n MS x Pit
Ei2_4 1 [ri j3=1 Ms x piNiOUNB/
UNBINDtALL =
Bv.22 [173 A4-5,/ „ uN
Lai=1 14=-1
	
A Pit
v,22 1
	 x73 m-sj
4=1	 Fil
where t and j are defined as above.
These two indexes are used as dependent variables of the following regression mod-
els:
NOINIVLL = al
 + a2D1 + 13 1T + 02(71 X D1)
UNBINIVLL = a1
 + a2Di
 +131 T + )32(T
 x
The results of these regressions are shown in Table 6.7. As regards NOINIVLL , it
is possible to infer from the positive sign of the trend dummy coefficient (0.0025) and
19We are just building a price index using as basis the first period of the sample.
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from the no significance of the trend coefficient for the post-guarantee period (0 post)
that the effect of Tesco's LPG has been to cut the decreasing trend of the market price
of the basket of NOUNB products (Figure 6.2)20.
Table 6.7: Regression Analysis Results
Dependent Variable: NOINIVLL Dependent Variable:UNBINDJtILL
R2 = 92.28 ft2 = 91.28 R2 = 77.51	 Fe = 74.58
Coefficient Std. Error' Coeffcicient Std. Error
al 1.0076** 0.0032 al 0.9913** 0.0039
a2 -0.0515** 0.0112 02 0.0600** 0.0062
01 -0.0027** 0.0003 01. 0.0002 0.0005
02 0.0025** 0.0006 02 -0.0038** 0.0006
apost 0.9560** 0.0107 Opost 1.0514** 0.0048
0 post -0.00017 0.0004 13
 post -0.00363** 0.00022
Normality 4.6237 (0.099)
	 Normality 5.1141 (0.078)
apost = al
 + a2; 0 post = 01 ± 02
iNewey-West standard errors;*Significant at 10% level;" Significant at 5% level
With respect to UNBINDitILL
 regression analysis, observation of Figure 6.3 and
the negative and significant coefficient of the trend dummy (-0.0038) reveal . the real
effect of the LPG. Tesco's LPG changes the trend of UNBINDVLL from a slightly
increasing (0.0002) to decreasing (-0.0036).
• Consequently, the decreasing trend observed in RELPRItALL for the post-guarantee
period is explained by a quite stable path in the market weighted price of the basket
of NOUNB (as it is possible to observe in Figure 6.2) that goes along a decreasing
trend of the market weighted price of the basket of UNB.
Hence, the empirical evidence suggest the Tesco's PB guarantee is not triggering
an increase in the market averaged price of the products included in the LPG but a
reduction of it. This result is suggesting that the supposed anticompetitive effects of
the LPG and the related claims of antitrust action should be reconsidered.
2.- Given that most of the price comparisons have been carried out using as basis
20 A possible explanation of this phenomenon will be given later on in the chapter.
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the first period of the sample it would be interesting to make comparisons using two
different basis for UNBINDrL and NOINDILILL for the periods before and after the
start of the PB guarantee. Thus, for the period before the start of the PB we will
use as a basis the value of the corresponding series at the first period of the sample
(1JNBIND1 it ILL and NOINDl L ) and for the period after the start of the LPG
we will use the value of the corresponding series in the first fortnight in which the
LPG was effective (UNBIND16rL and NOIND16rL). We show the evolution of
NOIND1itILL , UNBIND irL NOIND16rL and UNBIND16 LL in Figures 6.4
and 6.5 (Appendix B).
Using these Figures as reference, we can use a Wilcon.xon Test for Pair Matched
Observations21 to compare the patterns of behaviour of the prices of the UNB and
NOUNB basket of products.
• For the period before the start of the PB guarantee and using the series with
basis on the first period of the sample we conduct the test:
Ho: On average, there is no difference between NOIND1r-6 and UNBINDirL
H1 : On average, there is a difference between NOIND1i4" and UNBINDV"
• For the period after the start of the PB guarantee and using the series with basis
on the first observation in which the PB guarantee was effective
Ho: On average, there is no difference betw6en NOIND16rL and UNBIND164LL.
H1 : On average, NOIND16ff is higher than UNBIND16LL
The results of both tests (Table 6.8) show that whilst for the first period the average
level of both price indexes (UNBIND1i4LL and NOIND1r) is similar (Figure 6.4),
21 We use a Wilconxon test for Matched pair observations because each observation in NOIND144"
is matched with the obervation of UNBIND1141L that correponds to the same fortnight. The same
happens with the observations belonging to NOIND16 LL and UNBIND14".
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the effect of Unbeatable Value is to keep the UNBIND16 4LL
 systematically below
NOIND16' L . As it is possible to observe in Figure 6.5, while NOIND16 LL keeps
quite a stable level during all the second part of the sample UNBIND 16 L is basically
always decreasing.
Table 6.8: Wilconxon Test. Different Basis Analysis 
T C.V. 5% CSS One/Two Sided
Weeks 1-15 40 21
	 14 Two
Weeks 16-27 0 13	 11	 One
T: value of the test; CV 5%: Critical Value at 5% significance level ; Rejection of Ho if
T<CV 5%; Corrected Sample Size (CSS) = Sample Size — Number of Zero differences
Supermarket Analysis
An interesting insight is to analyse in a more detailed way the pattern followed by
RELPRItALL. This could be done observing how the PB guarantee is affecting the
behaviour of a relative price index per supermarket. This index is built as:
v.22 ,LINBJ
RELPRII = ii=1 l'itv-.24 NOUNBJ
Z-di=1 P it
where:
.i, = 1,...,n products (n = 24 for NOUNB and n = 22 for UNB), J = TE, SA, SF and
t = 1,..., 27 fortnightly taken observations
This relative price index for each one of the supermarkets can be used as dependent
variable of the following regression model:
RELPRIIJ = al
 + a2D1 + 01T + 02(71 x D1)
The results of the OLS regression of this model for each one of the supermarkets
are shown in Table 6.9. Actual and fitted values of the relative price index for each
one of the supermarkets are shown in Figures 6.6 to 6.8 in Appendix B.
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Table 6.9: Regression Analysis by store
Dep. Variable:
R2 = 60.23
RELPRgE
R2 = 55.04
Coefficient Std. Error'
al 0.4257** 0.0032
a2 0.0313** 0.0058
01 0.0012** 0.0004
02 -0.0018** 0.0005
apost 0.4570** 0.0047
0 post -0.0006** 0.0002
Normality 1.3583 (0.507)
Dep. Variable: RELPRIP
R2 = 85.19 112 -= 83.26
Coefficient Std. Errorl
al 0.4219** 0.0028
a2 0.0723** 0.0049
01 0.0020** 0.0002
02 -0.0043** 0.0003
apost 0.4943** 0.0041
13 post -0.0023** 0.0002
Normality 0.926 (0.629)
Dep. Variable: RELPRip
R2 = 37.24 R2 = 29.05
Coefficient Std. Error'
al 0.4273** 0.0052
a2 0.0471** 0.0101
01 0.0006 0.0007
02 -0.0024** 0.0008
apost 0.4744", 0.0084
0 post -0.00173** 0.0004
Normality 1.589 (0.452)
apost = al a2; 0 post - 01 ± I2
iNewey-West standard errors;**Significant at 5% level; *Significant at 10% level
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Table 6.10: Supermarket Decomposition of RELPRI trend dummy coeffient
RELPRItALL RELPRITE RELPRIt5A RELPRItsF
'Rend Dummy -0.0028** -0.0017** -0.0043** -0.0024**
Coefficient (132 ) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0008)
Share (%) 100 20.24 51.19 28.57
Between brackets Newey -West standard errors. ** significant at 5% level
As regards the sign of 132 (coefficient of the trend dummy) the regression analysis
gives the same results for the three supermarkets. l32 is negative and significant for
the three supermarkets considered. As it is possible to observe in Table 6.9 the result
of the LPG, both for the active supermarket (Tesco) and the passive supermarkets
(Sainsbury and Safeway), is to invert the trend of RELPRIit from a positive trend to
a negative one (for Safeway the positive trend coefficient for the pre-guarantee period
was not significant).
However, the size of 132 is quite different across supermarkets. The highest ab-
solute value of 13 2 corresponds to Sainsbury (-0.0043) and the smallest one (-0.0018)
corresponds to the supermarket offering the LPG, Tesco. We can use the coefficients
of the trend dummy of each one of the supermarkets regressions to decompose the
change in trend of the market average price index RELPRItALL
 (-0.0028) in the shares
that correspond to each one of the supermarkets. As it is Possible to see in Table
6.10, Sainsbury is the supermarket explaining most of the change of observed in REL-
pmtALL trend. The fact that Tesco is the supermarket changing its price pattern the
less suggests that in some way it is acting as a market leader and that are the others
who are accommodating their price patterns.
To sum up, after analysing supermarket pricing behaviour before and after the start
of the LPG, it is clear that the increase in between supermarket price coordination for
the products included in Tesco's Unbeatable Value did not have as effect to increase
the price level. In this case the increase in price coordination cannot be explained as
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tacit collusion but, as a process of approximation of Sainsbury's and Safeway's prices
for the products included in the LPG to the prices set by the low-price supermarket,
Tesco (Figure 6.9)22.
If we identify the prices before the start of the PB as competitive then we should
conclude that Unbeatable Value had procompetitive effects. The only theoretical pa-
per that recognises possible procompetitive effects for LPGs is Corts [1996]. Using a
different framework in which he distinguishes between sophisticated and unsophisti-
cated 23consumers and with focus in the discriminatory effects of LPG, Corts shows
that when the elasticity of demand (at the relevant price) of the unsophisticated con-
sumers is higher than the elasticity of demand of the sophisticated consumers, PB can
result in procompetitive prices. However, he states that the results of his model are
more adequate for those markets in which a considerable price dispersion is present.
He identifies these markets as those with a large variety of outlets resulting in lim-
ited consumers' knowledge about the relevant price alternatives (more characteristic
of consumer electronics or automobile tires than groceries where most of the clients
are able to identify the relevant set of supermarkets) and with an important degree
of variation in the non price attributes of the product (we stressed before that the
LQs are almost homogenous across supermarkets and the only difference is given by
supermarket location).
22 h1 the Table below we can observe the difference between the price of the basket of UNB at
Tesco and at each one of the supermarkets affected by the LPG in Fortnight 16 (start of the LPG)
and Fortnight 27 (end of the sample).
Fortnight 16 Fortnight 27
TE-SA	 50	 8
TE-SF	 15	 6
It is clear the process of reduction of the prices of the products included in the LPG at Sainsbury
and Safeway to converge to Tesco's prices.
23 Unsophisticated consumers base their decissions in posted prices. Sophisticated consumer aware
of actual selling prices takes the purchasing decision with basis on them. Although both types of
consumers are aware of the LPGs, Corts assumes that whereas for the sophisticated consumers the
cost of activating the LPG (hassle cost) is low for the unsophisticated consumers this is high enough
to make unprofitable the attempt of activating them.
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6.5 Is Unbeatable Value a loss-leader strategy?
The empirical analysis we carried out in the previous section suggests that the effects of
the Tesco's LPG have been an increase in the degree of price coordination between the
supermarket introducing the price guarantee and the supermarkets affected by it, and
a decrease in the market average price of the basket of products included in the LPG.
These results seem to be evidence in favour of the hypothesis of LPGs as triggering
price wars, nevertheless there is no economic theory rationale behind this hypothesis.
We think that there is a missing piece in the empirical analysis of supermarket LPGs
and this is that they could be used as part of a loss-leader strategy by a multiproduct
supermarket. Hess and Gerstner [1987] define loss-leader pricing as a price strategy
in which retailers set very low-prices sometimes below costs to lure consumers to the
shop. Because the consumers once in the shop buy products other than loss-leaders
they price these other products to compensate the deals offered on the loss leaders.
Bliss [1988] uses a model of monopolistic competition between multiproduct retail-
ers with complete information on the consumer-side to develop a theory of retail pricing
and recognises the possibility of loss-leader pricing as arising because of asymmetries
in the cross-price elasticities of goods sold at the supermarkets. Howevei, the first real
attempt of using a formal model to analyse loss-leaders is Hess and Gerstner [1987].
They construct a two-period model with N identical fully informed consumers that be-
cause of high transaction costs visit only one store in each period. In this model stores
sell a selection of "impulse goods" (products sold without previous price comparison
across stores) and only one "shopping good" (products that determine which store to
visit). They show that under these assumptions, stores may be interested in pricing
the shopping good below marginal costs to lure consumers to the shop and obtaining
profits through their purchases of impulse goods.
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Lal and Matutes [1994] using a duopoly framework in which two firms compete
in price for the demand of two products, develop a model that relaxes some of the
assumptions of Hess and Gerstner [1987]. They relax the assumption impulse/shopping
goods and allow the consumer to decide which store to visit on the basis of the surplus
derived from the purchase of an assortment of goods; furthermore they allow for the
possibility of each consumer buying the two goods from different stores; finally, they
relax the assumption of fully informed consumers by assuming that consumers are
uninformed about prices unless advertised and in this way they introduce the role
played by price expectations 24 and advertising to explain loss-leader pricing. They
show that when the willingness to pay is sufficiently high for the stores to extract a
large consumer surplus from the unadvertised good and the cost of advertising relative
to the cost of shopping 25 is high enough, there exists a unique equilibrium in which firms
advertise only one product and this is sold at price below marginal cost. This is because
for the competition to be tight enough to result in loss-leader pricing, willingness to
pay has to be high enough relative to the transportation costs. Similarly, very low
advertising costs will lead to an equilibrium in which the two stores will advertise the
two products. Lal and Matutes [1994] claim that the products more likely to be used
as loss-leaders are those bought relatively often and/or with high storage costs.
6.5.1 From theory to practice
Both Dobson [1997] and the Own Brands KeyNote Report [1997] point to the use of
LQs as loss-leaders by the supermarkets. Whereas the first uses as an example the ac-
cusation of the Bakers federation to the supermarkets of loss-leading as an inducement
to consumers, the second reports the '96 baked beans supermarket price war that drove
24 They assume that consumers correctly predict how unadvertised prices depend on the prices
advertised by profit-maximizing firms.
25 The opportunity cost of shopping is understood as a transportation cost.
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the price of the LQ Tesco baked beans down to 3 pence'. LQs have two characteris-
tics that make them the optimum quality variant to carry out a loss-leader strategy:
first they are essential products with low prices and a high frequency of purchase, and
second the supermarkets have almost complete control of the wholesale prices for this
quality variant, and this facilitates the instrumentation of this kind of price strategies.
We can use the Known Value Item (KVI) list published by the Shaws List of
Recommended Fair Prices to check if the LQs included in our sample accomplish one
of the main characteristics required to potential loss-leaders. We could also check if
belonging to this list turns out to be a factor that allows us to distinguish between the
products included and not included in Unbeatable Value. The KVI list includes the
branded products whose price is assumed to be common knowledge among consumers
because they form part of their habitual shopping list. In order to sort the products
of our sample in KVI and no KVI, we make abstraction of the brand name just
considering the product as classification criterion, and include in the list white bread
and rice (products missed in the list and that we think that should be included in the
shopping basket of the representative English consumer").
Table 6.11: KVIs Products
KVI no KVI KVI (%) no KVI (%)
NOUNB
UNB
15
16
9
6
62.5
72.73
37.5
27.27
It is possible to observe in Table 6.11 that a big percentage of the UNB and
NOUNB products in the sample can be considered as KVI, however the percentage
of KVI products is more than 10% higher for the UNB than for the NOUNB.
26 An even more recent example (March-98) of a clear loss-leader strategy carried out with a LQ,
was the reduction of the price of the Tesco Value white bread from 29 to 15 pence followed by both
Sainbury and Safeway setting the price of their respective white bread discount line at 19 and 15
pence respectively.
27 Probably these two products are not included in the list because there is no a clear leader brand
in the market.
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Therefore, this is a first element establishing a distinction between the UNB and
NOUNB baskets of products.
As defined above, loss-leaders are products for which the supermarket sets very
low prices sometimes below marginal cost. However, as supermarket wholesale costs
are not available the possibility of identifying loss-leaders by price-cost comparison is
not possible. A second possibility could be to try to identify loss-leaders by means of
analysing supermarket advertising behaviour. Lal and Matutes [1994] suggest as can-
didate to loss leaders those products with low price and intense advertising. However,
their model clearly fits with the US experience in which supermarkets advertise once a
week in a local newspaper the prices of a subset of the products (loss-leaders) and are
free to change the price of the other products along the week. This weekly advertising
in a local newspaper does not take place in the UK 28
 and therefore the identification by
means of newspaper watching of those products that the UK supermarkets could be us-
ing as loss-leaders is precluded. A possible criterion to check if Unbeatable Value could
be identified as a loss-leaders 29
 strategy is to check if the probability of Tesco setting
prices lower than Sainsbury and Safeway in the pre-guarantee period is significantly
higher for the UNB than for the NOUNB basket of products. This is equivalent
to check by means of a Wilconxon Test for Pair Matched Observations 30 if on aver-
age, Lpirs is higher than LPC°""3 for the period before the start of Unbeatable
Vcdue 31 . LpigNB and LPC
and NOUNB defined as:
28 We checked for a period of two months (Nov-96 and March-97) the only local newspaper (Evening
Telegraph) and we did not find any price advertising by anyone of these supermarkets.
28 Loss-leader is understood here in a broad sense: products sold at very low prices most of the times
lower than competitors' prices, but not necessarily with prices lower than marginal cost.
30 We use a Wilconxon test because each obervation in LPIIINB
 is macthed with the observation of
LPirUNB that correspod to the same fortnight.
31 Formally the nun and alternative hypothesis of this one-sided Wilconxon Test for Price Matched
Observations would be:
Ho : On average, in the pre-policy period there is no difference between
is higher than LPIi	
N
	
B and LPiprouNB,
vOUNB: On average, in the pre-policy period LPIiINB
°uNB are the correspondent Low Price Indexes for UNB
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v,22
-LP t
-rb-rUNB
	 2  where i 1
	 22 are the UNB products22
vn24 LP.
LPtINOUNB = Li=1 tt where i = 1, ..., 24 are the NOUNB products24
where:
LP	 Pfit =	 ioftPhleErw<iseinin(tA	 )'14F
If it turns out to be true that the probability of Tesco setting the lowest price is
higher for the UNB than for the NOUNB basket of products then, we could infer
that Tesco is using this group of products as part of an advertising campaign to attract
customers into the shop and probably as a loss-leader strategy.
Table 6.12: Lowest Price Probability Test.UNB-NOUNB 
LPI	 T C.V. 5% CSS One/Two Sided
LPitUN -
LpitNOUN B 23 30	 15	 One
T: value of the test; CV 5%: Critical Value at 5% significance level ; Rejection of Ho if
T<CV 5%.
Corrected Sample Size (CSS) = Sample Size — Zero differences
The results of the Wilconxon test shown in Table 6.12 lead to reject the null hypoth-
tesis of no difference on average between LPI	 and LpINOUNBtUNB	 in the pre-guarantee
period. They confirm that the probability of Tesco setting the minimum price in the
area in the pre-guarantee period is higher for the UNB than for the NOUNB basket
of products32 . Probably Tesco, aware of this situation, is using those products for
which it is more likely to enjoy a price advantage over the other supermarkets to start
32 As it is possible to observe in the Table below, along the sample Tesco sets the lowest price alone
in 21.66% of the times for the NOUNB products and in 26.67% of the times for the UNB products
(5% difference).
CHAPTER 6. UNBEATABLE VALUE	 194
an advertising campaign33 based on the very low price of this subset of products to lure
consumers to the shop. Even though we cannot check if the price of all these products
is set below marginal cost, we think that the characteristics of Unbeatable Value are
very similar to those of a loss-leaders strategy. Tesco is using products for which is
setting a very low price (in general lower than the price at the two others supermarkets
considered in the sample) as a part of an advertising campaign addressed to attract
consumers into the shop.
6.5.2 Unbeatable Value: the start of a price war?
Once we have shown that Tesco's Unbeatable Value rather than a tool aimed at easing
between-supermarket price coordination seems to be a loss-leading strategy to lure
consumers to the supermarket, we concentrate the analysis in the effect of Unbeatable
Value over the price of the basket of UNB products. Both the analysis of RELPRItALL
and UNBINIVLL above suggested that the start of Unbeatable Value triggered a
supermarket price war. However, it is interesting to check if the start of this LPG was
actually along a significant reduction of Tesco's price for the basket of UNB products
(as we would expect in the event of a price war) and if Sainsbury and Safeway reacted
in the same way.
Therefore, we focus our analysis on the evolution of the price of the UNB basket
of products. We are interested not only in the evolution of the market averaged price
of this basket but also in the evolution of its price at each one of the supermarkets. In
Lowest price setting (%)
ALL TE SA SF TE-SA TE-SF SA-SF
NOUNB 23.33 21.66 16.66 8.89 14.17 10.83 4.44
UNB 39.69 26.67 9.69 3.03 7.87 12.12 0.90
However, we should consider the possibility of the other supermarkets setting low prices for some
of the products included in the sample in order to use them as loss-leaders. Hence, we can calculate
the percentage of times for which Tesco stands the lowest-price position (alone or jointly with other
supermarkets). Tesco sets the lowest price of the market 86.35% of the times for the UNB group of
products whereas only 69.99% of the times for the NOUNB group of products.
33 This advertising campaign could be understood as a low-price signalling device.
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order to carry out this analysis we first define the following indexes:
• Market Averaged Price of the Basket of UNB->
PUNB JtILL =	 [11.1=1MS x pYtN131
• Price of the Basket of UNB at supermarket J--->
PUNBii =	 pUNBJit
and then we run the following set of regressions:
PUNBis = al
 + a2Di + 01 T + 02 (T x
Table 6.13: PUNB Regression Analysis by store
Dependent Variable: PUNWILL
R2 = 77.51	 112
 = 74.58
Dependent Variable: PUNBTE
R2 = 25.00	 R2 = 15.22
Coefficient	 Std Error' Coefficient	 Std. Error'
al	 853.435**	 3.394
a2 	 51.668**	 5.343
01	 0.1638	 0.440
02	 -3.291**	 0.481
al	 834.1658**	 4.7166
a2	 14.5131	 8.5111
01	 -0.5718	 0.6965
02	 -0.6310	 0.7662
apost	 905.103**	 4.120
/3 post -3.1272**	 0.194
apost	 848.6789**	 6.9152.
/3 post -1.2028**	 0.2883
Normality
	 5.141 (0.078) Normality	 3.0903 (0.213)
Dependent Variable: PUNBisA
R2 = 88.68	 R2 = 87.21
Dependent Variable: PUNBP
R2 = 79.91
	 ft2
 = 77.30
Coefficient	 Std. Error' Coefficient
	 Std. Error'
al	 840.7180**	 5.1178
a2 	 132.8139**	 8.1861
01	 3.1494**	 0.4235
02	 -8.7264**	 0.5256
al	 885.4219**	 6.0204
a2	 7.6785	 7.8128
01	 -2.0860**	 0.6844
02	 -0.5157	 0.7264
apost	 973.5319**	 6.3962
0 post
	
-5.5770**	 0.3125
apost	 893.1004**	 4.9801
0o5 t 	 -2.6017**	 0.2437
Normality	 0.0578 (0.971) Normality	 2.3816 (0.304)
apost a l + 02 0 post = 01 ± 02
i Newey-West standard errors; **Significant at 5% level; *Significant at 10% level
It is possible to observe in Table 6.13 and in Figure 6.10 that the introduction of
Unbeatable Value changes the trend of PUNBitILL from increasing (0.1638) to decreas-
ing (-3.1272). As PUNB/tILL can be obtained as a weighted average of the PUNB1
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at each supermarket, we can use the estimated coefficients of the trend dummy (2)
of each one of the supermarket regressions to calculate the share that corresponds to
each supermarket in the change of trend of PUNB)tILL.
Table 6.14: Supermarket Decomposition of PUNB trend dummy coefficient
PUNlVLL PUNBTE PUNatsA PUNBSF
Trend Dummy -3.291** -0.6310 -8.7264** -0.5157
Coefficient (/32) (0.481) (0.7662) (0.5256) (0.7264)
Share (%) 100 6.39 88.39 5.22
Between brackets Newey -West standard errors. ** significant at 5% level
As it is possible to observe in Table 6.14, Sainsbury price setting is the main respon-
sible of the change in trend (from increasing to decreasing) of PUNWILL . We can use
the results obtained from the regression models to disentangle this phenomenon. It
is possible to observe in Table 6.13 that the estimated coefficient of the trend dummy
in Tesco's regression model is not significant, this is signalling that no change in trend
is observed as consequence of the start of the LPG34 . This Tesco's result fits with the
hypothesis about the real aim of Tesco's action stated before: Tesco, aware of its price
advantage in a given subset of products, launches an advertising strategy based on the
low price of these products to attract consumers into the store 35 . We can observe in
34 The negative trend coefficient is not significant in the pre-policy period and significant in the
post-policy period. However, one is not significantly different from the other.
33 As it is possible to observe in Figure 6.11 another effect of Tesco's LPG on Tesco's price setting
for the UNB basket of products has been to reduce the variability of the price of this basket. We can
check statistically this hypothesis by means of an F-test for equal variances with the following null
and alternative hypothesis:
Ho : There is no difference between the variance of ,PUNBi l
 for pre and post-guarantee periods.
H 1 : The variance of PUNBi is greater in the post-guarantee than in the pre-guarantee period.
As it is posible to observe in the table below, the results of the F-test confirm that the introduction
of the LPG had as effect a reduction in the degree of variation of the price of the basket of UNB
at Tesco. A possible interpretation of this fact is that Tesco when introducing the LPG is loosing
freedom in the price setting for the products included in the LPG.
P(F< f)
PUNBTE 4.5706 0.0078
PUNBi9A 1.6380 0.2079
PUNat9F 2.4663 0.0694
F is a random variable that follows and F distribution
It is also possible to observe that for Sainsbury and Safeway the null hypothesis of equal variances
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Figures 6.12 and 6.13 that the reaction of the two supermarkets affected in the area
under study by Tesco's LPG seems to be quite different. Figure 6.12 clearly shows that
the reaction of Sainsbury to Unbeatable Value is a continuous reduction of the price
of the basket of UNB that inverts the trend of PUNBi9A
 (whereas in the pre-policy
period the trend coefficient is 3.1494 in the post-policy period it is -5.5770). More-
over, Sainsbury's regression model is the only one for which the coefficient of the trend
dummy is significant. This result clearly matches with the declarations of a Sainsbury's
spokesman shortly after the start of Tesco's LPG that although neglecting the need of
a direct reaction to Tesco's move says: " When we launch Unbeatable Autumn, we said
we would undercut the competitors and that is just what we have done with this offer" 36 .
It seems that Sainsbury understood Unbeatable Value as a further Tesco's threat to its
lost market share leadership37 . With respect to Safeway the not significant coefficient
of the trend dummy seems to indicate no significant change in Safeway's price trend
for the UNB products after the introduction of the LPG, however we have still the
doubt if this decreasing trend would have continued for so long without the TeSco's
Unbeatable Value.
There is a still a prediction about the loss-leaders strategies that we have not checked
for Unbeatable Value: if a subset of products is used as loss-leader the supermarket must
is not rejected at 5% of significance. Therefore, for these supermarkets no difference is detected in the
variability of the price of the basket of UNB between the pre and post-policy periods.
36 Marketing Week, 13th September 1996.
Although Autumn Value was in principle advertised as a LPG over 700 product, it cannot be
considered as an actual LPG because it was always linked to a multi-unit product purchase of the
kind "Buy two units and have the third at half price". Additionally, it was never stated if the price
relevant for the LPG was the price per unit of the multiproduct purchase or the price when only one
unit was purchased.
Autumn Value started just in the fortnight after the start of Tesco's Unbeatable Value and it lasted
until Christmas (five observations in our sample) whereas the last one was still operating at the end of
the sample. It is possible to observe in Figure 6.11 that while the start of Tesco's LPG substantially
affected the patterns of price setting of Tesco for the products included in the LPG Autumn Value
does not seem to have any relevant effect.
37 Along 1995-1996 Tesco took over Sainsbury's market share leadership.
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obtain higher margin for other products in order to compensate. We can assume for
this analysis that these "other products" are the NOUNB products and we examine
if the LPG has any effect over Tesco's pricing for these products. It is possible to
observe in Figure 6.14 that whereas in the pre-guarantee period the price of the basket
of NOUNB products followed an ever decreasing trend, the start of the LPG breaks
this trend. The price of this basket is almost completely stable in the post-guarantee
period. If first we define:
E22 NOUNBTEPNOUNBF -	 pit
and then we perform the usual regression analysis:
PNOUNBTE
 = c 1 ± a2D1
 + OiT + 02 (T x D1)
the results (Table 6.15) just confirm the intuition we got through observation of Figure
6.14. Whilst the trend coefficient (-6.3512) in the pre-guarantee period is negative and
significant, in the post-guarantee period this trend coefficient (-0.1626) is no significant.
Another time, Tesco's pricing behavior after the start of the LPG fits quite well with a
doss-leaders strategy: once, by means of advertising the attention is placed on the low
prices of the subset of LPG products the process of reduction of the prices of "other
products" is halted.
To sum up, Tesco's Unbeatable Value did not consist in a significant reduction of the
prices of the products included in the campaign with the aim of triggering a price wax.
We think that Unbeatable Value is an advertising campaign with all the characteristics
of a loss-leader strategy (although we cannot prove the fact of possible pricing under
marginal cost) in which Tesco, after recognition of its price advantage in a group of
LQs, is using their low prices to lure consumers to the shop with the aim of earning
higher margins on other products. However, Sainsbury interpreted Tesco's Unbeatable
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Table 6.15: PNOUNB regression analysis
Dependent Variable : PNOUNBTE
R2 = 87.59 —R2 = 85.97
Coefficient Std. Error'
al 1958.3** 7.4520
a2 -101.0240** 26.0618
01 -6.3512** 0.8196
02 6.1886** 1.4096
apost 1857.3** 24.9737
0 post -0 .1626 1.1469
Normality 0.2792 (0.870)
apost = al
 + a2; 0 post = 01 ± 02
iNewey-West Standard Errors;** significant at 5% level; *significant at 10% level
Value as a clear threat, thus started a process of reduction of the prices included in
Tesco's Unbeatable Value that produced a change in the trend of the market average
price of the basket of these products.
6.6 Concluding Remarks
The empirical analysis of Tesco's LPG sheds light about the possible anticompetitive
effects of LPGs. Although it turns out to be true that this LPG resulted in a higher
degree of between-supermarkets price coordination for the products included in it,
this goes along with a price decreasing trend and not with a increasing trend such as
predicted by Dbdt and Nalebuff [1991].
In general, we expect that in supermarket retailing the expected reward from acti-
vating the LPG usually will not to be big enough to compensate the costs in which the
consumer has to incur to activate it. This could explain the inability of Tesco's LPG
to raise prices to supracompetitive levels, but by no means it serves as explanation of
the procompetitive pattern detected. In order to explain the procompetitive effects
of the LPG over the prices of the products included in it, it is necessary to bear in
mind the nature of the supermarket as a multiproduct firm. The results of our analysis
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indicate that Tesco's Unbeatable Value did not consist in a significant reduction of the
prices of the products included in the campaign with the aim of triggering a price war.
Unbeatable Value seems an advertising campaign with all the characteristics of a loss-
leader strategy (although we cannot prove the fact of possible pricing under marginal
cost) in which Tesco, after recognition of its price advantage in a group of LQs, is
using their low prices to lure consumers to the shop with the aim of earning higher
margins on other products. However, Sainsbury interpreted Tesco's Unbeatable Value
as a clear threat to its market share and reacted with a significant reduction of the
prices of the products included in the guarantee. Hence, antitrust claims related with
LPGs [Sargent, 1993] should be revisited in those cases involving multiproduct firms.
These claims should carefully analyse the real objective of the multiproduct firms when
announcing a given strategy. Otherwise they run a clear risk of misunderstanding.
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Figure 6.1: RELPRI (ALL) Actual and Fitted Values
Figure 6.2: NOIND(ALL) Actual and Fitted Values
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Figure 6.3: UNBIND(ALL) Actual and Fitted Values
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Figure 6.4: NOIND1/UNBIND1.Basis Fortnight 1
Figure 6.5: NOIND16/LTNBIND16.Basis Fortnight 16
Figure 6.6: RELPRI(TE): Actual and Fitted Values
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Figure 6.7: RELPRI(SA): Actual and Fitted Values
Figure 6.8: RELPRI(SF): Actual and Fitted Values
Figure 6.9: Evolution of the Price of the Basket of UNB products
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Figure 6.10: PUNB(ALL): Actual and Fitted Values
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Figure 6.13: PUNB(SF) Actual and Fitted Values
Figure 6.14: PNOUNB(TE) Actual and Fitted Values
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C. Reduced Sample Analysis
Motivated for the lack of weights when building the basket of products included
(UNB) and not included in the LPG (NOUNB), the aim of this Appendix is to
show the robustness of the results to the subset of products included in the sample.
With respect of the sample used in the general body of the paper (full sample), we
exclude here the categories of alcoholic products (beer) and toiletries (deodorant, hair
shampoo, shower gel, toothpaste, sanitary towels, soap). The reason for this exclusion
is that this is the subset of products for which interpurchase time is longer and/or
tastes more important in the buying decision.
The numbering of the Tables in this Appendix corresponds to that of the general
body of the paper and an a is added to distinguish them.
Table 6.4a: Mann-Whitney Test for differences on average DDPMI. UNB-NOUNB 
Value of the test (U) Critical Value 5% One/Two Sided
TE-SA 179
	 120.07
	 Two
TE-SF 178
	 119.91	 Two
Post-guarantee	 Value of the test (U) Critical Value 5% One/Two Sided
TE-SA 105.5
	 131	 One
TE-SF 114
	 131.24	 One
Rejection of the Ho if U< CV5%
It is possible to observe in Table 6.4a that the results obtained do not differ from the
results obtained with the full sample. Whereas in the pre-guarantee period the average
DDPMI is similar for UNB and NOUNB (the null hypothesis is not rejected), in
the post-guarantee period the average DDPM_I is higher for UNB than for NOUNB.
0.5943** 
-0.0019**
0.0042
0.0002
°post
0 post
One
One
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Table 6.5a: Wilconxon Test for differences on average DDPMI.  Pre-post guarantee
NOUNB	 T C.V. 5% CSS One/Two Sided
TE-SA 47 41	 17 One
TE-SF 63 53
	
19 One
UNB	 T C.V. 5% 
TE-SA 8 47
	
18
TE-SF 29 53
	
19
T: value of the test; CV 5%: Critical Value at 5% significance level ; Rejection of Ho if
T<CV 5%; Corrected Sample Size (CSS) = Sample Size — Number of Zero Differences.
As for the full sample, the results shown in Table 6.5a suggest that while for the
NOUNB there is no difference in the average DDPMI between the pre and post-
guarantee period, for the UNB the DDPMI is higher in the post-guarantee period.
Table 6.6a: RELPRI regression analysis
Dependent Variable : RELPRItALL
Coefficient Std. Error'
R2 =73.62 R2 =70.18
01	 0.5262**	 0.0047
a2	 0.0680**	 0.0065
'31	 0.0015**	 0.0006
02	 -0.0034**	 0.0007
Normality	 4.4569 (0.108)
apost = 01
 ± a2; 0 post = 01 ± 02
iNewey-West Standard Errors; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 5% level
The results of the regression analysis (Table 6.6a) show that Tesco's LPG is invert-
ing the trend of RELPRItALL
 from increasing to decreasing confirming the evidence
obtained with the full sample (whereas in the pre-policy period the trend coefficient is
0.0015 in the post policy period it is -0.0019).
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Table 6.7a: Regression Analysis Results
Dependent Variable: NOINDitILL
R2 = 83.16	 R2
 = 80.97
Dependent Variable:UNBINDft'LL
R2 = 67.74	 R2 = 63.53
Coefficient Std. Error' Coefficient Std. Error
al 1.0116** 0.0049 01 0.9810** 0.0048
az -0.0732** 0.0170 az 0.0460** 0.0076
01 -0.0032** 0.0005 o, -0.0006 0.0006
02 0.00321** 0.0009 02 -0.0028** 0.0007
apost 0.9384** 0.1633 apost 1.0359 0.0059
0 post 0.00001 0.0007 0 post -0.0034 0.0003
Normality 3.3542(0,187)
	
Normality 4.5651(0.102) 
apost = al + az; Opost - + /2
iNewey-West Standard Errors; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 5% level
It is possible to observe in Table 6.7a that as with the full sample Tesco's LPG
changes the trend coefficient NOINDPLL from negative and significant to a no sig-
nificant one. The trend coefficient of UNBIND:ILL changes from no significant to
negative and significant.
Table 6.8a: Wilconxon Test. Different Base Analysis
NOUNB T C.V. 5% CSS One/Two Sided
Weeks 1-15 38 21 14 Two
Weeks 16-27 0 13 11 One
T: value of the test; CV 5%: Critical Value at 5% significance level ; Rejection of Ho if
_T<CV 5%; Corrected Sample Size (CSS) = Sample Size - Number of Zero Differences
Table 6.8a confirms the results obtained using the full sample. Whilst for the pre-
guarantee period the average level of UNBIND1 and NOIND1 is similar, the effect
of Tesco's LPG is to keep UNBIND16 systematically below NOIND16.
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Table 6.9a: Regression Analysis by store
Dependent Variable: RELPRgE
R2
 = 62.10 R2
 = 57.15
Coefficient	 Std. Error'
al 0.5364**	 0.0058
a2 0.0466**	 0.0086
01 0.0008	 0.0008
02 -0.0017*	 0.0009
apost 0.5830**	 0.0060
13 post -0 .0010**	 0.0003
Normality 0.7105 (0.705)
Dependent Variable:RELPRIV
R2 = 72.99 112
 = 69.47
Coefficient
	 Std. Error'
al 0.5149**	 0.0067
az 0.0739**	 0.0089
01 0.0027**	 0.0005
/32 -0.0047**	 0.0006
apost 0.5888**	 0.0059
post -0.0020**	 0.0003
Normality 1.5773 (0.454)
Dependent Variable:RELPRIP
R2
 = 44.79 ft2 = 37.59
Coefficient Std. Error'
al 0.5283** 0.0125
a2 0.0830** 0.0131
01 0.0010 0.0014
02 -0.0037** 0.0014
apost 0.6113** 0.0035
/3 post -0.0028** 0.0001
Normality 2.3698(0.306)
apost = al + a2; 13 post .= 01 ± 02
iNewey-West Standard Errors; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 5% level
Table 6.10a: Supermarket Decomposition of RELPRI trend dummy coefficient
RELPRIt'L RELPRgE RELPRIP RELPRIP
Trend Dummy -0.0034** -0.0017* -0.0047** -0.0037**
Coefficient (/3 2) (0.00067) (0.00087) (0.00063) (0.00013)
Share (%) 100 16.80 46.17 37.03
Between brackets Newey-West standard errors. ** significant at 5% level;* significant at
10% level
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The joint observation of Tables 6.9a and 6.10a reveals that all the results obtained
with the full sample are confirmed when using the reduced sample. On the one hand
the effect of Tesco's LPG is to invert the trend of RELPRII (from increasing to
decreasing) at each one of the supermarkets, on the other hand as it is possible to
observe in Table 6.10a. Sainsbury is the supermarket that has altered more its pricing
behavior as a consequence of the LPG.
Table 6.11a: KVIs Products
KVI no KVI KVI (%) no KVI (%)
NOUNB
UNB
11
15
8
5
57.90
75.00
42.10
25.00
As when using the full sample the percentage of KVI products is more than 10%
higher for the products included in the LPG that for the products not included (Table
6.11a)
Table 6.12a: Lowest Price Probability Test. UNBNOUNB 
LPI	 T C.V. 5% CSS One/Two Sided
IdPir 13 —
LpitNOUNB 23 30	 15	 One
T: value of the test; CV 5%: Critical Value at 5% significance level ;Rejection of Ho if
T<CV 5%; Corrected Sample Size (CSS) = Sample Size — Number of Zero Differences
The results we get using the reduced sample and shown . in Table 6.12a confirm
that the probability of Tesco setting the lowest price of the three supermarkets is
significantly higher for the UNB than for the NOUNB.
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Table 6.13a: PUNB Regression Analysis by store
Dependent Variable: PUNWILL Dependent Variable: PUNBTE
R2 = 76.16 R2 = 73.05 R2 = 25.32 F12 = 15.58
Coefficient Std Error' Coefficient Std. Error'
a l 790.92** 3.8235 a l 773.88** 6.9511
a2 36.7966** 6.0703 az 2.9779 9.1278
01 -0.4656 0.5070 01 -1.1111 0.9493
0 2 -2.2349** 0.5495 02 0.3278 1.0097
apost 827.7213** 4.7161 a	 tpos 776.858** 5.1050
/3 post -2.7006** 0.2128 0 post -0.78322** 0.2178
Norm. 2.9835(0.225) Norm. 3.0419 (0.219)
Dependent Variable:PUNBV Dependent Variable: PUNBP
R2 = 83.02 R2
 = 80.81 R2 = 67.74 R2 = 63.53
Coeffcient	 Std.Error Coeffcient Std. Error
al 779.681**	 6.6892 al 819.21** 10.7016
a2 105.813**	 10.7207 a2 1.5985 12.3524
01 2.0822**	 0.6062 01 -2.3682** 1.0808
132 -7.1893**	 0.7505 02 0.1562 1.1181
a	 tpos 885.4951**	 7.8052 apost 820.8109 6.1200
13 post -5.1071**	 0.3503 0 post -2.2115** 0.2782
Norm. 0.6868 (0.709)	 Norm. 0.0583 (0.971)
apost = a l
 ± az; 13post - 01 + 02
iNewey-West Standard Errors; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 5% level
Table 6.14a: Supermarket Decomposition of PUNB trend dummy coefficient
PUNBitILL PUNBTE PUNBi9A PUNBSF
Trend Dummy -2.2349 0.3278 -7.1893 0.1566
Coefficient (/32) (0.5495)** (0.7691) (0.7016)** (1.118)
Share (%) 100 -4.89 107.22 -2.32
1 1\Tewey-West Standard Errors; ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level
The joint consideration of the results shown in tables 6.13a and 6.14a confirms the
evidence obtained when using the full sample. Whilst in the period before the start
of the LPG, PUNWILL did not follow a defined trend, this trend is clearly decreasing
after the start of the LPG. Most of this phenomenon is explained by the change in the
price setting behaviour of Sainsbury.
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Table 6.15a: PNOUNB regression analysis
Dependent Variable : PNOUNBP
R2 = 83.16 R2 = 80.97
Coefficient Std. Error'
al 1442.1** 8.2317
az -110.2637** 28.7888
01 -3.7548** 0.9053
02 4.8159** 1.5571
apost 1331.8** 27.5867
Opost 1.0621 1.2669
Normality	 0.2471 (0.884)
apost = al + 2; Opost = 01 + 02
iNewey-West Standard Errors; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 5% level
It is possible to observe in Table 6.15a that the results using the reduced sample
confirm the no significant trend coefficient for the basket of NOUNB products at Tesco
after the start of the LPG.
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D	 PRODUCTS INCLUDED IN THE SAMPLE
LPG	 PRODUCT	 KVI 
NO UNBEATABLES Canned Sweet Corn (Green Giant 340grs)
Bleach (Domestos Bleach 21) 	 KVI
Conditioner (Lenor Ultra Plus Fabric Conditioner 21)	 KVI
Kitchen Foil (Bacofoil 450mm x5m)
Washing Powder (Ariel Future 2kgs)	 KVI
Washing Up Liquid (Fairy Excel Plus 500m1)
	
KVI
Beer (Heineken 330 ml)
Bread (Mighty White. 800 grs) 	 KVI
Cat Food (Whiskas 400grs) 	 KVI
Coffee (Nescafe Gold 200grs)	 KVI
Dog Food (Chum Original Large 400gr)	 KVI
Frozen Peas (Birds Eye 340 grs)	 KVI
Ice Cream (Walls Vanilla 750grs)
Oven Chips (McCain 1810 grs)
Pasta Sauce (Dolmio Pasta sauce Original 475 grs)
Salad Dressing (Heinz Salad Dressing 285 grs) 	 KVI
Tea (PG Tips 250 grs) 	 KVI
Tuna in Oil (John West 200grs )
Yogourth (Muller Strawberry 200 grs)
Orange Juice (Del Monte 1 L)
Deodorant (Sure 24 hours Apa 150 ml ) 	 KVI
Hair Shampoo (Timotei Herbs Shampoo 400grs) 	 •	 KVI
Shower Gel (Imperial Leather 500m1) 	 KVI
Toothpaste (Colgate Total 100m1)
	
KVI 
UNBEATABLE	 Baked Beans in Tomato Sauce (Heinz 425 grs) 	 KVI
Canned Peas (Hartley's Garden Peas)
Canned Spaghetti (Heinz 200 grs)
	
	
KVI
,
Canned Tomatoes (Napolina Chopped Tomatoes 400grs)
Kitchen Towel (Sterling Luxury Kitchen Towel Twin Pack) KVI
Tissues (Ultra 90. Kleenex)	 KVI
Toilet Roll (Twin Andrex 4)	 KVI
Cornflakes (Kellogs Cornflakes 500grs) 	 KVI
Fish Fingers (10 Birds Eye)	 KVI
Flour (Homepride Flour 1,5kgs) 	 KVI
Ketchup (Heinz 340grs)
	
KVI
Margarine (Flora 500 grs) 	 KVI
Mayonneise (Hellmans 400grs)	 KVI
Peach Halves in Natural Juice ( Del Monte 415 grs)
Rice (Uncle Ben Long Grain Rice 1 kg) 	 KVI
Smoked Back (Danepack 8s)
Spaghetti (Buitoni 500grs)
Strawberry Jam (Robertson 454 grs) 	 KVI
Walkers Crisps (Variety Multipack. 6 packs)
Coca-Cola (2 1)	 KVI
Sanitary towels (Always 16)
	
KVI
Soap (Dove 250 grs )	 KVI
Chapter 7
Do the supermarkets compete with
the discounters?
Abstract
In the UK, supermarkets face not only the competition of other supermarkets but
also the competition of discounters. Whereas the physical characteristics of the prod-
ucts sold by supermarkets and discounters are almost identical, supermarkets provide a
higher service quality than discounters. Using a micro-level data set of prices, we study
the implications of this service quality differential (as an element of vertical product
differentiation) over the patterns of price setting observed in the market. In addition,
we explore the possible influence of this differential in service quality on the effects over
supermarkets and discounters price setting of a LPG offered by one of the supermarkets
considered.
7.1 Introduction
In the UK market, supermarkets face not only the competition of other supermarkets
but also the competition of discounters. Although the physical characteristics of the
goods sold by supermarkets and discounters are almost identical, the level of service
quality provided clearly differentiate them.
Supermarkets provide a "high" service quality level. Beside selling the product,
supermarkets offer additional services such as a nice shopping environment, in-store
delicatessen and fishmonger or loyalty cards and banking services. Discounters offer a
"low" service quality level focusing their attention on offering the lowest possible price.
216
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The aim of this chapter is to investigate the role played by this difference in service
quality in the patterns of competition between supermarkets and discounters. With
this purpose, we carry out a twofold analysis: on the one hand, we analyse the patterns
of price setting when supermarkets and discounters are considered as forming part of
a unique relevant market; on the other hand, we analyse differences and similarities in
the reactions of supermarkets and discounters to a low-price guarantee offered by one
of the competing supermarkets.
The first piece of analysis uses as starting point the Garcia, Georgantzis and Petit
[1998] model, that we slightly modify to allow for location asymmetries. In this model,
vertical product differentiation is given by the difference in consumers' reservation
price depending on whether the product is bought at a "high" or "low" service quality
outlet. The horizontal differentiation (as in the Hotelling model) is given by the outlet
location. Considering in the sample a discounter (providing "low" service quality)
and two supermarkets (providing "high" service quality) asymmetrically located with
respect to the discounter will allow us to analyse the importance of horizontal and
vertical product differentiation in determining supermarket price setting. Additionally,
_ the fact that both supermarkets and discounters sell branded products (BP) and low-
quality own brand products (LQ) will allow us to compare the patterns of price setting
for these two quality variants.
The result of this analysis signals that both for BPs and LQs the vertical component
is the main element explaining observed differences in food-retailing price setting. For
the BPs locational asymmetries do not seem to play a relevant role to explain price
setting, and service quality differentials seem to be a sufficient element to isolate su-
permarkets from the competition of discounters. However, for the LQs service quality
loses part of its ability to segment the market and locational asymmetries arise as a
potential element in determining price setting.
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The second piece of analysis compares the effects of Tesco's Unbeatable Value low-
price guarantee over a Sainsbury and a Kwik Save outlets affected by the guarantee in
the south of Coventry. By means of an analysis of price coordination and price trends,
we detect a clear reaction of Sainsbury to Tesco's LPG whereas Kwik Save 's price
setting behaviour does not seem to be affected.
In this work, we use a micro level data set of prices that were directly taken in
two supermarkets (Tesco and Sainbury) and a discounter (Kwik Save) in the south of
Coventry. Throughout all the paper, we make use of non parametric tests, the reason is
that some of the price series and indexes we use do not fullfil the normality conditions
required by the parametric tests.
UK supermarkets do not necessarily set their prices nationally. Supermarket chains
adapt price setting to local competition conditions. This allows us to interpret the
results as arising from the specific conditions of the local area considered'.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present a theoretical
model of price setting in presence of service quality differentials. In Section 3, we
describe the characteristics of the market analysed and introduce the data set we use.
. In Section 4, we empirically test the predictions of the theoretical model presented in
Section 2. In Section 5, we investigate the effects of Tesco's LPG over price coordination
and price trends. Finally, Section 6 is devoted to the conclusions.
7.2 The model
In order to analyse the effects of horizontal and vertical product differentiation over the
patterns of price competition between supermarkets and discounters, we use a slightly
modified version of the model proposed by Garcia, Georgantzis and Petit [1998]. Their
model allows to take into account both vertical quality differences and horizontal as-
1 We have known this through interviews with some supermarket managers.
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pects. Whereas they assume firms to be symmetrically located, we introduce locational
asymmetries.
Firms (two supermarkets and a discounter) are located along a circle of length L.
Supermarket 1 (s i ) is at the same distance (equidistant) from supermarket 2 (8 2 ) and
discounter (v), being this distance 1 1 (Figure 7.1). The distance between s 2 and v is 12,
with /1 > 12 . Consumers are located uniformly on the circle of length L with density
equal to 1. Consumers' reservation price for the product sold in the market differs
depending on whether the product is purchased in a supermarket or in a discounter.
If the product is purchased in a supermarket then the reservation price is R, if the
product is purchased in a discounter then the reservation price is r (with R > r).
It is assumed that in any case, reservation prices are high enough to ensure that in
equilibrium all consumers are served. Each consumer buys 'one unit of the product
that is homogeneous except in location and service quality. Locational differences are
given by the distance along the circle between the consumer's location and the point-
of-purchase. Differences in service quality are reflected in the different consumers'
reservation prices for purchases at supermarkets or discounters.
Therefore, the utility that a consumer located at X obtains from purchasing one
unit of the product at supermarket si (for i =1,2),
Ux,s, = R — psi — txsi
	(7.1)
and the utility from purchasing one unit of the product from the discounter is,
Ux,v = - pv - tXv	 (7.2)
11 11
11
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Figure 7.1: Location along the circumference
a) Theretical Model
12
b) Empirical Application
Sainsbury
Kwik Save	 Tesco
12
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where xi for i = 8 1 ,82 , v is the distance from X to the point-of-purchase and t is the
transportation cost for unit of distance. p81 , p„ and pi, are respectively the prices at
the two supermarkets and at the discounter.
For a given set of prices, M (p81 , p82, Pv) a consumer located at X1 between the
two supermarkets will be indifferent between buying at one or at the other if Ux1,s1 =
Ux1, ,s2 . This indifference condition determines the distance between the location of the
consumer that is indifferent between the two supermarkets and the location of Si,
(182 — Psi) , 11
x i = 2t
By analogy, the indifference condition Ux2,82 = Ux2 ,,, determines the distance between
the location (X2 ) of the consumer (situated between s 2 and v) that is indifferent be-
tween s2 and v, and the location of 82
R — r pi, — 133 2	 12
x2 =
	
± -
22f
Finally, the indifference condition Ux3,81 = Ux3,,, determines the distance between the
location (X3 ) of the consumer (situated between s 1 and v) that is indifferent between
-8 1 and v, and the location of v
r — R + — 13v /1
x3 =	 + -22f
Given that the consumer density along the circle is equal to 1, from (7.3), (7.4) and
(7.5) we get the market demands for each one of the firms. From (7.3) and (7.5) the
market demand for s1 can be written as,
(Ps2 — Psi) + (Pv — 138 1 )+ (R r) d5 1 = xi + (11— x 3 ) —	 +112f
In the same way, using (7.3) and (7.4), we can obtain the market demand for s2 as,
(7.3)
(7.4)
(7.5)
(7.6)
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+ 
(li
 + 12)ds, = X 2 + ( 1 1 — xl) = (1351 —
 1982) + (Pv — Ps2) ± (R — r)2f	 2
Similarly, from (7.4) and (7.5) we get the market demand for v as,
de, = x3 ± (12 _ x2 ) = (Psi — Pv) ± (Ps2 — Pv ) + 2 (r — R) + ( 1 1 + 12) (7.8)2f	 2
Let us consider the single stage game in which the two supermarkets (s i
 and .52)
and the discounter choose simultaneously their prices. Each firm has the cost function
{wdm + K if m = Si, 82Cm =	 (7.9)
wdm
 + k if m = v
With the aim of focusing in the analysis of demand related factors, we assume that
the wholesale cost (w) is the same for the three firms in the market. Hence, we place
all the burden of providing a better service quality on the fixed costs 2 . The profits of
each one of the firms will be given by,
118 1 = (135 1 — tV ) ds, — K
	
(7.10)
1152 = (Ps2 — IV ) d52 — K	 (7.11)
ilt, = (Pd — W) du — k	 (7.12)
where K is the fixed cost of providing the "high" service quality associated to the
supermarkets and k is the fixed cost of providing the "low" service quality associated
to the discounters (K> k). The resulting Bertrand-Nash equilibrium 3 is characterised
ensures non-negative shares for all the three firms in the market.
2 This assumption is standard in models of pure vertical product differentiation such as Shaked and
Sutton [1983].
3 The equilibrium prices are obtained by solving the system of FOCs resulting from the maximiza-
tion of each one of the three firms. We restrict our analysis to those values of f for which equilibrium
t(311 + 212)
margins are non-negative (non trivial configuration), i.e. f <	 • This same condition2
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by the following prices for each one of the firms (without loss of generality we set
w = 0),
1 ,
Ps, = —5 Lf + t (4/ 1 +12)1
1
1352 = -5 Lf + t (3/ 1 + 212)]
1
Pv = —5 [t (3/ 1 + 212 ) — 2f]
(7.13)
(7.14)
(7.15)
where f --= R—r. From these equilibrium prices we can derive the following proposition,
Proposition 1 In the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium the highest price corresponds to the
supermarket that is located furthest away from the discounter (s i). The lowest price
corresponds to the discounter (v) and the supermarket located closest to the discounter
(82) sets a price such that p„ > p82 > pv.
Proof:
1
1381 — 2382 = —5 t (/1 —12 ) >0
3
13s2 — Pv = -5 f > 
o
(7.16)
(7.17)
The intuition behind this result is clear: the higher consumers' reservation price for
the product when it is bought at a supermarket allows the two supermarkets to set a
price higher than the price set by the discounter. The fact that s i is located further
from v than s2 confers it a certain degree of price setting power (monopoly power),
that translates in p„ > ps2.
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7.3 From the theory to the practice
7.3.1 Characterising supermarkets and discounters
The supermarket outlets considered in our analysis belong to the superstore format.
With a floor space over 25.000 square feet and located out of town, these superstores
sell a large range of food and non-food products. The discounter outlets with a floor
space between 6.000 and 12.000 square feet sells also a range of food and non-food
products but more limited in size than the supermarket range.
Supermarkets and discounters differ in the rank of quality variants sold. The su-
permarkets sell three quality variants: Branded Products (BP) 4 , High Quality Own
Brand Products (HQ) and Low Quality Own Brand Products (LQ). For BP, we are
referring to the manufacturer product sold under the manufacturer brand name (eg:
Heinz Baked Beans). The BPs are considered the highest quality variant available at
the supermarket. Although both HQs and LQs are own-brand products sold under the
supermarket's brand name, there exists a clear gap of qualities between them. With
the aim of competing with the BPs for the high segment of the consumer distribution,
the supermarket offers with the HQs an alternative of very similar quality to the BPs.
LQs are instead very basic generic products that were introdubed by the supermarkets
since the arrival in the UK of the continental discounters (Aldi, Netto,...) to face their
competition for the lowest segment of the consumer distribution. In order to distin-
guish it from the hard or Continental discounters', Kwik Save is usually qualified as
a soft discounter. In Kwik Save we can find only the two extreme quality variants:
BPs and LQs. As in the case of the supermarkets the introduction of the generic own
4 Although the characteristics of these three quality variants were presented in Chapter 2, we briefly
recall them here.
5 Continental discounters sell only a limited and discontinuous line of generic own-brand products
(lowest quality variant) in outlets that are smaller in size than Kwik Save ones. Only occasionally it
is possible to find BPs among their assortment.
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brand products was a reaction to the arrival in the UK of the Continental discounters.
Therefore, our analysis will focus on the quality variants sold by supermarkets and
discounters: BP and LQ.
As explained in the theoretical model, apart from the price the utility that a con-
sumer gets from buying a product depends also on the physical characteristics of the
product, on the location of the food-retailer and on the level of service quality provided
by the food-retailer. As regards the physical characteristics of the product, the BPs
provided by the same manufacturer to all the food-retailers are homogeneous both in
quality and horizontal characteristics other than location. The LQs are very basic
products; for this quality line food-retailers avoid the introduction of any element of
horizontal product differentiation that could increase the price. The relevant competi-
tion dimension is the price and as a result these products have very similar and basic
characteristics at supermarkets and discounters.
Nevertheless, supermarkets and discounters offer a different level of service quality.
The first element determining this difference in service quality is the shopping environ-
ment. The supermarkets offer a nice shopping atmosphere with wide aisles, tidy shelves
. and big number of check-out lines to assure short queuing times and convenience. In
contrast, in Kwik Save aisles are narrower, products are just piled up on the shelves, the
number of check-outs is small and the queues are frequent, etc. Supermarkets accept
all major debit and credit cards whilst Kwik Save only accepts some of them. Super-
markets offer loyalty cards with accumulable 'points that later on will be transformed
in monetary discounts, and the possibility of using them in the own supermarket petrol
station. Recently, supermarkets have started offering banking services and the possi-
bility of home shopping via Internet. Supermarkets offer wider opening hours. Finally
and more importantly, supermarkets offer a larger range of products making possible
the desired one-stop shopping and reducing in this way the cost of shopping in terms of
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time. The implications of this higher service quality provided by the supermarkets are
twofold. On the one hand, consumers will be willing to pay more for the same product
when they buy it at the supermarket (this is reflected by the difference between R and
r in the theoretical model). On the other hand, the fixed costs that the supermarket
has to incur to provide the "high" quality service are greater (this is reflected by the
difference between K and k in the theoretical model ).
7.3.2 The data
The data used in this analysis are a micro level data set of prices that were taken
directly in three selected stores in the south of Coventry. Two of them, Tesco and
Sainsbury, belong to the two supermarket chains with the biggest market share in the
UK and the third belongs to Kwik Save, the largest discounter chain. Tesco and Kwik
Save stores considered are located in Cannon Park shopping center 6
 and Sainsbury is
located approximately one and a half mile from them.
The data set comprises 27 price observations for each one of the products taken
from November 1995 to March 1997. Prices have been taken every two weeks but for
the Christmas periods. For each one of the products considered the price of the BP
and LQ variants were taken.
With respect to the criteria to choose the products, it was already described in
Chapter 4. The list of the products used in the analysis is included in Appendix F.
7.4 Empirical Part I: Are Supermarkets competing
with discounters?
The objective of this section is to test Proposition 1 both for the BPs and LQs. The
first step is to translate the theoretical model to our market: the discounter v of the
6 This shopping center includes a few small shops, a pharmacy from a national chain, Tesco and
Kwik Save.
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theoretical model is Kwik Save in our real market, the supermarket s2 (located closer
to the discounter) is Tesco and the supermarket s i located further from the discounter
is Sainsbury. Just to note that with 12 — 1 1 >0 we are not trying to measure a geo-
graphical distance but the asymmetric location of the supermarkets with respect to
the discounter. The aim is to check if the presence of Kwik Save in the same shopping
center is influencing Tesco's pricing behaviour.
Let piJtk be the price set by food retailer J in fortnight t for the quality variant k of
product i. We can formulate Proposition 1 for each one of the products in the sample
as,
KwksAk	TEkOn average, pi > pi > pi
where piJic is the series integrated for p i`itK for t = 1, ..., 27; i =. 1, ..., 46.
The testing procedure proposed used to establish a supermarket price rank for each
one of the products in the sample 7 consists of two steps: first, we use a Friedman test
to check if there is any difference between the average prices set for the same product
at the three food-retailers; second, if the Friedman test detects a difference, we use the
_ Dunn's multiple comparison method to establish the supermarket price rank for the
product. The reason for using these two non parametric tests is that most of the price
series do not follow a normal distribution and in these circumstances parametric test
do not result appropriate8 . The results of this testing procedure are summarized in
Table 7.1.
In the rows of Table 7.1, we show both for the BPs and LQs the number of products
that satisfy a given supermarket price rank. The first one of these supermarket price
7 This testing procedure is specified in Appendix B. We also explain in this appendix the choice of
these two tests
We do not provide descriptive statistics for all the price series (276) just for a question of space.
They are available on request.
8 For a full description of the test see Neave and Worthington [1988].
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Table 7.1: Testing Proposition 1: Summary Table
BPs LQs
PSA > PTE > PKW 1 3
PSA	 PTE > PKW 37 20
PSA	 PTE	 PKW 2 8
PSA > PTE	 PKW 1 7
PTE > PSA > PKW 1 1
PKW > PSA > PTE 0 1
PKW	 PSA > PTE 0 3
PKW > PSA	 PTE 4 3
Tot al 46 46
ranks is just the one predicted by Proposition 1, pSA > pTE > pKW. A predominance
of this price rank would confirm the predictions of the theoretical model and would
signal that both vertical and horizontal asymmetries are important factors in deter-
mining price setting behaviour. A predominance of psA
 PTE > pKw would indicate
that whilst service quality is the main factor determining differences in price setting
behaviour, locational asymmetries between supermarkets are not relevant. On the
contrary a predominance of PSA > PTE PKw would reveal that locational asymme-
tries are more important than service quality differentials in determining food-retailers
price setting behaviour. Similar levels of prices at the three food retailers considered
(PsA PTE PKW) would be the recognition that neither locational asymmetries nor
differences in service quality are important factors in determining price setting behav-
iour. The predominance of a situation in which Tesco is pricing above Sainsbury and
this above Kwik Save (PTE > PSA > PKw) would not respect the pricing predictions of
the model but would still signal service quality as the element segmenting the market.
From row six onwards, we show all those price ranks for which the price of the low
service quality retailer (Kwik Save) is significantly higher than the price of at least one
of the two high service quality retailers (Sainsbury and Tesco).
As we can see for the BPs the prediction of Proposition 1 turns out to be true only
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for 1 out of the 46 products of the sample. 'Whereas the theoretical model predicts
lower prices for the supermarket located closer to the discounter, for the BPs evidence
shows that for 43 of the 46 products of the sample average prices are equal at the two
supermarkets'. Furthermore, for 37 of these 43 products average prices are significantly
higher at the two supermarkets than at Kwik Save. Two implications follow from these
results. The first, they clearly signal service quality as the main determinant of food-
retailer pricing behaviour. The second, they reveal that the degree of neighborhood
with the discounter does not have any impact on supermarkets' price setting policy.
For the BPs service quality is segmenting the market and isolating supermarkets from
the potential competition of the discounters.
For the LQs, the prediction of Proposition 1 is satisfied for 3 of the 46 products. As
for the BPs, also for the LQs the predominant price rank is pSA pT E > pKW , _nowever
the number of products satisfying this price rank is much smaller (20, compared to the
previous 37)
In order to compare the observed distribution of supermarket price ranks for BPs
and LQs, we build a contingency table with the distributions of supermarket price ranks
as shown in Table 7.1 and test the null hypothesis of no association between quality
variant and distribution of supermarket price ranks. The rows of this contingency table
are the distribution of price ranks for BPs and LQs such as specified in Table 7.1.
Table 7.2: Contingency Table Association Test 
Pearson-x 2 D. of F. Significance
BPs-LQs 18.313	 7	 0.011
The test of association leads to reject the null hypothesis of no association between
quality variant and distribution of supermarket price ranks (Table 7.2). This result is
9 To those satisfying the price rank PsA cz-1 PTE > Play we should add the two products satisfying
PSA PTE Play and the four products satisfying pKw > PSA PTE.
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evidence in favour of a different distribution of supermarket price ranks for each one
of the quality variants considered. In order to disclose the causes behind the rejection
of the test of association, we stress the main differences between the distributions
of supermarket price ranks for the BPs and LQs. The first of these differences is
related with the importance of locational asymmetries in determining supermarkets
price setting: whereas the number of products for which PTE > psA is equal for BPs and
LQs (one product), the number of products for which psA > PTE is significantly higher
for LQs than for the BPs (14 and 2 respectively). Whilst locational asymmetries do not
seem to be a relevant factor to explain BP price setting, they play a relevant role in the
price setting of the LQs: the supermarket located closer to the discounter prices almost
a third of the products cheaper than the supermarket located further. The second
difference gives us evidence both about the importance of locational asymmetries and
service quality differentials as determinants of price setting. First, as it is possible to
observe in Table 7•3, 10
 the number of products for which psA > pKw and the number
of products for which PTE > pKw , is lower for the LQs than for the BPs. It seems ' that
the ability of service quality differentials to isolate supermarkets from the discounters
• is lower for LQs than for BPs. Second, we can observe in Table 7.3 that whereas for the
BPs the number of products for which PTE > PKW is similar to the number of products
for which PSA > PKw, for the LQs the number of products for which PTE > pKw is
significantly smaller. This result confirms the importance of locational asymmetries to
explain LQs price setting.
Table 7.3: Summarizing Price Differences
BP LQ 
PTE > PKw 39 24
PSA > PKw 40 31 
10 This Table has been extracted from Table 7.1.
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Summing up, for the BPs service quality differentials seem to be the main deter-
minant of price setting. The higher service quality offered by the supermarkets (with
respect to the discounters) segments the market and allows them to set prices signifi-
cantly higher than the discounter for a large proportion of the products included in the
sample. The fact that the BPs are addressed to the highest segment of the consumer
distribution and that very likely these consumers are not only concerned about the
price but also about the service quality level offered by the supermarket could explain
the ability of service quality to segment the market. Locational asymmetries do not
seem to play an important role in BP price setting as it is shown by the fact that
for 42 out of 46 product prices on average are equal at Tesco and Sainsbury. With
respect to the LQs, service quality differentials seem to lose part of their capacity to
segment the market (as shown by the fact that the number of *products for which price
is higher at the supermarkets than at the discounter . is smaller for the LQs) and lo-
cational asymmetries seem to play an important role in price setting. The LQs are
addressed to the lowest segment of the consumer distribution for whom price is the
main relevant dimension, this could explain the loss of segmentation ability of service
_quality differentials for the LQ market.
7.5 Empirical Part II: Analysis of Tesco's LPG
On September 1996 Tesco announced the introduction of the following low-price guar-
antee (LPG):
"Lowest Local Price or We'll Refund you DOUBLE the Difference"
This LPG included 22 of the 46 of the products of our sample and split it into two
periods, before (pre-guarantee period) and after the start (post-guarantee period) of
"This LPG was already analysed for a sample of three supermarkets offering homogeneous level
of service quality in Chapter 6. For a full description of the LPG see that chapter.
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the LPG (the length of these periods is fifteen and twelve fortnights respectively). This
event offered us the invaluable opportunity of investigating the effects of Tesco's LPG
over the supermarkets and the discounter included in our sample and to check whether
the effects of the LPG (if any) are homogenous for the two groups of food-retailers
considered, independently of the different service quality provided12.
7.5.1 A brief theoretical introduction to LPGs
Low-price guarantees can be defined as promises by firms to match or beat the price
of one or several rivals'. Salop [1986] seminal paper argued that LPGs could facilitate
tacit collusion leading to higher prices and profits. On the one hand by giving an
incentive to the customer to report rivals' price cuts LPGs serve as an exchange-
information device; on the other hand, by reducing the potential benefits of one-time
cheating LPGs act as an incentive-management device discouraging price-cutting by
rival firms. Most of the literature stream following Salop [1986] has concentrated on the
analysis of the effects of price-matching guarantees using oligopolistic models, and only
in recent years the possible differential effects of the price-beating guarantees have been
analysed. In order to illustrate the differences between these two variants of LPG, let
us consider a static game of complete information in which two firms (1 and 2) choose
simultaneously a posted price and a price policy {p i , oi l that conform their strategy,
where:
{NPG = No price guarantee
Si = PM = Price Matching
PB = Price Beating
and the effective price of each firm (s i ) under each one of the possible strategies:
12 thethe aim of showing that the results obtained when analysing food-retailers price setting in
the previous section are not caused by Tesco LPG, we replicate the analysis using only the fortnights
of the sample before the LPG (1 to 15) in Appendix B.
13 Although, we included in Chapter 6 a theoretical review about LPGs, we briefly describe here
some theoretical aspects of LPGs interesting for this analysis.
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INPG si = pi for i = 1, 2
si = PM si = min {pi , pi — (1 + A) (pi — pi )} with A = 0
PB si = min {pi, pi — (1 + A) (pi — pi )} with A > 0
If a firm offers PM, it is just compromising to match any price set by the rival, if a
firm offers PB it is compromising to undercut by a given proportion A any price set by
the rival. Tesco's LPG should be considered as a price-beating guarantee, with Tesco's
effective price for the products included in the LPG given by:
sTE = min {pTE,Pj — 2(PTE — pi ll with j = SA, KW
Whilst Dixit and Nalebuff [1991] and Sargent [1993] conclude that they are even
more effective than price-matching guarantees at supporting high prices, Hviid and
Shaffer [1994] and Corts [1995] show that price-beating guarantees restore the incentive
to undercut rival's prices and that independently of the degree of asymmetry in the
market they cannot support any anticompetitive prices in equilibrium'''. Hviid and
Shaffer [1998,1999] extend the analysis of the PB by removing the assumption that it
is costless to the consumers to activate the LPG. They substitute the assumption of
automatic activation of the LPG by the assumption that each consumer foregoes the
same amount z > 0 to activate the LPG 15 . Therefore, in the static game described
before, if firm i is offering a PB guarantee and pi > pi , customers will activate it if and
only if (1 + A)(pi — pi) z. By analogy, when (1 + A) (p i —pi ) <z the PB guarantee
will never be activated. They show that in this last case the only possible equilibrium
prices are those of the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium with differentiated products. They
also show that when (1 + A)(p i — pi ) > z, and for sufficiently asymmetric markets,
the existence of z > 0 makes it possible for the PB guarantees to increase prices to
supracompetitive levels.
14 0ther papers analysing price-beating guarantees: Baye and Kovenock [1994], Chen [1995] and
Corts [1996].
15 z is defined as a hassle cost: "any cost run by the client to make effective the price guarantee:
time, discomfort of asking for the reinsburment, need of visting two shops...".
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Because of its contrast with the economic theory, it is also interesting to recall the
reaction of the press to the retailers' announcements of LPGs. Usually, the news relate
LPGs with the triggering of price wars. An example is that The Times (September, 5-
1996) as a reaction to Tesco's announce of Unbeatable Value publishes " Tesco launches
a new price war'
Hess and Gerstner [1991] and Chapter 6 of this PhD dissertation consider a sample
of supermarkets offering homogenous levels of service quality to analyse the possible
pro-competitive or anti-competitive effects of the low-price guarantees. Nevertheless,
in this section we consider a sample of food-retailers offering different levels of service
quality (Tesco and Sainsbury as supermarkets and Kwik Save as a discounter) and focus
our analysis on the possible differential effects of Tesco's LPG over the supermarket
and the discounter considered in the analysis. This offers the possibility of checking the
extent to which supermarkets and discounters are effectively competing. With the aim
of detecting possible differential effects of the LPG over the pattern of price setting of
the two supermarkets and the discounter, we will analyse first the effects of the LPG
over the patterns of price coordination, and then over price trends.
7.5.2 Low-price guarantees and price coordination
In Chapter 6 analysing the same LPG but using supermarkets only data, we show
that Tesco's PB guarantee increased the degree of price coordination between the
supermarket actor of the LPG and the supermarkets affected by the LPG for the
products included in it (UNB products). The pattern of price coordination for the
products not included in the LPG (NOUNB products) remained unchanged.
Here, following with the empirical analysis carried out in former sections, we check
if the observed differential in service quality between supermarkets and discounters
16 Another example is the Financial Times, January 18 1996, as a reaction to the Price Watch LPG
by Esso (price-matching guarantee) published "Petrol Rivals on Price-Footing".
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conditioned the effect of Tesco's LPG on the degree of price coordination between this
retailer and the other two retailers considered in the analysis. We use as analytical
tool the Dynamic Degree of Price Matching Index (DDPMI) 17 . We build this index
in the following way:
Let /34 be the price set by supermarket J in fortnight t for product i. Where:
i = 1,...,46 products included in the sample and t = 1,...,27 fortnightly taken price
observations; J --= TE, SA, KW stores included in the sample.
Then if we define:
J	 J
J pit — Pit-i
git =
Pit-1
the Dynamic Degree of Price Matching between Tesco and store J (different from
Tesco) for product i in fortnight t is calculated as:
1. •if gTtE = 9,4 = 0
DDPIWt-11 =
,-,J
H it if I gTtE I
gTtE 	 I > Ig41
TE
gitJ	 <git
As we are interested in detecting possible changes in the patterns of price coordina-
tion between Tesco and Sainsbury/Kwik Save induced by the LPG an -d the influence
over these changes of the differential in service quality between supermarkets and dis-
counters, we calculate for each one of the products two DDPMIs that correspond to
the pre and post-guarantee periods. These two indexes are defined as:
Pre-Policy Period Index —> DDPMITE-J — EDDPMTEThli,PRE	 14	 it
t=2
27
1Post-Policy Period Index DDPMITE-JT -— E DDPMTE-ji,POS 	 it12
15
t=16	 •
17 This index has been already used in other chapters. We described its characteristics in Appendix
C of Chapter 4.
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If both for the pre and post-guarantee periods we group together the indexes that
correspond to the products included in the LPG (UNB) and those that correspond
to the products not included (NOUNB) the result are four series of DDPMIs for
each one of the two retailer pairs (TE-SA and TE-KW) considered in this analysis. For
ffv-TE-SAexample, the series DDPivuUNB,PRE would include DDPM...TB-SA for the twenty-two,P RE
UNB
In order to obtain a benchmark case to analyse the effects of the LPG over the
degree of between-retailers price coordination, we start by investigating if there was any
difference in the degree of between-retailers price coordination for UNB and NOUNB
in the pre-guarantee period. We perform this analysis by means of a two-sided Mann-
Whitney18 test with the following null and alternative hypotheses:
Ho : On average, in the pre-guarantee period there is no difference in the degree of
price coordination between Tesco and Sainsbury (Kwik Save) for UNB and NOUNB,
i.e. on average there is no difference between DDPMITUNBE-j and DDPMI,PRE	 TN	 B ,P RE
(for J = SA,KW).
H 1 :On average, in the pre-guarantee period there is a difference in the degree of
_price coordination between Tesco and Sainsbury (Kwik Save) for UNB and NOUNB,
i.e. on average there is a difference between DDPMITuEN-Bjp R E and DDPMITArt:Uiv B,PRE
(for J = SA,KW).
As it is possible to observe in Table 7.4 this test leads to the same results for the two
pairwise comparisons considered. Neither the 'null hypothesis of no difference between
DDpivrrTE-sA
N B,P RE and DDPMIT E- ANOUNB,PRE) nor the null hypothesis of no difference
between DPP MIT E-KWNOUNB,PRE and D DP MiTuENTLWR E are rejected.
Once we have a general picture of between-retailers price coordination before the
start of the LPG, the next step is to check if the LPG had any effect over the degree
18 For the reasons to use this non-parametric test see section 4.1 in Chapter 6.
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Table 7.4: Mann-Whitney Test for differences on average DDPMI.UNB-NOUNB
Pre-Guarantee	 Value of the test (U) Critical Value 5%
TE-SA 209	 174.64
TE-KW 258
	 174.45
Rejection of the Ho if U< CV 5%
of between-retailers price coordination and if this effect is dependent upon retailers
service quality level. We perform this analysis by means of a battery of one-sided
Wilconxon test 19 with the following null and alternative hypotheses:
H0 : On average, there is no difference between DDPMITE-J and DDPMITE-JS,PRE	 S,POST
(for S = UNB, NOUNB and J = SA,KW).
H1 : On average, DDPMITEp T is higher than DDPMIL'Ep-RJE (for S = UNB,
NOUNB and J = SA,KW).
Table 7.5: Wilconxon Test for differences on average DDPMI. Pre-post policy periods
NOUNB	 T	 C.V. 5% CSS One/Two Sided
	
TE-SA 79	 75	 22 One
TE-KW 49.50 83	 23 One 
UNB	 T	 C.V. 5% 
	
TE-SA 8	 60	 20 One
	
TE-KW 38	 75	 22 One
T: value of the test; CV 5%: Critical Value at 5% significance level ; Rejection of Ho if
- T<CV 5%; Corrected Sample Size (CSS) = Sample Size — Number of Zero Differences
Observation of Table 7.5 reveals that the effects of the LPG are not homogeneous
across retailers with different service quality levels. Let us analyse first the price co-
ordination between the actor of the LPG (Tesco) and the other retailer offering the
same service quality level (Sainsbury). Consistently both with the news hypothesis
and with the Salop 's line of analysis, the LPG increased the degree of price coordi-
nation between Tesco and Sainsbury for the products included in the LPG (the null
hypothesis DDPMI SN RE DDPMI u iv-BSI-OST is rejected). However, the LPGu iv-B
19 For the reasons to use this non-parametric test see section 4.1 in Chapter 6.
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did not change the average degree of price coordination between these two retailers
for the products not included in the LPG (the null hypothesis DDPM*E07/5A,PRE
DDp A 4TTE 
,POSTNOUNB
—SÄ 	 is not rejected).'
The degree of price coordination between Tesco (the actor of the LPG) and Kwik
Save (low service quality retailer) is higher in the post guarantee period both for the
products included and for the products not included in Unbeatable Value LPG (both the
null hypotheses of DDPMITE-KW ,,z,, DDpivrTTE-KWUNB,PRE	 "'"-UNB,POST and DDPMINTE,-, 1,nf l'Ki:Uiv ',PRE
D DP MITNE0
-LIKN1137
 ,POST
post-guarantee period is higher both for the products included and not included in the
LPG rises doubts about the LPG as the factor causing the observed increase in price
coordination. The analysis of Kwik Save price trends in the next section will confirm
this intuition.
The final step of the analysis of price coordination consists in checking how the
observed price coordination changes have modified the pre-guarantee status of no dif-
ference in the degree of between-retailers price coordination of UNB and NOUNB.
We carry out this test using a one-sided Mann-Whitney test with the following null
and alternative hypotheses:
H0
 :On average, in the post-guarantee period there is no difference in the de-
gree of price coordination between Tesco and Sainsbury (Kwik Save) for UNB and
TE-JNOUNB 9 i.e. on average there is no difference between DDPMIuNB,POST and
DDPM121707INB,POST (for J = SA, KW).
H1
 :On average, in the post-guarantee period the degree of price coordination be-
tween Tesco and Sainsbury (Kwik Save) is higher for UNB than for NOUNB, i. e. on
average DDPMIT, ,.,u iv-BjPOST is higher than DDPMIT5, jnrNv-UivB,POST (for .-7" =
are rejected). The fact that average price coordination in the
SA, KW).
The results of this test shown in Table 7.6 reveal that in the post guarantee period
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price coordination TE-SA is higher for UNB than for NOUNB products. The higher
degree of price coordination TE-KW for UNB and NOUNB products in the post
guarantee period does not change the pre-guarantee balance: both in the pre and post-
guarantee periods the degree of price coordination TE-KW is similar for UNB and
NOUNB products.
Table 7.6: Mann-Whitney Test for differences in average DDPMI.UNB-NOUNB
Post-Guarantee	 Value of the test (U) Critical Value 5%
TE-SA 182.5
	 188.88
TE-KW 237
	 188.77
Rejection of Ho if U<CV 5%
To sum up, the analysis of the implications of Tesco's LPG over the patterns of
between-retailers price coordination sheds light about the influence of the service qual-
ity differential on the effects of the LPG over Sainsbury and Kwik Save. As result
of the LPG price coordination between the two food retailers offering the same level
of service quality becomes higher for the products included in the LPG than for the
products not included. However, the pre-guarantee status of similar levels of price coor-
dination between Tesco and the low service quality retailer (Kwik Save) for UNB and
-NOUNB products is not altered by the LPG. The next step is to analyse if the LPG
had any effect over retailer price trends and if it is possible to detect any differential
effect linked to differences in service quality.
7.5.3 Low price guarantees and price trends
In order to analyse the effect of Unbeatable Value LPG over the level of prices at each
one of the supermarkets, we follow a two stage procedure. In the first stage, we compare
the evolution of the prices of the baskets of UNB and NOUNB products at each one
of the food-retailers by means of a regression analysis of the RELPRI index described
in the next paragraph. Once we know if the price of the basket of UNB products is
CHAPTER 7. SUPERMARKETS AND DISCOUNTERS	 240
increasing or decreasing with respect to the price of the basket of NOUNB products,
we analyse separately the effects of the LPG over the evolution of the prices of the
basket of UNB and NOUNB at each one of the food-retailers.
We define the RELPRI index as,
PUNB1 RELPRIii = PNOUNB1
where:
22
. E pi rBjPUNB tJ = Unbeatable Products Basket Priceir
i.-1.
24
PNOUNBil = No Unbeatable Products Basket Market Price	 NOUNBJi7 = Epit
for J=TE,SA,KW.
This relative price index for each one of the food retailers (RELPRI1) 2° can be
used as dependent variable of the following regression model:
RELPRIii
 = a l
 + a2D1 + /3 1T + /32 (T x D1)
where:
0 from t = 1 to t = 15
Di =
	
	 and T is a time trend
1 otherwise
The results of the OLS regressions for each supermarket are shown in Table 7.7.
Actual and fitted values of the relative price index for each one of the supermarkets
are shown in Figures 7.2 to 7.4 of Appendix D. Observation of these figures suggests to
"An ideal construction of the baskets of UNB and NOUNB products will weight the products
according to their weight in the representative consumer budget. Hess and Gerstner[1991] used as
weights those of the consumer price index, however these weights are not available in the UK with the
required disaggregation. With the aim of showing that the results obtained are robust to the set of
products included in the sample, in Appendix E we replicate the analysis excluding from the sample
the alcohol and toiletries categories.
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focus our attention on the analysis of the trend followed for RELPRLI at each one of
the food-retailers in the pre and post-guarantee periods. Any change in trend caused
by Unbeatable Value LPG will be caught by the coefficient of the slope dummy (02).
Table 7.7: RELPRI Regression Analysis by store
Dep. Var: RELPRITE
R2 =60.23	 112=55.04
Dep. Var: RELPRVA
R2=85.19
	 R2 =83.26
Dep. Var: RELPRIrw
R2=72.74	 R2=69.:
Coeff.	 Std. Error' Coeff.	 Std. Error' Coeff. Std. Er
al 0.425r* 0.0032 al 0.4219** 0.0028 al 0.5212** 0.0075
a2 0.0313** 0.0058 a2 0.0723** 0.0049 az -0.0998** 0.0106
01 0.0012** 0.0004 01 0.0020** 0.0002 01 -0.0032** 0.0009
02 -0.0018** 0.0005 02 -0.0043** 0.0003 02 0.0075** 0.0010
apost 0.4570** 0.0047 apost 0.4943** 0.0041 ap.st 0.4213** 0.0073
13 post 0.0006** 0.0002 13 post 0.0023** 0.0002 Opost 0.0044** 0.0003
Norm.	 1.3583 (0.507)	 Norm.	 0.9264 (0.629)	 Norm.	 0.3325(0.847)
apost = al ± 02; post = 181 + 02
iNewey-West standard errors," Significant at 5% level; *Significant at 10% level
Both for Tesco (supermarket offering the LPG) and Sainsbury (supermarket affected
for the LPG) 132 is negative and significant. As it is possible to observe in Figures 7.2
and 7.3 and in Table 7.7, the effect of the LPG for the two food-retailers offering
high service quality is to invert the trend of RELPRI1 from increasing to decreasing.
.Nevertheless, in absolute value is higher for Sainsbury (-0.0043) than for Tesco
(-0.0018) with the result of a steeper negative slope for Sainsbury in the second period.
In contrast to the supermarkets' regressions, for the Kwik Save regression 13 post is
positive and significant. However, observation of Figure 7.4 reveals clearly that the
increasing trend of RELPRIKw does not start with Tesco's LPG but as soon as in
Fortnight 9 of the sample. Therefore, the regression analysis of RELPRI for each one
of the food-retailers is providing evidence about a differential effect of Tesco's LPG over
Sainsbury and Kwik Save. Whilst for both high quality service food-retailers (Tesco
and Sainsbury) RELPRI shows a decreasing trend in the post-guarantee period, this
trend is increasing for the low service quality food-retailer (Kwik Save). Therefore,
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whereas in the post-guarantee both in Tesco and Sainsbury the price of the basket
of UNB products was decreasing with respect to the price of the basket NOUNB
products, for Kwik Save the opposite is true. With the aim of confirming whether the
trends observed for RELPRI for each one of the food-retailers can be imputed to the
LPG, the next step will be to check if these trends are the result of changes in the
prices of the products included in the LPG, or in the products excluded.
In order to analyse the evolution of the price of the basket of NOUNB and UNB at
each one of the food-retailers, we use the PNOUNB1 and PUNB1 indexes (described
above) as dependent variables of the following regression models:
PNOUNBii
 = al
 + a2D1 + 13 1T +132 (T x Di)
PUNBil
 = al + a2D1 + 0 171 + 02 (T x D1)
Let us start by analysing the trends followed by the prices of the baskets of UNB
and NOUNB at Tesco (the food-retailer offering the LPG) in the pre and post-
guarantee periods (Figures 7.5 and 7.6). As it is possible to observe in Table 7.8
•the estimated coefficient of the trend dummy in the PUNBT E
 regression model is not
significant. This clearly signals that the trend followed by the price of the basket of
UNB products at Tesco although negative in both periods is not modified by the LPG.
With respect to the trend dummy in the regression analysis of PNOUNBT E , this is
positive (6.1886) and significant. The LPG changes the trend of PNOUNBTE from
negative (-6.3512) and significant in the pre-guarantee period to negative (-0.1626) but
no significant in the post-policy period.
We can observe in Figure 7.7 that Sainsbury's reaction to Tesco's LPG is a con-
tinuous reduction of the price of the basket of UNB products that changes the trend
of PUNBPI from increasing to decreasing. The results of the regression analysis for
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PUNBP confirm this change in trend: whereas in the pre-guarantee period the trend
coefficient is 3.1494, in the post-guarantee period the trend coefficient is -5.5770 . It
seems that Sainsbury interpreted Unbeatable Value as a threat to its custom and re-
acted reducing the prices of the products included in the LPG. This Sainsbury's price
reduction lead to a process of convergence (Figure 7.9) between the prices of Sainsbury
and Tesco for the basket of UNB products, that reduced the price difference between
the basket of UNB in Tesco and Sainsbury from fifty pence at Fortnight 16 to eight
pence at Fortnight 27 (in Table 7.9 we show the difference in the prices of the basket of
UNB products in the fortnight of the start of the LPG and at the end of the sample).
This evidence about the process of price reduction is sustained by the declarations of
a Sainbury's representative shortly after the start of Tesco's LPG: " When we launch
Unbeatable Autumn, we said that we would undercut the competitors and that is just
what we have done with this offer". In contrast to the observed change in trend de-
tected for PUNBP, it is possible to observe in Table 7.8 that the trend dummy in the
regression analysis of PNOUNBP is not significant. This is signalling that Tesco's
LPG did not affect significantly Sainsbury's price setting for the products not included
in the LPG21.
With respect to the reaction of Kwik Save to Tesco's LPG, we can observe in
Figures 7.10 and 7.11 the trends followed by the prices of the baskets of UNB and
NOUNB products at the low service quality food-retailer. The regression analysis
for PUNBrw provides us with positive estimations 22 of the trend coefficients both
for the pre and post-guarantee periods with a trend coefficient that is significantly
higher in the post guarantee period. Furthermore, the opposite trends observed for
21 The fact that the LPG affected only to Sainsbury price setting for the UNB group of products
(and no to the price setting for the NOUNB group of products) confirms that the cause of the change
is Tesco's LPG.
22 The trend coeffcient is not significant in the pre-guarantee period.
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Table 7.8: Table PUNB Regression Analysis by store
Dep. Var: PUNBTE
R2=25.00 112=15.12
Dep. Var: PNOUNBTE
R2 =87.58	 R2=85.97
Coeff. Std. Error Coeff. Std. Error
al 834.1658** 4.7166 al 1958.3** 7.4250
a2 14.5131 8.5111 a2 -101.024** 26.0618
01 -0.5718 0.6965 01 -6.3512** 0.8196
02 -0.6310 0.7662 02 6.1886** 1.4096
a	 tpos 848.6789** 6.9152 apost 1857.3** 24.9737
13
 post -1.2028** 0.2883 /3 post -0.1626 1.1469
Norm. 3.0903 (0.213) Norm. 0.2792 (0.870)
Dep. Var: PUNBV Dep. Var: PNOUNBi"
R2=88.68 R2=87.21 R2 =84.17 R2=82.11
Coeff. Std. Error Coeff. Std. Error
02
01
02
840.7180**
132.8139**
3.1494**
-8.7264**
5.1178
8.1861
0.4235
0.5256
a2
01
/32
1992.2**
-17.5134
-1.8536**
-0.5904
7.3128
25.5751
0.8043
1.3833
a	 tpos
post
973.5319**
-5.5770**
6.3962
0.3125
apost
19
 post
1974.6**
-2.4441**
24.5073
-1.1255
Norm. 0.0585 (0.971)	 Norm. 0.5347 (0.765)
Dep. Var: PUNBt' W
R2=70.84	 R2=66.63
Dep. Var: PNOUNBKw
R2=84.73	 112=82.74
Coeff.	 Std. Error Coeff.	 Std. Error
al 820.3921**	 7.4935 1573.2**	 10.5324
a2 -34.1381**	 16.8939 a2 257.2708**	 36.8348
01 0.7784	 0.9496 01 11.7652**	 1.1584
02 2.5204**	 1.2097 02 -19.6611**	 1.9923
apost 786.254**	 14.4636 a	 tpos 1830.4**	 35.2969
13 post 3.2988**	 0.6348 13 post -7.8959**	 1.6210
Norm. 0.3901 (0.823) Norm 1.0454 (0.593)
apost = a1
 + a2; Opost = 01 ± 02
1 1•Tewey-West standard errors,** Significant at 5% level; *Significant at 10% level
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Table 7.9: Differences in the prices of the basket of UNB products
Fortnight 16 Fortnight 27
PUNVA — PUNBTE	50
	 8
PUNBrw — PUNBTE	16	 64
the prices of the basket of UNB at Tesco and Kwik Save has as a result a process of
increasing divergence between the prices of the UNB basket at these two food-retailers
(Figure 7.9). This process of continuous price divergence contrasts with the process of
price convergence observed between Tesco and Sainsbury for the prices of the basket
of UNB.
The results of the regression analysis for PNOUNBrw indicate that whereas in the
pre-guarantee period it follows a positive trend (11.7652) its trend in the post-guarantee
period is negative (-7.8959). However, the simple consideration of this regression results
can be misleading. Figure 7.11 indicates that the start of the change in trend detected
happened in Fortnight 13, well before the start of the LPG. Hence, it seems that to
attribute the change observed in PNOUNBr iv to the start of Tesco's LPG is not
adequate.
7.5.4 Summing up
Tesco's LPG has an undoubted effect over the patterns of price setting of Sainsbury. As
a consequence of the LPG, price coordination between the two retailers providing high
service quality increases and Sainsbury starts a process of reduction of the prices of the
products included in the LPG that makes the price of the basket of UNB products
at Sainsbury to converge towards the price of this basket at Tesco. However, the LPG
does not seem to affect the price setting of the low service quality food-retailer (Kwik
Save). Furthermore, in the post-guarantee period the gap (higher price at Kwik Save
than at Tesco) between the prices of the basket of UNB products at Tesco and Kwik
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Save grows instead of shrinking. Hence, the difference in service quality provided by
each one of the food-retailers is an important factor when analysing the effects of the
LPG.
The absence of a reaction by Kwik Save to Tesco's LPG seems to indicate that the
difference in service quality observed is actually segmenting the market. Likely, Kwik
Save price setting can be explained calling at a reputation issue: the belief that loyal
consumers will trust its reputation of low-price retailer and will not be attracted by
the LPG of a higher price-higher quality reputation supermarket as Tesco, allows Kwik
Save to face Tesco' LPG without modifying substantially its pricing behaviour.
If we accept that service quality is segmenting the market, then the analysis of the
LPG should focus on analysing the effect of this over the relevant price for the market
segment served by the supermarkets. In this line it was shown in Chapter 6 that the
increase in between-supermarket price coordination, and the fall in the market price
of the basket of UNB (Tesco and Sainsbury prices fall in the post-guarantee period)
observed could be part of loss-leaders strategy advertised by Tesco as a LPG. Tesco,
aware of the fact that is setting lower prices than the other supermarkets for a subset
of products, uses these products as part of an advertising strategy addressed to lure
consumers. Sainsbury takes this action as a threat to its custom and reacts reducing
the prices of the same group of products.
7.6 Concluding remarks
The results obtained in this paper shed light about the ability of service quality dif-
ferentials to segment the market. From the analysis carried out in the first part of the
paper, it is clear that the main element determining patterns of price setting for the
BPs is the differential in service quality between supermarkets and retailers. For the
LQs, both service quality differentials and locational asymmetries seem to play a role
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in determining food-retailers price setting. This is signalling that for the LQs service
quality differentials could be losing part of their segmentation ability.
The exploration of the effects of Tesco's LPG offered us the opportunity of going
deeper in the analysis of the competition between supermarkets and discounter for the
LQ variant. The reaction of Sainsbury to Tesco's LPG (continuous reduction of the
price of the basket of the products included in the guarantee) resulted in an increase
of the degree of price coordination between the two food-retailers offering the same
level of service quality. However, Kwik Save does not seem to react to Tesco's LPG.
Furthermore, whereas after the start of the LPG the price of the basket of products
included in the guarantee follows a decreasing trend at Tesco, for Kwik Save it shows an
increasing trend. The result of these opposite trends in the post-guarantee period is an
increase of the divergence between the prices of the basket of products included in the
guarantee. This result clearly indicates that service quality is actually segmenting the
market and that even for LQs and independently of location, competition is much more
intense between food-retailers offering the same level of service quality than between
food-retailers offering different levels of service quality.
. These findings result of great importance to define the relevant market to analyse
food-retailer competition. Although service quality seems to be more determinant to
segment the market for BPs than for LQs, the analysis of the differential effects of the
LPGs rises serious doubts about the convenience of considering supermarkets and dis-
counter as forming part of a unique food-retailers relevant market. Likely supermarkets
and discounters compete in two markets with different levels of service quality. Fur-
thermore, the results suggest that the common custom to this two markets is quite
small.
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B. Testing Proposition 1
This appendix consists of two parts. In the first part we describe the Friedman test
and give the reasons to use it. In the second part, we explain the complete testing
procedure for Proposition 1. We carry out this testing procedure for each one of the
products of the sample both for BPs and LQs.
1. Description of the Friedman Test
This non-parametric test should be used to detect differences in average between
more than two samples when observations are related in some way across the samples.
In our particular case, we have 27 fortnightly observations for the price of product j at
three food-retailers. The observations in the three samples are not independent, but
are related by a common feature: the fortnight in which they were taken.
For the Friedman test we consider each one of the K samples as a column with
the related observations located in the same row of each one of the columns ( in our
case, the price samples of product j for each one of the three food-retailers should
be considered as a column, with the observations corresponding to a given fortnight
t located in the same row of each one of the three columns). Then, the observations
within each row are ranked from 1 to K. The M statistic can be obtained as
12M = 	 — 3N(K + 1)NK(K + 1)
where:
Rj is the sum of ranks in column j and N is the number of observations (the
number of observations is equal in each one of the columns). The null hypothesis of no
difference in the average level of the variable under analysis is rejected if M > XL-1.
Some correction is needed in presence of ties. A full description of the test can be
found in Neave and Worthington [1988]
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2. Testing procedure for Proposition 1
This testing procedure consists of two parts:
Step 1: Friedman Test
In this first step, we use the Friedman test for more than two related samples to test
if there is any difference between the average prices set by Tesco, Sainsbury and Kwik
Save for each one of the products of the sample. Formally, the null and alternative
hypotheses of this test for product i are:
Ho: There is no difference in the average prices set by Sainsbury, Tesco and Kwik
Save for the quality variant k of product i.
H1 : There are some differences in the average prices set by Sainsbury, Tesco and
Kwik Save for the quality variant k of product i.
For those products for which the null hypothesis is not rejected, we conclude that on
average there is no difference between the prices set at the three food-retailers and halt
the testing sequence. For those products for which the null hypothesis is rejected, we
proceed to the second step of the testing procedure to establish a rank of food-retailers
prices.
Step 2: Dunn's multiple comparisons technique
The next step for those products for which the Friedman test led to reject the null
hypothesis of no difference between the average prices set by the three food retailers is to
check using as basis food-retailers pairs which food-retailer price is different from which.
We perform this analysis by means of the Dunn's multiple comparisons procedure.
The three sets of hypotheses for this multiple comparisons test are:
Ilkl' ic) : Food-retailers J and K set the same average price for the quality variant
k of product i
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H(j'ic) : Food-retailers J and K set different average price for the quality variant ki
of product i
with (J,K)= (KW,SA), (KW,TE), (TE,SA).
With the results of this multiple comparisons test and the sum of ranks for each one
of the food-retailers obtained as an intermediate output of this test, we can establish
a rank of supermarket prices
Let us use as an example the results of the test that correspond to the BP Cola
to illustrate the procedure. The results of the test for BP Cola are summarized in the
Table below as:
M CV 5% RKW RSA RTE T KW—SA TKW—TE TSA—TE CV 30
BP COLA 49.368
	 6.4	 29	 67	 66	 5.171	 5.035
	 0.136	 1.64,!
For the BP Cola the value of the Friedman statistic (M) leads to reject the null
hypothesis of equal prices on average for the three supermarkets (even at 1% level)
and it is evidence of some difference in the average price set by BP Cola at the three
food-retailers. Therefore the next step is to check by means of the Dunn's procedure
which food-retailer average price is different from which. The joint consideration of the
- values of the sums of ranks RKW, RSA and RTE and the statistics TKW-SA, TKW-TE and
TsA_TE are evidence of similar average prices for the BP Cola at Tesco and Sainsbury
that are significantly higher than the price at Kwik Save (the null hypothesis of each
one of the comparisons is rejected if T j_K is greater than the critical value).
Although the reasons to use a 30% significance level were already described in
Appendix B of Chapter 4 (when the Dunn's procedure was explained), we briefly
1
remember them here. If we were carrying a single test, the probability would be —2a,
1however with the Dunn's procedure we are performing —2 k(k-1) tests. In order to share
out the risk equally between these tests the appropriate probability is —1 a/-1 k(k —1) =2 2
a/k (k — 1) .
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On the basis of this rule with k = 3, we choose an a = 30%. The z that corresponds
to an upper probability a/k (k —1) = 0.05 is 1.645 . Therefore, we will reject the null
hypothesis when ITii l >1.645.
In Table Al and A2 we show the results of the Friedman test and the Dunn's
multiple comparisons procedure both for BPs and LQs.
Table Al: Friedman Test and Dunn's Multiple Comparisons Test. BP. Full sample.
M Signif	 KW SA	 TIE TKW-SA TKW-TE TSA-TE CV 30%
BB 45,750 0,000 29 67	 66 5,171 5,035 0,136 1,645
BEER 22,463 0,000 39 66,5	 56,5 3,742 2,381 1,360 1,645
BLE 22,533 0,000 67 47,5	 47,5 2,653 2,653 0,000 1,645
BRIE 18,420 0,000 36,5 63,5	 62 3,674 3,470 0,204 1,645
CAT 53,365 • 0,000 27 67	 68 5,443 5,779 0,136 1,645
COC 49,368 0,000 29 67	 66 5,171 5,035 0,136 1,645
COF 30,687 0,000 33,5 66,5	 62 4,491 3,878 0,612 1,645
CON. 35,473 0,000 33 62	 67 . 3,946 4,627 0,680 1,645
CORN 19,419 0,000 44 58,5	 59,5 1,973 2,109 0,136 1,645
CP 16,000 0,000 46 60	 58 2,177 1,905 0,272 1,645
CS 49,560 0,000 28 66	 68 5,171 5,443 0,272 1,645
CS1 53,355 0,000 81 40	 41- 5,579 5,443 0,136 1,645
CT	 • • 33,363 .0,000 32 67	 63 4,762 4,218 0,544 1,645
DE 44,355 0,000 29 . 72	 61 5,851 4,354 1,496 1,645
DO 38,847 0,000 31 61,5	 69,5 4,151 5,239 1,088 1,645
FIS 48,667 0,000 28 65	 69 5,035 5,579 0,544 1,645
FLO 39,511 0,000 30,5 62,5	 69 4,354 5,239 0,885 1,645
FRO 14,000 0,001 48 66,5	 47,5 2,517 0,068 2,585 1,645
GEL 24,796 0,000 34,5 65,5	 62 4,219 3,742 0,476 1,645
ICE 28,451 0,000 33 64,5	 64,5 4,287 4,287 0,000 1,645
KET • 54,000 0,000 27 67,5	 67,5 5,511 .5,511 0,000 1,645
KITC 50,273 0,000 27 65	 . 70 5,171 5,851 0,680 1,645
KIT 27,846 0,000 37 .52,75
	 72,5 2,109 4,830 2,722 1,645
MAR 39,102 0,000 31,5 64,5	 .	 66,5 :4,422 4,762 0,340 1,645
MAY - 47,929 0,000 28 65,5	 68,5 5,103 5,511 0,408 1,645
ORA 41,247 0,000 30 63,5	 68,5 4,550 5,239 0,686 , 1,645
OVE 4,261 0,119 49 62	 51
PAS 31,659 0,000 32 62 •
	 68 4,0824 4,899 0,816 1,645
PEA 49,235 0,000 81 41,5	 39,5 5,375 5,647 0,2721 1,645
RIC 0,626 0,731 53 53	 52,5
SAL 32,830 0,000 32 66,5 -	 63,5 4,694 4,286 *0,4082 1,645
SAN 39,783 0,000 31 61,5	 69,5 4,15 5,239 1,088 1,645
SHA 33,300 - 0,000 33 66	 .	 63 4,49 4,082 0,408 1,645
SMO 51,441 0,000 27 65	 70 5,171 5,854 0,68 1,645
SOAP 52,795 0,000 27 66,5 .	 68,5 5,375 5,647 0,272 1,645
SPA 45,358 0,000 29 78	 55 6,668 3,538 3,129 1,645
- . STRA 40,085 0,000 29 68	 65 5,3072 4,899 0,4028 1,645
. TEA • 53,365 0,000 27 68	 67 5,5793 5,443 0,136 1,645
•	 TIS 54,000 0,000 27 67,5	 67,5 5,5511 . 5,511 2,394 1,645
TOT 38,000 0,000 31,5 63	 . 67,5 4,286 4,898 0,162 1,645
TO 20,583 0,000 36 65	 61 3,946 3,402 0,544 1,645
TU. 31,431 . 0,000 31 67,5	 63,5 4,967 4,422 0,544 1,645
WAL 16,701 0,000 70,5 41	 50,5 4,014 2,721 1,2927 1,645
WU 26,380 0,000 35 61	 66 3,538 4,128 0,68 1,645
WP	 • 39,747 0,000 30 66,5	 65,5 4,967 4,83 0,136 1,645
•	 YO 34,879 0,000 31 65,5	 65,5 4,694 4,694 0 1,645
254
Table A2: Friedman Test and Dunn's Multiple Comparisons Test. LQ. Full sample
M Sign	 KW SA TE T KW-SA TKW-TE T SA-TE CV 30%
BB 12,400 0,002 50 62,5 49,5 1,701 0,068 1,769 1,645
BEER 50,296 0,000 27 56 79 3,946 7,076 3,130 1,645
BLE 42,522 * 0,000 29 62 71 4,491 5,715 1,225 1,645
BRE	 .28,744 0,000 34 67 61 4,491 3,674 0,816 1,645
CAT 32,667 0,000 33 64,5 64,5 4,287 4,287 0,000 1,645
COC 23,918 0,000 37,5 66 58,5 3,878 2,858 1,021 1,645
COF 50,818 0,000 27 71 64 5,988 5,035 0,953 1,645
CON. 44,963 0,000 77 57 28 2,722 6,668 3,946 1,645
CORN . 52,095 0,000 27 67 68 5,443 5,579 0,136 1,645
CF 20,000 0,000 64 49 49 2,041 2,041 0,000 1,645
CS 39,402 0,000 44,5 79 38,5 4,695 0,816 5,511 1,645
CS1 27,724 0,000 43 70 49 3,674 0,816 2,858 1,645
CT • - 17,526 0,000 48 64,5 . . 49,5 2,245 0,204 2,041 1,645
DE 1,212 0,546 55,5 49,5 57
DO 16,286 0,000 39 60 63 2,858 3,266 0,408 1,645
FIS 1,153 0,562
FLO 9,892 0,007 47. 60,5 54,5 1,837 1,021 0,816 1,645
FRO 4,598 0,100 45,5 59,5 57
GEL 52,095 0,000 27 68 67 5,579 5,443 0,136 1,645
ICE 13,634 0,001 40,5 62,5 59 2,994 2,518 0,476 1,645
KET • 41,152 0 1000 28 65,5 68,5 5,103 5,511 0,408 1,645
KITC 2,154 0,341 58 49 55.
KIT 29,936 0,000 62,5 . 67 32,5 0,612 4,082 4,695 1,645
MAR 8,361 0,015 48,5 . 64 49,5 2;109 0,136 1,973 1,645
MAY - 1,238 0,538 -57 50 55
ORA 4,542 0,103 50,5 60 51,5
OVE 37,514 . 0,000 37,5 79,5 45 5,715 1,021 4,695 1,645
PAS 44,408 0,000 - 27 62,5 72,5 4,831 6,192 1,361 1,645
PEA 21,765 0,000 64 61,5 . 36,5 0,340 3,742 3,402 -1,645
RIC 38,273 0,000 33,5 65 63,5 4,287 4,082 0,204 1,645
SAL 40,821 0,000 29 70,5 62,5 5,647 4,559 1,089 1,645
SAN 2,508 0,285 57,5 55,5 49
SHA 13,127 0,001 64,5 51,5 .46 1,769 2,518 0,748 1,645
SMO 13 , 127 : 0,001 64,5 51,5 46 . 1,769 2,518 0,748 1,645
SOAP. 43,600 0,000 34,5 79 .48,5 6,056 1,905 4,151 1,645
SPA 15,500 0,000 43 61 58 2,449 2,041 0,408 1,645
-.STRA 5,702 0,058 47 63 52
_ TEA - 49,279 0,000 39 80,5 42,5 5,647 0,476 5,171 1,645
-TIS 44,000 0,000 32 65 . 65 4,491 4,491 0,000 1,645
TOT 52,699 0,000 . 81 . 40,5 40,5 5,511 -5;511 0,000 1,645
TO 48,667 0,000 27 78 57 6,940 4,082 2,858 1,645
TU 28,778 .0,000 38 60,5 63,5 3,062 3,470 0,408 1,645
WAL 25,387 0,000 39,5 67,5 55 3,810 2,109 1,701 1,645
WU 15,846 0,000 61,5 62 38,5 0,068 3,130 3,198 1,645
WP 50,400 0,000 . 27 72 63 6,124 4,899 1,225 1,645
YO 23,565 0,000 39,5 68 54,5 3,878 2,041 1,837 1,645
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C. Testing Proposition 1 for the period before the LPG
With the aim of showing that the results obtained when testing Proposition 1 are
not a consequence of the LPG offered by Tesco from Fortnight 16 onwards, we replicate
the empirical analysis of Proposition 1 using as sample period the 15 fortnights before
the start of the LPG.
The results obtained can be summarized in the following tableu
Table 7.1a: Testing Proposition 1 in the Pre-guarantee period. Summary Table
BPs LQs
PSA > PTE > PKW 1 2
PSA R'-' PTE > PKW 34 19
PSA'''' PTE ''''-=' PKW 5 6
PSA > PTE ''-''' PKW 1 9
PTE > PSA > PKW 1 2
PKW > PSA > PTE 0 0
PKW ^'.' PSA > PTE 0 5
PKW > PSA 1^ PTE 4 2
PTE > PSA '-' PKW 0 1
In order to show that the results do not depend on the sample period analysed,
we check if there is any association between distribution of supermarket price ranks
• and period of analysis. In order to do this, we build two contingency tables, one for
the BPs and another one for the LQs. The rows of the BPs contingency table are the
distributions of supermarkets price ranks of the BPs for the full period and the period
before the start of the LPG. By analogy, the rows of the LQs contingency table are
the distributions of supermarket price ranks for the LQs for the full period and the
period before the start of the LPG. In these two contingency tables, we test the null
hypothesis of no association between period of analysis and distribution of supermarket
price ranks.
23 The numbering of the tables correpond to that of the general body of the paper, we have added
an "a" to the number to mean an Appendix table.
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Table: 7.1b24 Contingency table association test. Full vs pre-guarantee sample
period
Pearson-x2 D. of F. Significance
BPs Full vs. Pre-guarantee samples 1.418	 5	 0.922
LQs Full vs. Pre-guarantee samples 3.795	 8	 0.875
As it is possible to observe in Table 7.1b, in both cases the null hypothesis of no
association is not rejected. Therefore, it is evidence (both for the BPs and LQs) in
favour of a common distribution of price ranks for the full and pre-guarantee periods.
We use also a contingency table to check, as we did for the full period sample, the
null hypothesis of no association between quality variant and distribution of supermar-
ket price ranks. The rows of this contingency table correspond to the columns of Table
7.1a.
Table 7.2a: Contingency Table Association test
Pearson-x2 D. of F. Significance
BPs-LQs 18.070	 7	 0.012
As for the full period, for the period before the start of LPG the test of associa-
tion leads to reject the null hypothesis of no association between quality variant and
distribution of supermarket price ranks. Therefore, the results obtained using the pre-
-guarantee period sample are identical to those obtained using the full-period sample.
The results of the battery of Friedman and Dunn's multiple comparisons tests for
BPs and LQs for the period before the start of the LPG are shown in Tables A3 to A4.
24 As this table does not appear on the main body of the paper we number the table as the one
before but we add the "b" to distinguish it from 7.1a.
Table A3: Friedman Test and Dunn's Multiple Comparisons Test. BP. Fortnights 1-15 
M CV 5% RKw RSA RTE T KW-SA TKW-TE TSA-TE CV 30%
BB 19.455 6.4 17 37 36 3.651 3.469 0.183 1.645
BEER 9.991 6.4 21 35.5 33.5 2.647 2.282 0.365 1.645
BLE 7.056 6.4 37 26.5 26.5 1.917 1.917 0.000 1.645
BRE. 11.359	 • 6.4 20 32.5 37.5 2.282 3.195 0.913 1.645
CAT 25.889 6.4 15 37 38 . 4.017 4.199 0.183 1.645
COO 25.889 6.4 15 38 37 - 4.199 4.017 0.183 1.645
COF 14.832 6.4 19 39 32 3.651 2.373 1.278 1.645
CON 14.860 6.4 19 33 38 2.556 3.469 0.913 1.645
CORN 0.851 6.4 28 30,5 31.5
CP 11.548 6.4 21 35.5 33.5 2.647 2.282 0.365 1.645
CS 22.672 6.4 16 36 38 3.651 4.017 0.365 1.645
CS1 25.889 6.4 45. 22 23 4:199 4.017 0.183 1.645
CT 18.582. 6.4 17 37.5 35.5 3.743 3.378 0.365 1.645
DE 23.846 6.4 16	 . 41.5 32.5 4.656 3.012 1.643 1.645
DO 21.409 6.4 16.5 35 38.5 3.378 4.017 0.639 1.645
FIS 22.672 6.4 16 36 38 3.651 4.017 0.365 1.645
FLO
FRO
21.179
11.115
6.4
6.4
16.5
26.5
35.5
39
38
24.5
3.469
2.282
3.925
0.365
0.456
2.647
1.645
1.645
GEL 7.584 6.4 21.5 34.5 34 2.373 2.282 0.091 1.645
ICE 22.623 6.4 16 38.5 35.5 4.108 3.560 0.548 1.645
KET 26.129 6.4 .15 37.5 37.5 4.108 4.108 0.000 1.645
KITC 26.129 6.4 15 37.5 37.5 4.108 4.108 0.000 1.645
KIT .14.694 6.4 20 30 •	 40 1.826 3.651 1.826 1.645
MAR 13.874 6.4 19.5 33.5 37 2.556 3.195 0.639 1.645
MAY 25.889 6.4 15 - 37 • - 38 4.017 4.199 0.183 1.645
ORA 1 9.3e.4- C)..4 17 35.5 z,T. 3,378 3.743 0.365 1.645
OVE - 2.D29 29 33 28
PAS 21.312 6.4 16 36 38 3.651 4.017 0.365 1.645
PEA 24.202 6.4 45 23.5 21.5 . 3.925 4.290 0.365 1.645
RIO 4.420 6.4 34 24.5 31.5
SAL 13.782 6.4 19 37.5 33.5 • 3.378 2.647 0.730 1.645
SAN - 16.181 6.4 19 31.5 39.5- 2.282 3.743 1.461 1.645
SHA 11.285 6.4 •	 21 37.5 .31.5 3.012 1.917 1.095 1.645
SMO 25.645 - 6.4 •	 15 35.5 39.5 3.743 4.473 0.730 1.645
SOAP 26.129 6.4 15 37.5 37.5- 4.108 4.108 0.000 1.645
SPA 23.652 6.4. 17 43.5 29.5 4.838 2.282 2.556 1.645
STRA 26.682. 6.4 . 15 42 33 - 4.930 3.286 1.643 1.645
TEA	 - 25.889 6.4 15 - 38 37 4.199 4.017 0.183 1.645
TIS •	 26.129 6.4 •	 15 37.5 37.5 4.108 4.108 0.000 1.645
TOI 20.949 6.4 16.5 36.5 37 .	 3.651 3.743 0.091 1.645
TO• 5:400 6.4 23 -35 32
TU 26.169 6.4 15 33 42 3.286 4.930 1.643 1.645
WAL .15.092 6.4 42 25 23 3.104 3.469 0.365 1.645
WU 6.177 6.4 23 31.5 35.5
WP 19.050 6.4 17 -	 36 37 . 3.469 3.651 0.183 1.645
YO 12.847 6.4 19 36 35 3.104 2.921 0.183 1.645
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Table A4: Friedman Test and Dunn's Multiple Comparisons Test. LQ. Fortnights 1-15
M CV 5% RKW RSA RTE TKW-SA TKW-TE TSA-TE CV 30%
BB 8.820 6.4 27 38 25 2.008 0.365 2.373 .1.645
BEER 30.000 6.4 15 30 45 2.739 5.477 2.739 1.645
BLE 22.165 6.4 17 0 42 2.556 4.564 2.008 1.645
BRE 7.635 6.4 22 33.5 34.5 2.100 2.282 0.183 1.645
CAT 14.052 6.4 19 35.5 • 35.5 3.012 3.012 0.000 1.645
COC 7.577 6.4 24.5 37.5 28 2.373 0.639 1.734 1.645
COF 26.129	 - 6.4 15 37.5
.
37.5 4.108 4.108 0.000 1.645
CON 21.733 6.4 41 33
.
16 1.461 4.564 3.104 - 1.645
CORN 25.350 6.4 15 37 38 4.017 4.199 0.183 1.645
CP 8.862 6.4 38 26 26 2.191 2.191 0.000 1.645
CS 18.415 6.4 26 43 21 3.104 .0.913 4.017 1.645
CS1 21.174 6.4. 23 43.5 23.5 3.743 0.091 3.651 1.645
CT 6.419 6.4 27 37 26 1.826 0.183 2.008 1.645
DE 0.707 6.4 32 30.5 27.5
DO 1.072 6.4 27 31 32
FIS 17.157 6.4 18 38 34 3.651 2.921 0.730 1.645
FLO 14.115 6.4 21.5 . 37.5 31.5 - 2.921 1.826 1.095 1.645
FRO 18.489 6.4 18.5 30 41.5. 2.100 4.199 2.100 1.645
GEL 25.350 6.4 . 15 38 37 • 4.199 4.017 0.183 1.645
ICE 14.863 .6.4 18.5 - 38 33.5 3.560 2.739 0.822 1.645
KET 22.291 6.4 16 39.5 34.5 4.290 3.378 0.913 1.645
KITC
KIT
13.855
13.826
6.4 29.5
•6.4	 32.5
20.5
38
40
19.5
•	 1.643
1.004
1.917
2.373
3.560
3.378
1.645
1.645
MAR 19.350 6.4 21.5 43.5 25 .4.017 0.639 3.378 •1.645
MAY 19.410 6.4 34.5 17 38.5 3.195. 0.730 3.925 1.645
ORA 2.352 6.4 31.5 32.5 26
OVE 20.133 6.4 21 44 25 4.199 0.730 3.469 1.645
AS 24.850 6.4 15 34.5 40.5 3.560 4.656
.
1.095 1.645
PEA 20.016 6.4 40 33 17 1.278 4.199 2.921 1.645
RIC 13.846 6.4 20 35 35 2.739 2.739 1.645
SAL 18.965 6.4 17 35.5 37.5 3.378 3.743 0.365 1.645
SAN 6.028 6.4 36 24 30
SHA 0.720 6.4 29 29 32
SMO 14.837 6.4 18 37.5 34.5 3.560 3.012 6.548 1.645
SOAP 21.738 6.4 18 43 29 4.564 2.008 2.556 1.645
SPA 0.720 6.4 29 32 29
STRA 9.459 6.4 21 37 32 2.921 2.008 0.913 1.645
TEA 25.714 6.4 20 45 25 4.564 0.913 3.651 1.645
TIS 23.520 6.4 16 37 37 3.834 3.834 0.000 1.645
TOI 25.579 6.4 45 22.5 22.5 4.108 4.108 0.000 1.645
TO 25.200 6.4 15 •	 42 33 4.930 3.286 1.643 1.645
TU 23.520 6.4 16 37 37 3.834 3.834 0.000 .	 1.645
WAL 19.029 6.4 18 39.5 32.5 3.925 2.647 1.278 1.645
WO 9.232 6.4 32.5 36.5 21 0.730 2.100 . 2.830 1.645
WP 26.129 6.4 15 37.5 37.5 4.108 4.108 0.000 1.645
YO 20.329 6.4 18 42 30 4.382 2.191 2.191 1.645
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D: Figures of the LPG analysis
Figure 7.2: RELPRI (TE) Actual and Fitted Values
RELPRI(TE)
Figure 7.3: RELPRI (SA) Actual and Fitted Values
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Figure 7.4: RELPRI(KW) Actual and Fitted Values
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Figure 7.5 : PUNB(TE) Actual and Fitted Values
Figure 7.6: PNOUNB(TE) Actual and Fitted Values
Figure 7.7: PUNB(SA) Actual and Fitted Values
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Figure 7.8: PNOUNB(SA) Actual and Fitted Values
Figure 7.10: UNB(KW) Actual and Fitted values
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Figure 7.11: PNOUNB(KW) Actual and Fitted Values
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E. Reduced Sample Analysis
Motivated by the lack of weights when building the basket of products included
(UNB) and not included in the LPG (NOUNB), the aim of this Appendix is to
show the robustness of the results to the subset of products included in the sample.
With respect to the sample used in the general body of the paper (full sample), we
exclude here the categories of alcoholic products (beer) and toiletries (deodorant, hair
shampoo, shower gel, toothpaste, sanitary towels, soap). The reason for this exclusion
is that this is the subset of products for which interpurchase time is longer and/or
tastes more important in the buying decision.
The numbering of the Tables in this Appendix corresponds to that of the general
body of the paper and an a is added to distinguish them.
Table 7.4a: Mann-Whitney Test for differences on average DDPMI. UNB-NOUNB 
Pre-guarantee	 Value of the test (U) • Critical Value 5% One/Two Sided
TE-SA 179
	 120.07
	 Two
TE-KW 158.5
	 119.83	 Two
Rejection of the Ho if U< CV5%
It is possible to observe in Table 7.4a that the results obtained do not differ from
the results obtained with the full sample. For the retailer Pair TE-SA, in the pre-
guarantee period there is no significant difference between the average DDPMI of
UNB and NOUNB (the null hypothesis is not rejected). Also for the retailer pair
TE-KW the null hypothesis of no difference on average between the DDPMI of UNB
and NOUNB is not rejected for the pre-guarantee period.
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Table 7.5a: Wilconxon Test for differences on average DDPMI. Pre-post guarantee
NOUNB	 T C.V. 5% CSS One/Two Sided
TF-SA 47 41	 17 One
TE-KW 43 47	 18 One 
UNB	 T C.V. 5% 
TE-SA 8 47	 18 One
TE-KW 37 60	 20 One
T: value of the test; CV 5%: Critical Value at 5% significance level
Rejection of Ho if T<CV 5%; Corrected Sample Size = Sample Size — Number of Zero
Differences
As for the full sample, the results shown in Table 7.5a for the retailer pair TE-SA
suggest that while for the NOUNB there is no difference in the average DDPMI
between the pre and post-guarantee period, for the UNB the DDP1VII is higher in
the post-guarantee period. However, for the retailer pair TE-KW both for UNB and
NOUNB products average DDPMI is higher in the post than in the pre-guarantee
period. As we say in the main text, the fact that average price coordination in the
post-guarantee period is higher both for the products included and not included in the
LPG rises doubts about the LPG as the factor causing the observed increase in price
coordination.
. Table 7.6a: Mann-Whitney Test for differences on average DDPMLUNB-NOUNB 
Post-guarantee	 Value of the test (U) Critical Value 5% One/Two Sided
TE-SA 105.5	 131	 One
TE-KW 141	 130.94	 One
Rejection of the Ho if U< CV5%
With respect to the situation in the post-guarantee period (Table 7.6a), on average
DDPMI between TE and SA is higher for UNB than for NOUNB products. However,
for the retailer pair TE-KW the situation does not change from the pre to the post-
guarantee periods: there is no difference in the degree of price coordination of UNB
and NOUNB.
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Table7.7a: Regression Analysis by store
Dependent Variable: RELPRgE
R2 = 62.10 R2 =-- 57.15
Coefficient Std. Error'
al 0.5364** 0.0058
a2 0.0466** 0.0086
01 0.0008 0.0008
02 -0.0017* 0.0009
apost 0.5830** 0.0060
/3 post -0.0010** 0.0003
Norm.	 0.7105 (0.701) 
Dependent Variable: RELPRIP
R2 = 72.99 112 = 69.47
Coefficient Std. Error"
a l 0.5149** 0.0067
a2 0.0739** 0.0089
01 0.0027** 0.0005
02 -0.0047** 0.0006
apost 0.5888** 0.0059
Opost -0.0020** 0.0003
Norm.
	 1.5773 (0.454) 
Dependent Variable: RELPRItl<147
R2 = 66.86 R2
 = 62.54 
Coefficient Std. Error'
al 0.6025**	 0.0109
a2 -0.0780**	 0.0117
01 -0.0033**	 0.0014
02 0.0072**	 0.0014
posa	 t 0.5245**	 0.0044
0 post 0.0039**	 0.0002
Norm. 0.1799 (0.914)
apost = al ± a2; /3 post = 01 ± 02
iNewey-West Standard Errors;** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.
With respect to the analysis of RELPRI trends for each one of the food retailers,
observation of Table 7.7a reveals that all the results obtained with the full sample are
confirmed when using the reduced sample. On the one hand the effect of Tesco's LPG
is to invert the trend of RELPRI (from increasing to decreasing) at each one of the
two high service quality retailers (supermarkets) considered in the analysis. On the
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other hand as for the full sample, RELPRIticw shows an increasing trend in the post-
guarantee period. This increasing trend starts as soon as Fortnight 9-10 of the sample
(Figure 7.4a).
Table 7.8a: PUNBt and PNOUNBt Regression Analysis by store
Dep. Var: PUNBTE
R2=25.32 R2=15.58
Dep. Var: PNOUNBP
R2 =83.16
	 R2=80.97
Coeff. Std. Error Coeff. Std. Error
al 773.8801** 6.9511 al 1442.1** 8.2317
az 2.9779 9.1278 a2 -110.2637** 28.7886
01 -1.1111 0.9493 01 -3.7548** 0.9053
02 0.3278 1.0097 02 4.8159** 1.5571
apost 776.8579** 5.1050 apost 1131.8** 27.5867
0 post -0.7832** 0.2178 0 post 1.0621 1.2669
Norm. 3.0419 (0.219)
Var: PUNBisA
Norm 0.2471 (0.884) 
PNOUNBPDep. Var:Dep.
R2 =83.02	 170=80.81 R2 =84.26	 R2=82.21
Coeff.	 Std. Error Coeff.	 Std. Error
al	 779.6818** 6.6892 al	1514.0**	 12.7747
a2	 105.813**3 10.7207 az	 -3.7358	 22.0380
01	 2.0822** 0.6062 01	 -3.3607**	 1.2486
02 -7.1893** 0.7505 02	 -0.5036	 1.5808
apost 885.4951** 7.8052 apost 1510.3**	 16.4999
0 post -5.1071** 0.3503 0 post -4.1643**	 0.7380
Norm. 0.6868 (0.709)
Dep. Var: PUNBrw
Norm. 1.9621 (0.375)
Dep. Var: PNOUNBrw
R2=67.43 112=63.19 R2 =71.57
	 .2=67.86
Coeff. Std. Error Coeff.	 Std. Error
al	759.4740** 7.7628 al	 1260.8**	 11.2543
a2	 -37.8345** 16.2673 a2 	 106.0333**	 27.8508
01	 0.5599 1.0623 01	 8.3902**	 1.5046
02	 2.8613** 1.2778 02	 -11.2022**	 1.8678
apost 721.6395**	 13.6821 apost 1366.8** 25.4756
0 post 3.4212**	 0.06069 0 post -2.8120** 1.1068
Norm. 0.2310 (0.891) Norm. 0.22612 (0.893)
apost = a l + a2; 0 post = 01 ± 02
1 Newey-West Standard Errors;" significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.
We show the results of the regression analysis of PUNB and PNOUNB for each
one of the food-retailers using the reduced sample in Table 7.8a. We start analysing
CHAPTER 7. SUPERMARKETS AND DISCOUNTERS 	 268
the trends followed by the prices of the baskets of UNB and NOUNB products at the
food-retailer offering the LPG. The analysis of these trends using the reduced sample
confirms that the trend followed by the price of the basket of UNB products at Tesco
is not modified by the LPG (the trend dummy of PUNBT E is not significant). With
respect to the trend dummy in the regression analysis of PNOUNBT E it is positive and
significant. The LPG changes the slope of PNOUNBTE
 from negative and significant
in the pre-policy period to negative but not significant in the post policy period.
As regards the results in the regression analysis of PUNBisA and PNOUNR7A,
the results obtained using the reduced sample confirm the results obtained when using
the full sample. First, PUNR7 A changes trend: from increasing in the pre-guarantee
period to decreasing in the post guarantee period. Second, the coefficient of the trend
dummy in the regression analysis of PNOUNR7A is not significant confirming that
Tesco's LPG did not affect significantly Sainsbury's price setting for the products not
included in the LPG.
As it is possible observe in Table 7.8a, the results obtained in the regression analysis
of PUNBrw and PNOUNBrw just confirm the results obtained when using the full
sample. The trend coefficient of PUNBrw is positive in both pre and post-guarantee
periods. The trend coefficient of PNOUNBrw is positive in the pre-guarantee period
and negative in the post-guarantee period, but again this change in trend seems to
happen in Fortnight 13, well before the start of the LPG (Figure 7.11a)
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Figures reduced sample analysis
Figure 7.4a: RELPRI (KW) Actual and Fitted Values
Figure 7.11a: PNOUNB(KW) Actual and Fitted Values
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F	 Products Included in the Sample
LPG	 PRODUCT
NO UNBEATABLES Canned Sweet Corn (Green Giant 340grs)	 CS1
Bleach (Domestos Bleach 21)	 BLE
Conditioner (Lenor Ultra Plus Fabric Conditioner 21) 	 CON
Kitchen Foil (Bacofoil 450mm x5m)	 KITC
Washing Powder (Ariel Future 2kgs) 	 WP
Washing Up Liquid (Fairy Excel Plus 500m1)	 WU
Beer (Heineken 330 ml) 	 BEER
Bread (Mighty White. 800 grs) 	 BRE
Cat Food (Whiskas 400grs)	 CAT
Coffee (Nescafe Gold 200grs) 	 COF
Dog Food (Chum Original Large 400gr) 	 DO
Frozen Peas (Birds Eye 340 grs) 	 FRO
Ice Cream (Walls Vanilla 750grs) 	 ICE
Oven Chips (McCain 1810 grs)	 OVE
Pasta Sauce (Dolmio Pasta sauce Original 475 grs) 	 PAS
Salad Dressing (Heinz Salad Dressing 285 grs)	 SAL
Tea (PG Tips 250 grs)	 TEA
Tuna in Oil (John West 200grs ) 	 •	 TU
Yogourth (Muller Strawberry 200 grs)	 YO
Orange Juice (Del Monte 1 L)	 ORA
Deodorant (Sure 24 hours Apa 150 ml )	 DE
Hair Shampoo (Timotei Herbs Shampoo 400grs) 	 SHA
Shower Gel (Imperial Leather 500m1) 	 GEL
Toothpaste (Colgate Total 100m1)	 TO 
UNBEATABLE	 Baked Beans in Tomato Sauce (Heinz 425 grs)	 BB
Canned Peas (Hartley's Garden Peas)	 CP
Canned Spaghetti (Heinz 200 grs) CS
Canned Tomatoes (Napolina Chopped Tomatoes 400grs) CT
Kitchen Towel ( Sterling Luxury Kitchen Towel Twin Pa) KIT
Tissues (Ultra 90. Kleenex) 	 TIS
Toilet Roll (Twin Andrex 4) 	 TOI
Cornflakes (Kellogs Cornflakes 500grs) 	 CORN
Fish Fingers (10 Birds Eye) 	 FIS
Flour (Homepride Flour 1,5kgs)	 FLO
Ketchup (Heinz 340grs)
	
KET
Margarine (Flora 500 grs)	 MAR
Mayonneise (Hellmans, 400 grs)	 MAY
Peach Halves in Natural Juice ( Del Monte 415 grs) 	 PEA
Rice (Uncle Ben Long Grain Rice 1 kg)	 RIC
Smoked Back (Danepack 8s) 	 SMO
Spaghetti (Buitoni 500grs)	 SPA
Strawberry Jam (Robertson 454 grs) 	 STRA
Walkers Crisps (Variety Multipack. 6 packs) 	 WAL
Coca-Cola (2 1)	 COC
Sanitary towels (Always 16) 	 SAN
Soap (Dove 250 grs )	 SOAP
Chapter 8
Concluding Remarks
Food-retailing competition is a hot regulatory topic in the UK The aim of this PhD
dissertation has been to analyse the patterns of food retailing price setting and its
implications over competition.
Our work sheds light about the importance of considering the UK supermarkets not
only as a multiproduct firm but also as a multiquality firm. Ignoring that supermarkets
offer three quality variants for most of their products can be the cause of misleading
results when analysing competition.
Possibilities of product differentiation are not homogeneous across quality variants.
These differences in product differentiation possibilities arise as a key factor to deter-
mine supermarket patterns of price setting. Supermarket price competition seems to
be inversely related to product differentiation possibilities. It is in this context that the
successful development of a wide line of high quality own brand products provides a de-
terminant element to explain the high profitability of the UK supermarkets. Whereas
branded products and low-quality own brand products are almost homogeneous across
supermarkets, high quality own brand products offer a big scope for product differen-
tiation.
Supermarkets can use these greater possibilities of product differentiation for the
high-quality own brand products to create loyalty. If customer perceive the high-
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quality own brand products of each one of the supermarkets as different products,
they will not be indifferent between buying a given high quality own brand product
in any supermarket. They will systematically buy in the supermarket selling the own
brand product they prefer. Once in the supermarket, the consumers will buy a whole
assortment of goods (one stop shopping is predominant in modern societies) very likely
consisting of branded products, high and low-quality own brand products. Therefore,
differentiation of the high-quality own brand product can relax between supermarket
competition not only for the own variant but also for the other variants the supermarket
sells.
UK supermarkets ability to develop a successful line of high-quality own brand
products has clear implication on the current debate about the high profitability of the
UK supermarkets in comparison with their continental counterparts. It seems quite
evident that the UK supermarkets enjoy significant buyer power (specially in their
bargaining with the own brand product producers). But it also should be considered
that the characteristics of the UK own brand product phenomenon have no parallel
in the Continent where most of the supermarket chains have followed a low quality
approach for their own brand product programmes. Therefore, not only the exercise of
buyer power but also the ability of developing a highly successful own brand product
programme should be factors taken into account when analysing the high profits of the
UK supermarkets.
The multiproduct nature of the UK supermarkets should be carefully considered
when analysing the possible effects of low-price guarantees over competition. When
low-price guarantees are offered by multiproduct firms, as UK supermarkets, they are
not necessarily an instrument addressed to ease tacit collusion. Multiproduct firms
can use these guarantees as low-price signalling devices forming part of advertising
strategies. The results obtained when analysing Tesco's Unbeatable Value low-price
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guarantee suggested a possible association between this low-price guarantee and a
loss-leaders strategy. This is just a clear example of how the multiproduct character
of supermarket chains increases dramatically the complexity of the analysis of price
competition for regulatory authorities.
The definition of the relevant market is of crucial importance when analysing com-
petition. In UK food retailing the determination of the relevant market implies to
analyse if supermarkets compete with discounters. The main element that distin-
guishes supermarkets and discounters is the different level of service quality provided.
This differential in service quality arises in our analysis as an element segmenting the
market. The high service quality provided by supermarkets isolates them from the com-
petition of the low service quality discounters. Very likely, UK competition authorities
when analysing competition in food retailing should carefully consider the ability of
service quality differentials to segment the market before considering supermarkets and
discounters as forming part of a unique relevant market.
Finally, let me mention one shortcoming of this PhD dissertation and point to future
lines of analysis. This research has been carried out with a reduced database of prices
for a particular local area. Future research of competition in food retailing should be
performed using databases providing data both about prices and quantities. Likely the
use of scanner data would provide us with a much clear understanding of competition
in food retailing. The use of scanner data including information about prices and
quantities would make possible to carry out studies using as basis the discrete choice
models of product differentiation already used in the car or the computer markets.
However, scanner data is expensive and difficult to get. Supermarkets aware of its
value sell them to a few consultancies imposing restrictive conditions of use and resale.
With respect to the analysis of low-price guarantees I am already involved in a
project aimed to check the predictions of the different theoretical models making use
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of experiments. Although not analysed in this paper, there is a large stream of literature
that considers the possibility of using low-price guarantees as a price discrimination
device. Low price guarantees could allow firms to discriminate between informed and
uninformed consumers. The main aim of this project is to test by means of experi-
ments the ability of low price guarantees to price discriminate between informed and
uninformed consumers and its impact over retailer prices and profits.
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